136 research outputs found
Justice from an interdisciplinary perspective: the impact of the revolution in Human Sciences on Peace Research and International Relations
Peace and justice have been a preferred couple in theoretical writings - but what do we know about their empirical relationship? Insights from other disciplines suggest that humans are highly sensitive to violations of justice and that justice concerns permeate social relations. Neuroscientists have located the parts of the brain responsible for negative reactions to violation of claims for justice. Evolutionary biologists have identified rules of distribution and retribution not only in early human societies but among other socially living species as well. Psychologists have observed the emergence of a sense of justice in very early childhood, while behavioral economists have identified behavior of average persons in experiments that deviated significantly from the model of the "economic man" and could only be explained by a sense of justice. The chapter summarizes these findings and outlines their implications for peace research. It highlights the ambivalent nature of justice for social relations. Justice concerns can exacerbate conflicts between individuals and groups but justice can also provide standards for arriving at durable peaceful solutions to conflicts. Understanding these ambivalences and their repercussions for international and intrastate relations provides a promising path towards understanding conflict dynamics
DIPLOMACIA E POLĂTICA DOMĂSTICA: A LĂGICA DOS JOGOS DE DOIS NĂVEIS
A polĂtica domĂ©stica e as relaçÔes internacionais com freqĂŒĂȘncia sĂŁo inextricavelmente vinculadas; todavia,as teorias existentes (particularmente as estatocĂȘntricas) nĂŁo levam adequadamente em consideraçÔestais vĂnculos. Quando os lĂderes nacionais devem obter as ratificaçÔes (formais ou informais) dos membrosde seus parlamentos para um acordo internacional, seus comportamentos em negociaçÔes refletem os imperativossimultĂąneos tanto de um jogo de polĂtica domĂ©stica quanto de um jogo de polĂtica internacional.Usando exemplos de cĂșpulas econĂŽmicas ocidentais, das negociaçÔes do Canal do PanamĂĄ e do Tratado deVersalhes, dos programas de estabilização do Fundo MonetĂĄrio Internacional, da Comunidade EuropĂ©ia ede muitos outros contextos diplomĂĄticos, o artigo oferece uma teoria da ratificação. Ele enfatiza o papel daspreferĂȘncias, coalizĂ”es, instituiçÔes e prĂĄticas domĂ©sticas, das estratĂ©gias e tĂĄticas dos negociadores, daincerteza, das reverberaçÔes domĂ©sticas das pressĂ”es externas e o papel dos interesses do negociador-chefe.Essa teoria de âjogos de dois nĂveisâ tambĂ©m pode ser aplicĂĄvel a muitos outros fenĂŽmenos polĂticos, taiscomo a dependĂȘncia, os comitĂȘs legislativos e as coalizĂ”es multipartidĂĄrias
Introducing Regulatory Intermediaries
Regulation is frequently viewed as a two-party relationship between a regulator (R) and the targets of its regulation (T). This volume conceives of regulation as a three-party system, in which diverse intermediaries (I) provide assistance to regulators and/or targets, drawing on their own capabilities, authority and legitimacy. Our framework paper for the volume, Theorizing regulatory intermediaries: The RIT model, sets out a general theoretical model for analyzing the roles and implications of regulatory intermediaries in diverse settings
Cooperation by treaty: the role of multilateral powers
Who supports multilateral treaties and who doesnât? We offer a systematic account of treaty ratification patterns paying particular attention to different statesâ roles in international legal cooperation in relation to the United Statesâ ratification behavior. We argue that statesâ ability to influence the terms of treaties and their acceptance increases their incentives for treaty ratification. Multilateral powers â states which are powerful and independent from the US â support multilateral legal cooperation because this offers them an opportunity to shape treaty content. Their engagement in multilateral treaties is strongest when the United States does not lead. Other states that are weak and/or dependent cannot greatly affect treaties and are therefore less supportive of them but are subject to US pressure. An empirical analysis of statesâ decisions to ratify prominent postwar multilateral treaties covering a wide range of global issues supports our argument. We conclude with broader implications for future international cooperation
Informal IGOs as mediators of power shifts
In an era defined by shifting distributions of power, states are not only pushing for change in formal international organizations, they are increasingly using informal intergovernmental organizations (IIGOs) to mediate change. Why and how do states use IIGOs â institutions without a treaty or secretariat â to manage global power shifts? IIGOs are useful for states on both sides of the power shift. Established powers use IIGOs for system management through âcollaborationâ and strengthening the âhegemonic consensusâ to preserve their institutional privileges while adapting to changing power realities. Rising powers use IIGOs to redistribute through âpower bargainingâ and ârhetorical coercionâ to strengthen their institutional roles without overly disrupting the current order. Established and rising powers also work together to use IIGOs for integrative strategies including âcooptationâ and âprincipled persuasionâ, creating a mutually beneficial solution that accommodates both increased demands but also mounting responsibilities. IIGOs help states manage power transitions by providing flexible institutional arrangements that facilitate bargaining without freezing outcomes in permanent institutions while the power distribution evolves. We provide case vignettes of the G7 (system management) in the early phase of a power shift, BRICS (redistributive strategies) in the middle phase, and the G20 (integrative strategies) in the later phase
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