Looking for a psychology for the inner rational agent

Research in psychology and behavioural economics shows that individuals’ choices often depend on ‘irrelevant’ contextual factors. This presents problems for normative economics, which has traditionally used preference-satisfaction as its criterion. A common response is to claim that individuals have context-independent latent preferences which are ‘distorted’ by psychological factors, and that latent preferences should be respected. This response implicitly uses a model of human action in which each human being has an ‘inner rational agent’. I argue that this model is psychologically ungrounded. Although references to latent preferences appear in psychologically-based explanations of context-dependent choice, latent preferences serve no explanatory purpose

On ‘common-sense ontology’:A comment on the paper by Frank Hindriks and Francesco Guala

This note comments on Hindriks and Guala’s ‘unified theory of institutions’. One of the components that Hindriks and Guala seek to unify, and which they claim is unsatisfactory on its own, is the analysis of conventions that derives from the work of Lewis. I argue that the Lewisian approach provides simple and powerful explanations of many regularities in the social behaviour of humans and other animals. Those explanations can be seen as good social science even if, as Hindriks and Guala argue, they do not fit with common-sense ontology

Can a Humean be a Contractarian?

In this paper I argue, contrary to Hartmut Kliemt, that it is possible to be both a Humean and, in James Buchanan's sense, a contractarian. Hume sees principles of justice and political allegiance not as actual or hypothetical products of explicit agreement, but as conventions that have emerged spontaneously. However, it is fundamental to Hume's analysis that conventions are mutually advantageous, and hence cognate with agreements. The core idea in Buchanan's contractarianism is that the proper role of government is to implement voluntary exchanges between individuals, not to define and maximise a unified conception of social welfare. Although real politics cannot be based entirely on unanimous agreement, the voluntary exchange approach provides a valuable structure for normative economics.Hume, Buchanan, contractarian, contractarianism, conventions

Team reasoning and intentional cooperation for mutual benefit

This paper proposes a concept of intentional cooperation for mutual benefit. This concept uses a form of team reasoning in which team members aim to achieve common interests, rather than maximising a common utility function, and in which team reasoners can coordinate their behaviour by following pre-existing practices. I argue that a market transaction can express intentions for mutually beneficial cooperation even if, extensionally, participation in the transaction promotes each party’s self-interest

Implementation of virtual manufacturing by a technology licensing company

NoThe paper considers the implementation of a virtual manufacturing system as an alternative to outward technology licensing in a high technology industrial sector. Brief theoretical definition and description of the two strategy options is provided to give background and context. This is followed by empirical material from a longitudinal case study of a company that has developed a virtual manufacturing system in addition to its pre-existing outward technology licensing business stream. A summary account of the company history and development is followed by description of the virtual manufacturing proposal. Analysis of this identified a number of competencies that would be required in order to succeed. The final part of the paper describes the company's response to this analysis and discusses early implementation of the virtual system. It is shown that implementation of the proposal has represented a positive response to the business challenges facing the company

The emergence of reciprocally beneficial cooperation

This paper offers a new and robust model of the emergence and persistence of cooperation. In the model, interactions are anonymous, the population is well-mixed, and the evolutionary process selects strategies according to material payoffs. The cooperation problem is modelled as a game similar to Prisoner’s Dilemma, but there is an outside option of nonparticipation and the payoff to mutual cooperation is stochastic; with positive probability, this payoff exceeds that from cheating against a cooperator. Under mild conditions, mutually beneficial cooperation occurs in equilibrium. This is possible because the non-participation option holds down the equilibrium frequency of cheating.Cooperation; voluntary participation; random payoffs.

Spurious complexity and common standards in markets for consumer goods

It has been argued that cognitively constrained consumers respond sub-optimally to complex decision problems, and that firms can exploit these limitations by introducing spurious complexity into tariff structures, weakening price competition. We model a countervailing force. Restricting one's choices to the most easily comparable options is a psychologically well-attested heuristic. Consumers who use this heuristic favour firms that follow common conventions about tariff structures. Because a 'common standard' promotes price competition, a firm's use of it signals that it offers value for money, validating the heuristic. This allows an equilibrium in which firms use common standards and set competitive prices.common standard, spurious complexity, cognitive limitations