Surviving \u3cem\u3eCastle Rock:\u3c/em\u3e the Human Rights of Domestic Violence

In 2005, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales and held that Jessica Gonzales did not have a constitutional right to police enforcement of a restraining order. The decision highlighted the Court’s reluctance to recognize citizens’ affirmative rights, fortifying a deeply ingrained conceptualization of the Constitution of the United States as a “Negative Constitution” that creates a government with restraints on its actions and extremely limited obligations to its citizens. In August 2011, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights released a report publicizing its finding that by failing to take affirmative measures to address domestic violence, the United States had violated the human rights of Jessica Gonzalez as well as human rights belonging to abuse survivors across the country. This Article builds on the Commission’s report by pinpointing the extent and cause of these human rights violations and the systematic oppression of American women and minority populations that cannot incite necessary change through the exercise of financial and political power. This Article focuses on solutions stemming from modern American jurisprudence and present opportunities to curb the economic, reputational, and expressive fallout of domestic violence in the United States

The evolution of a slender non-axisymmetric drop in an extensional flow

An asymptotic method for analysing slender non-axisymmetric drops, bubbles and jets in a general straining flow is developed. The method relies on the slenderness of the geometry to reduce the three-dimensional equations to a sequence of weakly coupled, quasi-two-dimensional Stokes flow problems for the cross-sectional evolution. Exact solution techniques for the flow outside a bubble in two-dimensional Stokes flow are generalised to solve for the transverse flow field, allowing large non-axisymmetric deformations to be described. A generalisation to the case where the interior contains a slightly viscous fluid is also presented. Our method is used to compute steady non-axisymmetric solution branches for inviscid bubbles and slightly viscous drops. We also present unsteady numerical solutions showing how the eccentricity of the cross-section adjusts to a non-axisymmetric external flow. Finally, we use our theory to investigate how the pinch-off of a jet of relatively inviscid fluid is affected by a two-dimensional straining cross-flow

Results of the measurement of atmospheric ozone and hydrocarbons in Baden-Wurttemburg

Data are presented on the diurnal variations of the levels of ozone, ethylene, ethane, and acetylene. The measurement procedures used are described. Variations in monthly ozone levels are given, and measurements from different stations are compared. Data on the total monthly concentrations of NO and NO2 are compared with similar data for ozone. Problems in determining interrelationships among the concentrations of the various substances are discussed

Not the Power to Destroy: An Effects Theory of the Tax Power

The Supreme Court’s “new federalism” decisions impose modest limits on the regulatory authority of Congress under the Commerce Clause. According to those decisions, the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to use penalties to regulate interstate commerce, but not to regulate noncommercial conduct. What prevents Congress from penalizing non-commercial conduct by calling a penalty a tax and invoking the Taxing Clause? The only obstacle is the distinction between a penalty and a tax for purposes of Article I, Section 8. In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB), the Court considered whether the minimum coverage provision in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) imposes a penalty or a tax by requiring most individuals to either buy health insurance or make a payment to the Internal Revenue Service. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the minimum coverage payment is a tax for constitutional purposes, even though Congress called it a penalty. This Article develops an effects theory to distinguish between penalties and taxes. The authors believe that it provides the best theoretical justification of the tax-power holding in NFIB. The effect of a penalty is to prevent conduct, thereby raising little revenue, whereas the effect of a tax is to dampen conduct, thereby raising revenue. Three opposing characteristics of an exaction give incentives for preventing or dampening conduct, and thus provide criteria for distinguishing between penalties and taxes. A pure penalty condemns the actor for wrongdoing; she must pay more than the usual gain from the forbidden conduct; and she must pay at an increasing rate with intentional or repeated violations. Condemnation coerces expressively and relatively high rates with enhancements coerce materially. Alternatively, a pure tax permits a person to engage in the taxed conduct; she must pay an exaction that is less than the usual gain from the taxed conduct; and intentional or repeated conduct does not enhance the rate. Permission does not coerce expressively and relatively low rates without enhancements do not coerce materially. The ACA’s required payment for non-insurance has a penalty’s expression and a tax’s materiality. Its constitutional identity depends on the reasonable expectations of Congress concerning its effect. If Congress could have reasonably concluded that the exaction will dampen—but not prevent—the general class of conduct subject to it and thereby raise revenue, then courts should interpret it as a tax regardless of what the statute calls it. If Congress could have reasonably concluded only that the exaction will prevent the conduct of almost all people subject to it and thereby raise little or no revenue, then courts should interpret it as a penalty. In the case of the minimum coverage provision, the Congressional Budget Office predicts that the exaction for non-insurance will dampen uninsured behavior but not prevent it, thereby raising several billion dollars in revenue each year. Accordingly, the exaction is a tax for purposes of the tax power