Manufacturing in Winnipeg & Manitoba : a quantitative overview

ii, 58 p

Justice from an interdisciplinary perspective: the impact of the revolution in Human Sciences on Peace Research and International Relations

Peace and justice have been a preferred couple in theoretical writings - but what do we know about their empirical relationship? Insights from other disciplines suggest that humans are highly sensitive to violations of justice and that justice concerns permeate social relations. Neuroscientists have located the parts of the brain responsible for negative reactions to violation of claims for justice. Evolutionary biologists have identified rules of distribution and retribution not only in early human societies but among other socially living species as well. Psychologists have observed the emergence of a sense of justice in very early childhood, while behavioral economists have identified behavior of average persons in experiments that deviated significantly from the model of the "economic man" and could only be explained by a sense of justice. The chapter summarizes these findings and outlines their implications for peace research. It highlights the ambivalent nature of justice for social relations. Justice concerns can exacerbate conflicts between individuals and groups but justice can also provide standards for arriving at durable peaceful solutions to conflicts. Understanding these ambivalences and their repercussions for international and intrastate relations provides a promising path towards understanding conflict dynamics

DIPLOMACIA E POLÍTICA DOMÉSTICA: A LÓGICA DOS JOGOS DE DOIS NÍVEIS

A política doméstica e as relações internacionais com freqüência são inextricavelmente vinculadas; todavia,as teorias existentes (particularmente as estatocêntricas) não levam adequadamente em consideraçõestais vínculos. Quando os líderes nacionais devem obter as ratificações (formais ou informais) dos membrosde seus parlamentos para um acordo internacional, seus comportamentos em negociações refletem os imperativossimultâneos tanto de um jogo de política doméstica quanto de um jogo de política internacional.Usando exemplos de cúpulas econômicas ocidentais, das negociações do Canal do Panamá e do Tratado deVersalhes, dos programas de estabilização do Fundo Monetário Internacional, da Comunidade Européia ede muitos outros contextos diplomáticos, o artigo oferece uma teoria da ratificação. Ele enfatiza o papel daspreferências, coalizões, instituições e práticas domésticas, das estratégias e táticas dos negociadores, daincerteza, das reverberações domésticas das pressões externas e o papel dos interesses do negociador-chefe.Essa teoria de “jogos de dois níveis” também pode ser aplicável a muitos outros fenômenos políticos, taiscomo a dependência, os comitês legislativos e as coalizões multipartidárias

Introducing Regulatory Intermediaries

Regulation is frequently viewed as a two-party relationship between a regulator (R) and the targets of its regulation (T). This volume conceives of regulation as a three-party system, in which diverse intermediaries (I) provide assistance to regulators and/or targets, drawing on their own capabilities, authority and legitimacy. Our framework paper for the volume, Theorizing regulatory intermediaries: The RIT model, sets out a general theoretical model for analyzing the roles and implications of regulatory intermediaries in diverse settings

Cooperation by treaty: the role of multilateral powers

Who supports multilateral treaties and who doesn’t? We offer a systematic account of treaty ratification patterns paying particular attention to different states’ roles in international legal cooperation in relation to the United States’ ratification behavior. We argue that states’ ability to influence the terms of treaties and their acceptance increases their incentives for treaty ratification. Multilateral powers – states which are powerful and independent from the US – support multilateral legal cooperation because this offers them an opportunity to shape treaty content. Their engagement in multilateral treaties is strongest when the United States does not lead. Other states that are weak and/or dependent cannot greatly affect treaties and are therefore less supportive of them but are subject to US pressure. An empirical analysis of states’ decisions to ratify prominent postwar multilateral treaties covering a wide range of global issues supports our argument. We conclude with broader implications for future international cooperation

Informal IGOs as mediators of power shifts

In an era defined by shifting distributions of power, states are not only pushing for change in formal international organizations, they are increasingly using informal intergovernmental organizations (IIGOs) to mediate change. Why and how do states use IIGOs – institutions without a treaty or secretariat – to manage global power shifts? IIGOs are useful for states on both sides of the power shift. Established powers use IIGOs for system management through ‘collaboration’ and strengthening the ‘hegemonic consensus’ to preserve their institutional privileges while adapting to changing power realities. Rising powers use IIGOs to redistribute through ‘power bargaining’ and ‘rhetorical coercion’ to strengthen their institutional roles without overly disrupting the current order. Established and rising powers also work together to use IIGOs for integrative strategies including ‘cooptation’ and ‘principled persuasion’, creating a mutually beneficial solution that accommodates both increased demands but also mounting responsibilities. IIGOs help states manage power transitions by providing flexible institutional arrangements that facilitate bargaining without freezing outcomes in permanent institutions while the power distribution evolves. We provide case vignettes of the G7 (system management) in the early phase of a power shift, BRICS (redistributive strategies) in the middle phase, and the G20 (integrative strategies) in the later phase