\u27Are you playing god?\u27: Synthetic biology and the chemical ambition to create artificial life

Throughout history chemists have faced the accusation of ‘playing God’ or similar devilish associations, overshadowing all moral judgments of chemistry. The paper provides an ethical analysis of the accusation with focus on Craig Venter’s 2010 announcement of having produced the ‘first selfreplicating cell’. Against the deeper historical background of the ambitious projects that came to be known as ‘synthetic biology’, I describe Venter’s actual research and its international media reception. Then I analyze both the ethical and theological implications of creating living beings in the laboratory. In conclusion I argue that the Venter case, like many others cases from chemistry before, is a case of unfortunate science-public interaction that mislead both ethics and science

Bribeproof mechanisms for two-values domains

Schummer (Journal of Economic Theory 2000) introduced the concept of bribeproof mechanism which, in a context where monetary transfer between agents is possible, requires that manipulations through bribes are ruled out. Unfortunately, in many domains, the only bribeproof mechanisms are the trivial ones which return a fixed outcome. This work presents one of the few constructions of non-trivial bribeproof mechanisms for these quasi-linear environments. Though the suggested construction applies to rather restricted domains, the results obtained are tight: For several natural problems, the method yields the only possible bribeproof mechanism and no such mechanism is possible on more general domains.Comment: Extended abstract accepted to SAGT 2016. This ArXiv version corrects typos in the proofs of Theorem 7 and Claims 28-29 of prior ArXiv versio

A Survey on Approximation Mechanism Design without Money for Facility Games

In a facility game one or more facilities are placed in a metric space to serve a set of selfish agents whose addresses are their private information. In a classical facility game, each agent wants to be as close to a facility as possible, and the cost of an agent can be defined as the distance between her location and the closest facility. In an obnoxious facility game, each agent wants to be far away from all facilities, and her utility is the distance from her location to the facility set. The objective of each agent is to minimize her cost or maximize her utility. An agent may lie if, by doing so, more benefit can be obtained. We are interested in social choice mechanisms that do not utilize payments. The game designer aims at a mechanism that is strategy-proof, in the sense that any agent cannot benefit by misreporting her address, or, even better, group strategy-proof, in the sense that any coalition of agents cannot all benefit by lying. Meanwhile, it is desirable to have the mechanism to be approximately optimal with respect to a chosen objective function. Several models for such approximation mechanism design without money for facility games have been proposed. In this paper we briefly review these models and related results for both deterministic and randomized mechanisms, and meanwhile we present a general framework for approximation mechanism design without money for facility games

Cake Cutting Algorithms for Piecewise Constant and Piecewise Uniform Valuations

Cake cutting is one of the most fundamental settings in fair division and mechanism design without money. In this paper, we consider different levels of three fundamental goals in cake cutting: fairness, Pareto optimality, and strategyproofness. In particular, we present robust versions of envy-freeness and proportionality that are not only stronger than their standard counter-parts but also have less information requirements. We then focus on cake cutting with piecewise constant valuations and present three desirable algorithms: CCEA (Controlled Cake Eating Algorithm), MEA (Market Equilibrium Algorithm) and CSD (Constrained Serial Dictatorship). CCEA is polynomial-time, robust envy-free, and non-wasteful. It relies on parametric network flows and recent generalizations of the probabilistic serial algorithm. For the subdomain of piecewise uniform valuations, we show that it is also group-strategyproof. Then, we show that there exists an algorithm (MEA) that is polynomial-time, envy-free, proportional, and Pareto optimal. MEA is based on computing a market-based equilibrium via a convex program and relies on the results of Reijnierse and Potters [24] and Devanur et al. [15]. Moreover, we show that MEA and CCEA are equivalent to mechanism 1 of Chen et. al. [12] for piecewise uniform valuations. We then present an algorithm CSD and a way to implement it via randomization that satisfies strategyproofness in expectation, robust proportionality, and unanimity for piecewise constant valuations. For the case of two agents, it is robust envy-free, robust proportional, strategyproof, and polynomial-time. Many of our results extend to more general settings in cake cutting that allow for variable claims and initial endowments. We also show a few impossibility results to complement our algorithms.Comment: 39 page

