Rethinking feasibility analysis for urban development: a multidimensional decision support tool

Large-scale urban development projects featured over the past thirty years have shown some critical issues related to the implementation phase. Con-sequently, the current practice seems oriented toward minimal and wide-spread interventions meant as urban catalyst. This planning practice might solve the problem of limited reliability of large developments’ feasibility studies, but it rises an evaluation demand related to the selection of coali-tion of projects within a multidimensional and multi-stakeholders deci-sion-making context. This study aims to propose a framework for the generation of coalitions of elementary actions in the context of urban regeneration processes and for their evaluation using a Multi Criteria Decision Analysis approach. The proposed evaluation framework supports decision makers in exploring dif-ferent combinations of actions in the context of urban interventions taking into account synergies, i.e. positive or negative effects on the overall per-formance of an alternative linked to the joint realization of specific pairs of actions. The proposed evaluation framework has been tested on a pilot case study dealing with urban regeneration processes in the city of Milan (Italy)

Recommendations for a core outcome set for measuring standing balance in adult populations: a consensus-based approach

Standing balance is imperative for mobility and avoiding falls. Use of an excessive number of standing balance measures has limited the synthesis of balance intervention data and hampered consistent clinical practice.To develop recommendations for a core outcome set (COS) of standing balance measures for research and practice among adults.A combination of scoping reviews, literature appraisal, anonymous voting and face-to-face meetings with fourteen invited experts from a range of disciplines with international recognition in balance measurement and falls prevention. Consensus was sought over three rounds using pre-established criteria.The scoping review identified 56 existing standing balance measures validated in adult populations with evidence of use in the past five years, and these were considered for inclusion in the COS.Fifteen measures were excluded after the first round of scoring and a further 36 after round two. Five measures were considered in round three. Two measures reached consensus for recommendation, and the expert panel recommended that at a minimum, either the Berg Balance Scale or Mini Balance Evaluation Systems Test be used when measuring standing balance in adult populations.Inclusion of two measures in the COS may increase the feasibility of potential uptake, but poses challenges for data synthesis. Adoption of the standing balance COS does not constitute a comprehensive balance assessment for any population, and users should include additional validated measures as appropriate.The absence of a gold standard for measuring standing balance has contributed to the proliferation of outcome measures. These recommendations represent an important first step towards greater standardization in the assessment and measurement of this critical skill and will inform clinical research and practice internationally

Implementation science: a role for parallel dual processing models of reasoning?

BACKGROUND: A better theoretical base for understanding professional behaviour change is needed to support evidence-based changes in medical practice. Traditionally strategies to encourage changes in clinical practices have been guided empirically, without explicit consideration of underlying theoretical rationales for such strategies. This paper considers a theoretical framework for reasoning from within psychology for identifying individual differences in cognitive processing between doctors that could moderate the decision to incorporate new evidence into their clinical decision-making. DISCUSSION: Parallel dual processing models of reasoning posit two cognitive modes of information processing that are in constant operation as humans reason. One mode has been described as experiential, fast and heuristic; the other as rational, conscious and rule based. Within such models, the uptake of new research evidence can be represented by the latter mode; it is reflective, explicit and intentional. On the other hand, well practiced clinical judgments can be positioned in the experiential mode, being automatic, reflexive and swift. Research suggests that individual differences between people in both cognitive capacity (e.g., intelligence) and cognitive processing (e.g., thinking styles) influence how both reasoning modes interact. This being so, it is proposed that these same differences between doctors may moderate the uptake of new research evidence. Such dispositional characteristics have largely been ignored in research investigating effective strategies in implementing research evidence. Whilst medical decision-making occurs in a complex social environment with multiple influences and decision makers, it remains true that an individual doctor's judgment still retains a key position in terms of diagnostic and treatment decisions for individual patients. This paper argues therefore, that individual differences between doctors in terms of reasoning are important considerations in any discussion relating to changing clinical practice. SUMMARY: It is imperative that change strategies in healthcare consider relevant theoretical frameworks from other disciplines such as psychology. Generic dual processing models of reasoning are proposed as potentially useful in identifying factors within doctors that may moderate their individual uptake of evidence into clinical decision-making. Such factors can then inform strategies to change practice

Rationality and the experimental study of reasoning

A survey of the results obtained during the past three decades in some of the most widely used tasks and paradigms in the experimental study of reasoning is presented. It is shown that, at first sight, human performance suffers from serious shortcomings. However, after the problems of communication between experimenter and subject are taken into account, which leads to clarify the subject's representation of the tasks, one observes a better performance, although still far from perfect. Current theories of reasoning, of which the two most prominent are very briefly outlined, agree in identifying the load in working memory as the main source of limitation in performance. Finally, a recent view on human rationality prompted by the foregoing results is described

The logic-bias effect: The role of effortful processing in the resolution of belief-logic conflict.

