31 research outputs found

    Model the System from Adversary Viewpoint: Threats Identification and Modeling

    Full text link
    Security attacks are hard to understand, often expressed with unfriendly and limited details, making it difficult for security experts and for security analysts to create intelligible security specifications. For instance, to explain Why (attack objective), What (i.e., system assets, goals, etc.), and How (attack method), adversary achieved his attack goals. We introduce in this paper a security attack meta-model for our SysML-Sec framework, developed to improve the threat identification and modeling through the explicit representation of security concerns with knowledge representation techniques. Our proposed meta-model enables the specification of these concerns through ontological concepts which define the semantics of the security artifacts and introduced using SysML-Sec diagrams. This meta-model also enables representing the relationships that tie several such concepts together. This representation is then used for reasoning about the knowledge introduced by system designers as well as security experts through the graphical environment of the SysML-Sec framework.Comment: In Proceedings AIDP 2014, arXiv:1410.322

    IngĆ©nierie des exigences pour la conception d'architectures de sĆ©curitĆ© de systĆØmes embarquĆ©s distribuĆ©s

    Get PDF
    During the last ten years, the impact of security concerns on the development and exploration of distributed embedded systems never ceased to grow. This is mainly related to the fact that these systems are increasingly interconnected and thus vulnerable to attacks, and that the economic interest in attacking them has simultane- ously increased. In such a context, requirement engineering methodologies and tools have become necessary to take appropriate decisions regarding security early on. Security requirements engineering should thus strongly support the elicitation and specifica- tion of software security issues and solutions well before designers and developers are committed to a particular implementation. However, and that is especially true in embedded systems, security requirements should not be considered only as the abstract expression of a set of properties independently from the system architecture or from the threats and attacks that may occur. We believe this consideration is of utmost importance for security requirements engineering to be the driving force behind the design and implementation of a secure system. We thus describe in this thesis a security engineering requirement methodology depending upon a constant dialog between the design of system functions, the requirements that are attached to them, the design and development of the system architecture, and the assessment of the threats to system assets. Our approach in particular relies on a knowledge-centric approach to security requirement engineering, applicable from the early phases of system conceptualization to the enforcement of security requirements.Au cours des dix dernieĢ€res anneĢes, lā€™impact des questions de seĢcuriteĢ sur le deĢveloppement et la mise en oeuvre des systeĢ€mes embarqueĢs distribueĢs nā€™a jamais cesseĢ de croiĢ‚tre. Ceci est principalement lieĢ aĢ€ lā€™interconnexion toujours plus importante de ces systeĢ€mes qui les rend vulneĢrables aux attaques, ainsi quā€™aĢ€ lā€™inteĢreĢ‚t eĢconomique dā€™attaquer ces systeĢ€mes qui sā€™est simultaneĢment accru. Dans un tel contexte, meĢthodologies et outils dā€™ingeĢnierie des exigences de seĢcuriteĢ sont devenus indispensables pour prendre des deĢcisions approprieĢes quant a` la seĢcuriteĢ, et ce le plus toĢ‚t possible. Lā€™ingeĢnierie des exigences devrait donc fournir une aide substantielle aĢ€ lā€™explicitation et aĢ€ la speĢcification des probleĢ€mes et solutions de seĢcuriteĢ des logiciels bien avant que concepteurs et deĢveloppeurs ne soient engageĢs dans une implantation en particulier. Toutefois, et cā€™est particulieĢ€rement vrai dans les systeĢ€mes embarqueĢs, les exigences de seĢcuriteĢ ne doivent pas eĢ‚tre consideĢreĢes seulement comme lā€™expression abstraite dā€™un ensemble de proprieĢteĢs indeĢpendamment de lā€™architecture systeĢ€me ou des menaces et des attaques qui pourraient y survenir. Nous estimons que cette consideĢration est dā€™une importance capitale pour faire de lā€™ingeĢnierie des exigences un guide et un moteur de la conception et de la mise en œuvre dā€™un systeĢ€me seĢcuriseĢ. Notre approche sā€™appuie en particulier sur une approche centreĢe sur les connaissances de lā€™ingeĢnierie des exigences de seĢcuriteĢ, applicable deĢ€s les premieĢ€res phases de conception du systeĢ€me jusquā€™aĢ€ la mise en application des exigences de seĢcuriteĢ dans lā€™implantation

    Burnout among surgeons before and during the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic: an international survey

