Lecithin : cholesterol acyltransferase: symposium on 50 years of biomedical research from its discovery to latest findings

LCAT converts free cholesterol to cholesteryl esters in the process of reverse cholesterol transport. Familial LCAT deficiency (FLD) is a genetic disease that was first described by Kaare R. Norum and Egil Gjone in 1967. This report is a summary from a 2017 symposium where Dr. Norum recounted the history of FLD and leading experts on LCAT shared their results. The Tesmer laboratory shared structural findings on LCAT and the close homolog, lysosomal phospholipase A2. Results from studies of FLD patients in Finland, Brazil, Norway, and Italy were presented, as well as the status of a patient registry. Drs. Kuivenhoven and Calabresi presented data from carriers of genetic mutations suggesting that FLD does not necessarily accelerate atherosclerosis. Dr. Ng shared that LCAT-null mice were protected from diet-induced obesity, insulin resistance, and nonalcoholic fatty liver disease. Dr. Zhou presented multiple innovations for increasing LCAT activity for therapeutic purposes, whereas Dr. Remaley showed results from treatment of an FLD patient with recombinant human LCAT (rhLCAT). Dr. Karathanasis showed that rhLCAT infusion in mice stimulates cholesterol efflux and suggested that it could also enhance cholesterol efflux from macrophages. While the role of LCAT in atherosclerosis remains elusive, the consensus is that a continued study of both the enzyme and disease will lead toward better treatments for patients with heart disease and FLD.Peer reviewe

Bargaining in Legislatures, Portfolio Allocation, and the Electoral Costs of Governing

What motivates political parties in the legislative arena? Existing legislative bargaining models stress parties’ office and policy motivations. A particularly important question concerns how parties in coalition government agree the distribution of cabinet seats. We add to this portfolio allocation literature by suggesting that future electoral considerations affect bargaining over the allocation of cabinet seats in multi-party cabinets. Some parties are penalized by voters for participating in government, increase the attractiveness of staying in opposition. This “cost of governing” shifts their seat reservation price– the minimum cabinet seats demanded in return for joining the coalition. Results of a randomized survey experiment of Irish legislators support our expectation, demonstrating that political elites are sensitive to future electoral losses when contemplating the distribution of cabinet seats. This research advances our understanding of how parties’ behavior between elections is influenced by anticipation of voters’ reaction

Taking It to the Extreme:The Effect of Coalition Cabinets on Foreign Policy

Institutional constraints have been offered by some scholars as an explanation for why multiparty coalitions should be more peaceful than single-party cabinets. Yet others see the same institutional setting as a prescription for more aggressive behavior. Recent research has investigated these conflicting expectations, but with mixed results. We examine the theoretical bases for these alternative expectations about the effects of coalition politics on foreign policy. We find that previous research is limited theoretically by confounding institutional effects with policy positions, and empirically by analyzing only international conflict data. We address these limitations by examining cases of foreign policy behavior using the World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS) dataset. Consistent with our observation that institutional constraints have been confounded with policy positions, we find that coalitions are neither more aggressive nor more peaceful, but do engage in more extreme foreign policy behaviors. These findings are discussed with regard to various perspectives on the role of institutions in shaping foreign policy behavior.</p

Democracy, Accountability, and Coalition Bargaining

This paper begins by identifying a framework in which we can study democratic representation and accountability, namely the neo-institutional rational choice literature on delegation and agency. I suggest why I believe that the enforcement of accountability is becoming a more and more central democratic issue. I then go on to share some data from Norwegian election surveys that indicate that voters, at least in this country, are increasingly available to play the part that democratic accountability requires. Finally, I present evidence that political leaders in coalition bargaining anticipate and are constrained by this electoral accountability, sometimes with surprising results. There is even a silver lining to this part of my story, in the sense that coalition outcomes that may at first sight seem deviant or even pathological, may in fact play a perfectly normal part in the democratic process