Is Libertarian Paternalism an Oxymoron?

In this article I have attempted to discuss two points brought up by Sunstein and Thaler's new perspective on paternalism. The first is that whatever individuals do, they have to take second rank decisions, i.e. decisions that are equally attractive for them but impact others' people welfare. They then face a three alternative choice: either they do not care of the collateral consequences of their choice and act randomly, either they select the option that will make others better off, either they pick the option that will make others worst off. The authors assume they will necessarily act benevolently. I argued this statement is mistaken, and that the authors did not sufficiently distinguish the functional and the personal motivations of the planners. This leads me to define paternalism as the personal benevolence of the planners. Because they do not have any professional or moral duty towards the non-planners, they have absolutely no obligation to be benevolent. In most cases, the easiest choice is to act randomly. This incertitude about the planners' choice has dramatic consequences on non-planners: unless they know and trust the planners they cannot expect them to be paternalistic. They are subsequently less prone to blindly adopt default rules. The second point of the authors is that one can conceive a paternalistic system based on planners' benevolence that would not infringe libertarian principles. Default rules can, for instance, be combined with absolute freedom of choice. I argued that freedom of choice would not contribute to individual freedom if choices are not voluntary. The easiest they set up opting out options the less discriminating their system is, and eventually the most inefficient it will be.Libertarianism; Behavioral Economics; Paternalism; Voluntariness; Sunstein; Thaler

INDIVIDUAL DELIBERATION, MORAL AUTONOMY AND EMOTIONS : ROUSSEAU ON CITIZENSHIP

The present study addresses the question of uncertainty in individual deliberation in Rousseau's philosophy. Accordingly, it intends to consider in a new light his account of virtue and citizenship which cannot possibly be defined as systematic obedience to the general will. Weakness of the will, indeterminacy and prudence have not yet been adequately emphasized, despite some convincing evidence. Chapter XI, book III, of the Social Contract on the death of the body politic, for example, prompts us to reconsider the individuals' allegiance to the general will. However, it would be equally extreme to dismiss the core of his thought which affirms the legitimate superiority of the general will over particular desires. Rather it will beillustrated here that, when brought together, these two propositions provide a fruitful way of approaching this ethical issue.Rousseau ; Freedom ; Ethics

Freedom and Rationality

This paper deals with Rousseau's idea of freedom in terms of rationality and deliberation. It gives support to Berlin's interpretation of the general will as a rational and objective will but dismisses the idea that Rousseau's theory necessarily leads to authoritarianism. The general will, publicly expressed by the law, may be defined as the rational and self-regarding will agents would have if put in an independent and objective state, i.e. the state of nature. The general and the particular will, henceforth considered from an individual point of view, theoretically constitute two alternative choices for an agent. A special focus will then be placed on the function of the law in the process of individual deliberation. By signalling the general will, the law urges individuals to deliberate and to question the autonomy of their preferences. I shall argue that citizenship denotes for Rousseau the tendency of individuals to favour the general will and to master their natural weakness of will. The achievement of citizenship, however, strongly relies upon man's identification with the community, i.e. patriotism, and upon the emotions stirred by the potential death of the body politic.Rousseau ; Rationality; Freedom ; Deliberation, Emotions

AUTONOMIE MORALE ET AUTORITE Ou la question de la volonté chez Rousseau

In the Rousseauist tradition, the idea of sovereignty generally refers to the sovereignty of thebody politic. Rousseau never yields nevertheless to the holist temptation. Individual is at thecore of his system. The aim of this paper is to question his idea of liberty, understood as moralautonomy, in particular in its relation to the concept of authority.La notion de souveraineté renvoie généralement dans la tradition rousseauiste à la souveraineté du corps politique et non à celle des individus comme c'est le cas dans les théories du droit naturel. Rousseau, pourtant, ne cède jamais à la tentation holiste. L'individu,et sa protection, reste au fondement de son système. L'objet de cet article est de questionner la notion de liberté entendue comme autonomie morale, en particulier dans sa relation à l'autorit

Economics of paternalism: the hidden costs of self-commanding strategies

International audienceThis paper proposes an economic assessment of paternalism by comparing different alternative responses to dynamically inconsistent behaviors consecutive to hyperbolic discounting. Two main types of action are possible, self-commanding strategies and paternalism. The first category includes personal rules and pre-commitment. The second can be subcategorized between coercive and non-coercive forms of paternalism, which are respectively associated (although it is debatable) with legal paternalism and with ‘nudges’. Despite being self-inflicted, self-commanding strategies are actually not cost free and can result in a dramatic cutback of people’s freedom of choice. Likewise, legal paternalism can, on occasion, be less harmful than personal rules or precommitment; similarly, nudges can be more invasive and less effective than their proponents want us to believe. The aim of this paper is not to propose any standardized form of response to irrational behavior (whatever that may mean) but to argue, on the contrary, that every case should be individually appraised. Individual situations can be remedied by self-commanding strategies or by paternalistic policies, either in isolation or in combination

