Pollution Permits, Strategic Trading and Dynamic Technology Adoption

This paper analyzes the dynamic incentives for technology adoption under a transferable permits system, which allows for strategic trading on the permit market. Initially, firms can invest both in low-emitting production technologies and trade permits. In the model, technology adoption and allowance price are generated endogenously and are inter-dependent. It is shown that the non-cooperative permit trading game possesses a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, where the allowance value reflects the level of uncovered pollution (demand), the level of unused allowances (supply), and the technological status. These conditions are also satisfied when a price support instrument, which is contingent on the adoption of the new technology, is introduced. Numerical investigation confirms that this policy generates a floating price floor for the allowances, and it restores the dynamic incentives to invest. Given that this policy comes at a cost, a criterion for the selection of a self-financing policy (based on convex risk measures) is proposed and implemented.dynamic regulation, emission permits, environment, self-financing policy, technology adoption

Pollution permits, Strategic Trading and Dynamic Technology Adoption

This paper analyzes the dynamic incentives for technology adoption under a transferable permits system, which allows for strategic trading on the permit market. Initially, firms can both invest in low- emitting production technologies and trade permits. In the model, technology adoption and allowance prices are generated endogenously and are inter-dependent. It is shown that the non-cooperative permit trading game possesses a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, where the allowance value reflects the level of uncovered pollution (demand), the level of unused allowances (supply), and the technological status. These conditions are also satisfied when a price support instrument (dubbed European-cash- for{permits), which is contingent on the adoption of the new technology, is introduced. Numerical investigation confirms that this policy generates a floating price floor for the allowances, and it restores the dynamic incentives to invest. Given that this policy comes at a cost, a criterion for the selection of a self-financing policy (based on convex risk measures) is proposed and implemented.Dynamic regulation, emission permits, environment, self-financing policy, technology adoption

Efficiency and Equilibria in Games of Optimal Derivative Design

In this paper the problem of optimal derivative design, profit maximization and risk minimization under adverse selection when multiple agencies compete for the business of a continuum of heterogenous agents is studied. In contrast with the principal-agent models that are extended within, here the presence of ties in the agents' best-response correspondences yields discontinuous payoff functions for the agencies. These discontinuities are dealt with via efficient tie-breaking rules. The main results of this paper are a proof of existence of (mixed-strategies) Nash equilibria in the case of profit-maximizing agencies, and of socially efficient allocations when the firms are risk minimizers. It is also shown that in the particular case of the entropic risk measure, there exists an efficient "fix-mix" tie-breaking rule, in which case firms share the whole market over given proportions.Adverse selection, Nash equilibria, Pareto optimality, risk transfer, socially efficient allocations, tie-breaking rules

Capital adequacy tests and limited liability of financial institutions

The theory of acceptance sets and their associated risk measures plays a key role in the design of capital adequacy tests. The objective of this paper is to investigate, in the context of bounded financial positions, the class of surplus-invariant acceptance sets. These are characterized by the fact that acceptability does not depend on the positive part, or surplus, of a capital position. We argue that surplus invariance is a reasonable requirement from a regulatory perspective, because it focuses on the interests of liability holders of a financial institution. We provide a dual characterization of surplus-invariant, convex acceptance sets, and show that the combination of surplus invariance and coherence leads to a narrow range of capital adequacy tests, essentially limited to scenario-based tests. Finally, we emphasize the advantages of dealing with surplus-invariant acceptance sets as the primary object rather than directly with risk measures, such as loss-based and excess-invariant risk measures, which have been recently studied by Cont, Deguest, and He (2013) and by Staum (2013), respectively

Proceso de planeación estratégica de El Caporal con base en el balanced scorecard

El Caporal es una avícola con más de 40 años en el mercado y la gestión de la empresa hasta 2012 fue empírica y se generaron actividades con sentido estratégico sin una metodología establecida -- Este trabajo pretende documentar la planeación estratégica de El Caporal para el período 2014-2018 con base en la metodología del balanced scorecard (BSC), con la cual se espera incrementar la probabilidad de éxito en la estrategia definida -- La metodología del BSC y su ciclo de gestión es una herramienta de gestión estratégica diseñada para garantizar cada uno de los ciclos de la estrategia (construcción, ejecución, seguimiento y retroalimentación) tomando como base las cuatro perspectivas organizacionales (financiera, de clientes, de procesos y de aprendizaje y crecimiento) y de esta manera balancea y alinea a todos los niveles de la organización con los objetivos e iniciativas de la estrategia definida -- En este trabajo se describen los aspectos teóricos de la metodología del BSC, se presenta una reseña histórica de El Caporal y se documentan la construcción, la implementación y el seguimiento de la planeación estratégica con base en el BSC -- El análisis genera una metodología mediante la cual se puede probar, retroalimentar y actualizar la estrategia de la organización, en forma estructurada y con disminución de las probabilidades de fracaso en su implementación y seguimient