    Get PDF
    Background: SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has had many significant impacts within the surgical realm, and surgeons have been obligated to reconsider almost every aspect of daily clinical practice. Methods: This is a cross-sectional study reported in compliance with the CHERRIES guidelines and conducted through an online platform from June 14th to July 15th, 2020. The primary outcome was the burden of burnout during the pandemic indicated by the validated Shirom-Melamed Burnout Measure. Results: Nine hundred fifty-four surgeons completed the survey. The median length of practice was 10 years; 78.2% included were male with a median age of 37 years old, 39.5% were consultants, 68.9% were general surgeons, and 55.7% were affiliated with an academic institution. Overall, there was a significant increase in the mean burnout score during the pandemic; longer years of practice and older age were significantly associated with less burnout. There were significant reductions in the median number of outpatient visits, operated cases, on-call hours, emergency visits, and research work, so, 48.2% of respondents felt that the training resources were insufficient. The majority (81.3%) of respondents reported that their hospitals were included in the management of COVID-19, 66.5% felt their roles had been minimized; 41% were asked to assist in non-surgical medical practices, and 37.6% of respondents were included in COVID-19 management. Conclusions: There was a significant burnout among trainees. Almost all aspects of clinical and research activities were affected with a significant reduction in the volume of research, outpatient clinic visits, surgical procedures, on-call hours, and emergency cases hindering the training. Trial registration: The study was registered on clicaltrials.gov "NCT04433286" on 16/06/2020

    Effective and efficient security policy engines for automotive on-board networks

    No full text

    Model the system from adversary viewpoint: Threats identification and modeling

    No full text

    A requirement engineering driven approach to security architecture design for distributed embedded systems

    No full text
    Au cours des dix dernieĢ€res anneĢes, lā€™impact des questions de seĢcuriteĢ sur le deĢveloppement et la mise en oeuvre des systeĢ€mes embarqueĢs distribueĢs nā€™a jamais cesseĢ de croiĢ‚tre. Ceci est principalement lieĢ aĢ€ lā€™interconnexion toujours plus importante de ces systeĢ€mes qui les rend vulneĢrables aux attaques, ainsi quā€™aĢ€ lā€™inteĢreĢ‚t eĢconomique dā€™attaquer ces systeĢ€mes qui sā€™est simultaneĢment accru. Dans un tel contexte, meĢthodologies et outils dā€™ingeĢnierie des exigences de seĢcuriteĢ sont devenus indispensables pour prendre des deĢcisions approprieĢes quant a` la seĢcuriteĢ, et ce le plus toĢ‚t possible. Lā€™ingeĢnierie des exigences devrait donc fournir une aide substantielle aĢ€ lā€™explicitation et aĢ€ la speĢcification des probleĢ€mes et solutions de seĢcuriteĢ des logiciels bien avant que concepteurs et deĢveloppeurs ne soient engageĢs dans une implantation en particulier. Toutefois, et cā€™est particulieĢ€rement vrai dans les systeĢ€mes embarqueĢs, les exigences de seĢcuriteĢ ne doivent pas eĢ‚tre consideĢreĢes seulement comme lā€™expression abstraite dā€™un ensemble de proprieĢteĢs indeĢpendamment de lā€™architecture systeĢ€me ou des menaces et des attaques qui pourraient y survenir. Nous estimons que cette consideĢration est dā€™une importance capitale pour faire de lā€™ingeĢnierie des exigences un guide et un moteur de la conception et de la mise en œuvre dā€™un systeĢ€me seĢcuriseĢ. Notre approche sā€™appuie en particulier sur une approche centreĢe sur les connaissances de lā€™ingeĢnierie des exigences de seĢcuriteĢ, applicable deĢ€s les premieĢ€res phases de conception du systeĢ€me jusquā€™aĢ€ la mise en application des exigences de seĢcuriteĢ dans lā€™implantation.During the last ten years, the impact of security concerns on the development and exploration of distributed embedded systems never ceased to grow. This is mainly related to the fact that these systems are increasingly interconnected and thus vulnerable to attacks, and that the economic interest in attacking them has simultane- ously increased. In such a context, requirement engineering methodologies and tools have become necessary to take appropriate decisions regarding security early on. Security requirements engineering should thus strongly support the elicitation and specifica- tion of software security issues and solutions well before designers and developers are committed to a particular implementation. However, and that is especially true in embedded systems, security requirements should not be considered only as the abstract expression of a set of properties independently from the system architecture or from the threats and attacks that may occur. We believe this consideration is of utmost importance for security requirements engineering to be the driving force behind the design and implementation of a secure system. We thus describe in this thesis a security engineering requirement methodology depending upon a constant dialog between the design of system functions, the requirements that are attached to them, the design and development of the system architecture, and the assessment of the threats to system assets. Our approach in particular relies on a knowledge-centric approach to security requirement engineering, applicable from the early phases of system conceptualization to the enforcement of security requirements

    Evolving security requirements in multi-layered Service-Oriented-Architectures

    No full text

    Secure automotive on-board protocols : A case of over-the-air firmware updates

    No full text
    corecore