Behavioral Paternalism

International audienceIn this article I address the question of the moral legitimacy of paternalism. Paternalism is considered illegitimate a) when it acts under false pretenses to satisfy the interest of the paternalist agent, b) when it violates the individual autonomy of the people interfered with and c) when it does not respect the equality between people by singling out those who are deemed unable to decide for themselves. Over the last decade a new type of paternalism has emerged thanks to the groundbreaking works of some behavioral economists. This new type of paternalism, that I call here Behavioral Paternalism (BP), has become popular through Sunstein and Thaler's Nudges theory and challenges the view that paternalism is unacceptable today. The aim of this paper is to assess its moral legitimacy (not exclusively focusing on the autonomy proviso). The results of my investigation can be summarized as follows. Though BP is usually acknowledged for its 'libertarian' character, it does not satisfy the conditions of what is considered, since Feinberg, as 'soft paternalism'. Nevertheless, BP has a strong point that has been underestimated by its partisans: it withstands the equality argument. Unlike traditional forms of paternalism, BP is not demeaning and does not ostracize any category of people. Lastly, BP can be proved genuinely altruistic. This, however, demands that one abandons Sunstein and Thaler's main assumptions

Freedom and Rationality: Rousseau on Citizenship

This paper deals with Rousseau's idea of freedom in terms of rationality and deliberation. It gives support to Berlin's interpretation of the general will as a rational and objective will but dismisses the idea that Rousseau's theory necessarily leads to authoritarianism. The general will, publicly expressed by the law, may be defined as the rational and self-regarding will agents would have if put in an independent and objective state, i.e. the state of nature. The general and the particular will, henceforth considered from an individual point of view, theoretically constitute two alternative choices for an agent. A special focus will then be placed on the function of the law in the process of individual deliberation. By signalling the general will, the law urges individuals to deliberate and to question the autonomy of their preferences. I shall argue that citizenship denotes for Rousseau the tendency of individuals to favour the general will and to master their natural weakness of will. The achievement of citizenship, however, strongly relies upon man's identification with the community, i.e. patriotism, and upon the emotions stirred by the potential death of the body politic

Les articles 'Oe/Economie' et leurs désignants dans l'Encyclopédie.

Nous nous proposons donc ici de revenir, dans un premier temps, sur la tradition lexicographique du terme œ/économie afin de mieux identifier la nouveauté de l'Encyclopédie en la matière, puis sur les emplois propres à cette dernière, les articles et les désignants œ/économie. Dans une seconde partie, nous envisagerons l'économie publique et/ou politique dans ses rapports à l'économie domestique et l'économie rustique. Nous montrerons ainsi que Rousseau défend une économie entendue comme mode d'administration d'une communauté, qu'elle soit familiale ou nationale, alors que Quesnay et Leroy la perçoivent davantage comme mode de production (agricole), au niveau individuel comme au niveau national. Bien qu'appartenant à des perspectives différentes, ces deux approches peuvent fortuitement se recouper et/ou s'opposer, par exemple sur la question des flux monétaires, de l'industrie agricole ou de la fiscalité, mais elles ne peuvent être considérées comme des théories économiques concurrentes

L'ambivalence de la référence physiocratique chez Walras

La dette intellectuelle de Walras auprès de Say est certainement beaucoup plus importante que celle qu'il a pu avoir avec Quesnay. C'est probablement en matière de fiscalité que les deux économistes se rapprochent le plus. Quesnay occupe cependant une place d'honneur dans ses écrits, plus que nul autre économiste français. Malgré l'écart théorique qui les sépare, Walras ne cessa de s'y référer, voire de s'en réclamer, à une époque où le Tableau et ses commentaires étaient dédaignés par ses contemporains

L'échange et la loi : le statut de la rationalité économique chez Rousseau

The economic thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau has often been reduced to some pieces on money, inequalities, luxury and autarky. Compared to contemporary writings of Quesnay, Smith or Hume, it has been considered being as backward for a long time. However Jean Mathiot has shown that, far from being backward-oriented, Rousseau's economic thought can been seen as a significant step of political philosophy in its relation with political economy. According to him, the modernity of Rousseau's economic thought paradoxically reveals itself in his politically most achieved, but economically most refined book, the Social Contract. Our paper is following the same idea, except on one major point which concerns the status of the economic rationality. The ambition of this article is actually to show, through the example of the economic exchange, that the relation between politics and economics cannot be reduced to a hegemony of the political rationality. The economic rationality appears, on the contrary, constituent of the legitimate civil state including in its most negative expression, I mean autarky.La pensée économique de Rousseau a souvent été réduite à quelques fragments sur la monnaie, les inégalités, le luxe et l'autarcie. Comparée aux écrits contemporains de Quesnay, Smith ou Hume, elle est donc apparue comme ‘retardataire' voire réactionnaire. Jean Mathiot a cependant montré que loin de s'inscrire dans une tradition passéiste, la pensée économique de Rousseau marque au contraire une avancée significative de la philosophie politique dans ses rapports à l'économie politique, dont elle accompagne, voire anticipe, le développement. Selon lui, la modernité de la pensée économique de Rousseau se révèle paradoxalement dans son ouvrage le plus politiquement achevé, et économiquement le plus épuré, le Contrat Social. Notre article s'inscrit, sur ce point, dans sa continuité. Nous nous en démarquons cependant sur un point, le statut de la rationalité économique. L'ambition de cet article est, en effet, de montrer, à travers le cas de l'échange, que la relation entre la politique et l'économie, bien que hiérarchisée, ne se réduit pas à une hégémonie de la rationalité politique. La rationalité économique apparaît, au contraire, constitutive de l'état civil légitime y compris dans son expression la plus négative, à savoir l'autarcie