Beef up Your Competitor: A Model of Advertising Cooperation between Internet Search Engines

We propose a duopoly model of competition between internet search engines endowed with different technologies and study the effects of an agreement where the more advanced firm shares its technology with the inferior one. We show that the superior firm enters the agreement only if it results in a large enough increase in demand for advertising space at the competing .rm and a relatively small improvement of the competitor's search quality. Although the superior firm gains market share, the agreement is beneficial for the inferior firm, as the later firm's additional revenues from a higher advertising demand outweigh its losses due to a smaller user pool. The cooperation is likely to be in line with the advertisers' interests and to be detrimental to users' welfare.Search Engine, Two-Sided Market, Advertising, Strategic Complements, Technology

Pemilihan Pembiayaan KPR (Kredit Pemilikan Rumah) Dengan Akad Murabahah (Studi Kasus Di Bank Muamalat Tbk Cabang Pembantu Samarinda Seberang)

Having your own home is the dream of all people, even being the basic human needs that must be met. But most people cannot afford to buy with cash to buy in installments or credit and the bank Muamalat itself, provided a variety of KPRS that can be selected according to the needs and interest free. Having your own home is no longer a difficult one, because there are the housing loans granted by banks commonly called mortgage (KPR). Bank Muamalat was present meet the demand of people with the name Residential Syariah financing from Bank Muamalat is a financing facility for residential property in accordance with Islamic principles. Thatneeds with of the community in the ownership of the house in installment and in accordance with Islamic principles. The purpose of this study to determine Factors Influencing the Customer in choosing a mortgage with AkadMurabaha Financing. This study concluded that the factors Customers Choose AkadMurabaha Financing mortgages with Religion is a factor, Factor Location Factor, Friends, Ad Factors, Economic Factors, Care Factor

Technology licensing by advertising supported media platforms: An application to internet search engines

We develop a duopoly model with advertising supported platforms and analyze incentives of a superior firm to license its advanced technologies to an inferior rival. We highlight the role of two technologies characteristic for media platforms: The technology to produce content and to place advertisements. Licensing incentives are driven solely by indirect network effects arising fromthe aversion of users to advertising. We establish a relationship between licensing incentives and the nature of technology, the decision variable on the advertiser side, and the structure of platforms' revenues. Only the technology to place advertisements is licensed. If users are charged for access, licensing incentives vanish. Licensing increases the advertising intensity, benefits advertisers and harms users. Our model provides a rationale for technology-based cooperations between competing platforms, such as the planned Yahoo-Google advertising agreement in 2008. --Technology Licensing,Two-Sided Market,Advertising

Beef up your competitor: a model of advertising cooperation between internet search engines

We propose a duopoly model of competition between internet search engines endowed with different technologies and study the effects of an agreement where the more advanced firm shares its technology with the inferior one. We show that the superior firm enters the agreement only if it results in a large enough increase in demand for advertising space at the competing .rm and a relatively small improvement of the competitor's search quality. Although the superior firm gains market share, the agreement is beneficial for the inferior firm, as the later firm's additional revenues from a higher advertising demand outweigh its losses due to a smaller user pool. The cooperation is likely to be in line with the advertisers' interests and to be detrimental to users' welfare

Joint Customer Data Acquisition and Sharing among Rivals

It is increasingly observable that in different industries competitors jointly acquire and share customer data. We propose a modified Hotelling model with two-dimensional consumer heterogeneity to analyze the incentives for such agreements and their welfare implications. In our model the incentives of firms for data acquisition and sharing depend on the willingness of consumers to switch brands. Firms jointly collect data on transportation cost parameters when consumers are relatively immobile between brands. However, the firms are unlikely to cooperatively acquire such data, when consumers are relatively mobile. Incentives to share information depend on the portfolio of data firms hold and consumer mobility. Data sharing arises with relatively mobile and immobile consumers - it is neutral for consumers in the former case, but reduces consumer surplus in the latter. Competition authorities ought to scrutinize such cooperation agreements on a case-by-case basis and devote special attention to consumer switching behavior.Information Sharing, Data Acquisition, Price Discrimination

Austausch von Kundendaten unter Konkurrenten: Graubereich im Wettbewerbsrecht

Informationstechnologien erlauben Firmen immer mehr persönliche Daten über ihre Kunden zu sammeln. Mit diesen Daten werden Kundenprofile erstellt über Vorlieben für bestimmte Marken, Zahlungsbereitschaft oder Wechselbereitschaft bei Preiserhöhungen. Zudem kommt es immer häufiger vor, dass Unternehmen, die in direktem Wettbewerb stehen, Daten über ihre Kunden untereinander austauschen. Beispiele hierzu finden sich in Europa wie auch den USA bei Fluglinien, Banken, Versicherungen oder im Einzelhandel. Eine neue Studie des DIW Berlin zeigt, wie sich das Sammeln und der Austausch von Kundendaten unter Konkurrenten theoretisch auf den Wettbewerb und die Wohlfahrt auswirken. Diese Fragestellung ist allein deshalb interessant, weil die Europäische Kommission im Augenblick die europäischen Leitlinien zur horizontalen Zusammenarbeit von konkurrierenden Unternehmen überarbeitet. Neue ökonomische Theorien beschäftigen sich mit Arten des Informationsaustauschs, welche im Graubereich des Wettbewerbsrechts liegen. Es handelt sich hierbei nicht um wettbewerbswidrige Absprachen im klassischen Sinne (Kollusion), sondern um eine Koordination, welche den Wettbewerb zwar aufrecht erhält, aber dennoch den Konsumenten schaden kann. Dies deutet daraufhin, dass die Kartellbehörden mehr Anstrengung in ein besseres Verständnis dieser Arten des Datenaustauschs investieren sollten

Consumer flexibility, data quality and targeted pricing

We investigate how firms' incentives to acquire customer data for targeted offers depend on its quality. A two-dimensional Hotelling model is proposed where consumers are heterogeneous both with respect to their locations and transportation cost parameters (flexibility). Firms have perfect data on the locations of consumers while data on their flexibility is imperfect. When consumers are relatively homogeneous in their flexibility, in equilibrium both firms acquire customer data regardless of its quality. This increases profits but harms consumers. When consumers are relatively differentiated in flexibility, data acquisition incentives depend on its quality. Only if the data is sufficiently precise, both firms acquire it and their profits decrease, while consumers are better-off. Our model has particular relevance for location-based marketing such as in mobile telephony, where firms have near-perfect information on the proximity of customers but may have imperfect knowledge of other consumer characteristics