WASTE TREATMENT FACILITY LOCATION FOR HOTEL CHAINS

Tourism generates huge amounts of waste. About half of the waste generated by hotels is food and garden bio-waste. This bio-waste can be used to make compost and pellets. In turn, pellets can be used as an absorbent material in composters and as an energy source. We consider the problem of locating composting and pellet-making facilities so that the bio-waste generated by a chain of hotels can be managed at or close to the generation points. An optimization model is applied to locate the facilities and allocate the waste and products, and several scenarios are analysed. The study shows that, depending on the transportation, treatment waste and production management costs, the installation of facilities is profitable for the hotel chain

The follower location problem with attraction thresholds

Abstract. In this research note, the follower location problem where the customers' choice is based on an attraction function is analysed. The attraction function depends on both the distance between customers and facilities, and the characteristics (quality) of the facilities. Customers at each node impose a minimum level of attraction in order to patronise a facility and then they share their buying power among the facilities that pass this threshold. The amount of demand captured by each of these facilities is proportional to the attraction perceived by the customers. In this case, a discretisation of this network problem is proved. JEL classification: L10, R3

Spatial competition in networks under delivered pricing *

Abstract. We consider a two-stage non-cooperative Bertrand game with location choice involving r firms. There are n spatially separated markets located at the vertices of a network. Each firm first selects the location of a facility and then selects the delivered price in the markets in order to maximise its profit. The article extends the duopolistic model with completely inelastic demand (Lederer and Thisse 1990) to the oligopolistic scenario. Under moderate assumptions, a pure strategy equilibrium, which minimises social costs, exists. Furthermore, an equilibrium location can be obtained by finite steps and consists of vertices only. JEL classification: L13, R32, D4

SAM elaboration as a multiobjective adjustment problem

When elaborating a SAM many data adjustments have to be made. In our study we assume we need to adjust the household data on income to the data on labor payments derived from the IO Table, assuming that the data on households is the one that needs to be adjusted. In this adjustment both the distribution of each labor income among the different household types and the distribution of the different labor incomes among each household type have to be simultaneously taken into account. We propose multicriteria optimization techniques to solve this problem and to find a set of efficient solutions. We then show different ways to rank or select between these efficient solutions. We include various examples to show the effects of applying different decision criteria

Cournot oligopolistic competition in spatially separated markets: The Stackelberg equilibrium

Consider a two-stage non-cooperative Cournot game with location choice involving r firms. There are n spatially separated markets located at the vertices of a network. Each firm, first selects the location of a facility and then selects the quantities to supply to the markets in order to maximize its profit. Non-zero conjectural variation at the second stage in the model by Sarkar et al. (1997) is studied. When the demand in each market is sufficiently large, equilibrium in the quantities offered by each firm in the markets exists. Furthermore, each firm chooses to locate its facility at the vertices. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004L13, R30,

An exact procedure and LP formulations for the leader—follower location problem

Competitive location, Exact procedure, Leader–Follower problem, 90B80, 90C05, 90C27,