According to the default interventionist dual-process account of reasoning, belief-based responses to reasoning tasks are based on Type 1 processes generated by default, which must be inhibited in order to produce an effortful, Type 2 output based on the validity of an argument. However, recent research has indicated that reasoning on the basis of beliefs may not be as fast and automatic as this account claims. In three experiments, we presented participants with a reasoning task that was to be completed while they were generating random numbers (RNG). We used the novel methodology introduced by Handley, Newstead & Trippas (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 37, 28-43, 2011), which required participants to make judgments based upon either the validity of a conditional argument or the believability of its conclusion. The results showed that belief-based judgments produced lower rates of accuracy overall and were influenced to a greater extent than validity judgments by the presence of a conflict between belief and logic for both simple and complex arguments. These findings were replicated in Experiment 3, in which we controlled for switching demands in a blocked design. Across all three experiments, we found a main effect of RNG, implying that both instructional sets require some effortful processing. However, in the blocked design RNG had its greatest impact on logic judgments, suggesting that distinct executive resources may be required for each type of judgment. We discuss the implications of our findings for the default interventionist account and offer a parallel competitive model as an alternative interpretation for our findings

A social constructivist assessment process model: how the research literature shows us this could be best practice

Although assessment is acknowledged as vitally important in its effect on students' approaches to learning, there is much criticism of assessment practice. This paper argues that if a social constructivist approach is applied to the assessment process many of the problems could be overcome. It describes what a social constructivist approach to assessment would look like and gives practical examples, from the research literature, of ways it could be implemented

Screening for pre-clinical disability in different residential settings

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>Preventing disability and offering effective interventions to older people during early decline in function is most likely to be effective if those most at risk of progressive disablement are able to be identified. Similarly the ability to easily identify a group with similar functional profile from disparate sectors of the community is of significant benefit to researchers. This study aimed to (1) describe the use of a pre-clinical disability screening tool to select a functionally comparable group of older men and women with early functional limitation from different settings, and (2) explore factors associated with function and disability.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>Self-reported function and disability measured with the Late-Life Function and Disability Instrument along with a range of physical performance measurements were compared across residential settings and gender in a sample of 471 trial participants identified as pre-clinically disabled after being screened with the Fried pre-clinical disability tool. Factors that might lie on the pathway to progressive disablement were identified using multiple linear regression analysis.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>We found that a sample population, screened for pre-clinical disability, had a functional status and disability profile reflecting early functional limitation, regardless of residential setting or gender. Statistical models identified a range of factors associated with function and disability which explained a greater degree of the variation in function, than disability.</p> <p>Conclusions</p> <p>We selected a group of people with a comparable function and disability profile, consistent with the pre-clinical stage of disability, from a sample of older Australian men and women from different residential settings using the Fried pre-clinical disability screening tool. The results suggest that the screening tool can be used with greater confidence for research, clinical and population health purposes. Further research is required to examine the validity of the tool. These findings offer insight into the type of impairment factors characterising early functional loss that could be addressed through disability prevention initiatives.</p> <p>Trial Registration</p> <p>ACTRN01206000431527</p

Can cognitive psychological research on reasoning enhance the discussion around moral judgments?

In this article we will demonstrate how cognitive psychological research on reasoning and decision making could enhance discussions and theories of moral judgments. In the first part, we will present recent dual-process models of moral judgments and describe selected studies which support these approaches. However, we will also present data that contradict the model predictions, suggesting that approaches to moral judgment might be more complex. In the second part, we will show how cognitive psychological research on reasoning might be helpful in understanding moral judgments. Specifically, we will highlight approaches addressing the interaction between intuition and reflection. Our data suggest that a sequential model of engaging in deliberation might have to be revised. Therefore, we will present an approach based on Signal Detection Theory and on intuitive conflict detection. We predict that individuals arrive at the moral decisions by comparing potential action outcomes (e.g., harm caused and utilitarian gain) simultaneously. The response criterion can be influenced by intuitive processes, such as heuristic moral value processing, or considerations of harm caused

When fast logic meets slow belief: Evidence for a parallel-processing model of belief bias.

Two experiments pitted the default-interventionist account of belief bias against a parallel-processing model. According to the former, belief bias occurs because a fast, belief-based evaluation of the conclusion pre-empts a working-memory demanding logical analysis. In contrast, according to the latter both belief-based and logic-based responding occur in parallel. Participants were given deductive reasoning problems of variable complexity and instructed to decide whether the conclusion was valid on half the trials or to decide whether the conclusion was believable on the other half. When belief and logic conflict, the default-interventionist view predicts that it should take less time to respond on the basis of belief than logic, and that the believability of a conclusion should interfere with judgments of validity, but not the reverse. The parallel-processing view predicts that beliefs should interfere with logic judgments only if the processing required to evaluate the logical structure exceeds that required to evaluate the knowledge necessary to make a belief-based judgment, and vice versa otherwise. Consistent with this latter view, for the simplest reasoning problems (modus ponens), judgments of belief resulted in lower accuracy than judgments of validity, and believability interfered more with judgments of validity than the converse. For problems of moderate complexity (modus tollens and single-model syllogisms), the interference was symmetrical, in that validity interfered with belief judgments to the same degree that believability interfered with validity judgments. For the most complex (three-term multiple-model syllogisms), conclusion believability interfered more with judgments of validity than vice versa, in spite of the significant interference from conclusion validity on judgments of belief