Sequential Deliberation for Social Choice

In large scale collective decision making, social choice is a normative study of how one ought to design a protocol for reaching consensus. However, in instances where the underlying decision space is too large or complex for ordinal voting, standard voting methods of social choice may be impractical. How then can we design a mechanism - preferably decentralized, simple, scalable, and not requiring any special knowledge of the decision space - to reach consensus? We propose sequential deliberation as a natural solution to this problem. In this iterative method, successive pairs of agents bargain over the decision space using the previous decision as a disagreement alternative. We describe the general method and analyze the quality of its outcome when the space of preferences define a median graph. We show that sequential deliberation finds a 1.208- approximation to the optimal social cost on such graphs, coming very close to this value with only a small constant number of agents sampled from the population. We also show lower bounds on simpler classes of mechanisms to justify our design choices. We further show that sequential deliberation is ex-post Pareto efficient and has truthful reporting as an equilibrium of the induced extensive form game. We finally show that for general metric spaces, the second moment of of the distribution of social cost of the outcomes produced by sequential deliberation is also bounded

Mechanism Design for Constrained Heterogeneous Facility Location

The facility location problem has emerged as the benchmark problem in the study of the trade-off between incentive compatibility without transfers and approximation guarantee, a research area also known as approximate mechanism design without money. One limitation of the vast literature on the subject is the assumption that agents and facilities have to be located on the same physical space. We here initiate the study of constrained heterogeneous facility location problems, wherein selfish agents can either like or dislike the facility and facilities can be located on a given feasible region of the Euclidean plane. In our study, agents are assumed to be located on a real segment, and their location together with their preferences towards the facilities can be part of their private type. Our main result is a characterization of the feasible regions for which the optimum is incentive-compatible in the settings wherein agents can only lie about their preferences or about their locations. The stark contrast between the two findings is that in the former case any feasible region can be coupled with incentive compatibility, whilst in the second, this is only possible for feasible regions where the optimum is constant

Collaboration in sensor network research: an in-depth longitudinal analysis of assortative mixing patterns

Many investigations of scientific collaboration are based on statistical analyses of large networks constructed from bibliographic repositories. These investigations often rely on a wealth of bibliographic data, but very little or no other information about the individuals in the network, and thus, fail to illustrate the broader social and academic landscape in which collaboration takes place. In this article, we perform an in-depth longitudinal analysis of a relatively small network of scientific collaboration (N = 291) constructed from the bibliographic record of a research center involved in the development and application of sensor network and wireless technologies. We perform a preliminary analysis of selected structural properties of the network, computing its range, configuration and topology. We then support our preliminary statistical analysis with an in-depth temporal investigation of the assortative mixing of selected node characteristics, unveiling the researchers' propensity to collaborate preferentially with others with a similar academic profile. Our qualitative analysis of mixing patterns offers clues as to the nature of the scientific community being modeled in relation to its organizational, disciplinary, institutional, and international arrangements of collaboration.Comment: Scientometrics (In press

Comparison of Breast Cancer to Healthy Control Tissue Discovers Novel Markers with Potential for Prognosis and Early Detection

This study was initiated to identify biomarkers with potential value for the early detection of poor-outcome breast cancer. Two sets of well-characterized tissues were utilized: one from breast cancer patients with favorable vs. poor outcome and the other from healthy women undergoing reduction mammaplasty. Over 46 differentially expressed genes were identified from a large list of potential targets by a) mining publicly available expression data (identifying 134 genes for quantitative PCR) and b) utilizing a commercial PCR array. Three genes show elevated expression in cancers with poor outcome and low expression in all other tissues, warranting further investigation as potential blood markers for early detection of cancers with poor outcome. Twelve genes showed lower expression in cancers with poor outcome than in cancers with favorable outcome but no differential expression between aggressive cancers and most healthy controls. These genes are more likely to be useful as prognostic tissue markers than as serum markers for early detection of aggressive disease. As a secondary finding was that, when histologically normal breast tissue was removed from a distant site in a breast with cancer, 7 of 38 specimens displayed a cancer-like expression profile, while the remaining 31 were genetically similar to the reduction mammaplasty control group. This finding suggests that some regions of ipsilateral histologically ‘normal’ breast tissue are predisposed to becoming malignant and that normal-appearing tissue with malignant signature might warrant treatment to prevent new primary tumors

Longitudinal Analysis of Quality of Life, Clinical, Radiographic, Echocardiographic, and Laboratory Variables in Dogs with Preclinical Myxomatous Mitral Valve Disease Receiving Pimobendan or Placebo: The EPIC Study

Background: Changes in clinical variables associated with the administration of pimobendan to dogs with preclinical myxomatous mitral valve disease (MMVD) and cardiomegaly have not been described. Objectives: To investigate the effect of pimobendan on clinical variables and the relationship between a change in heart size and the time to congestive heart failure (CHF) or cardiac-related death (CRD) in dogs with MMVD and cardiomegaly. To determine whether pimobendan-treated dogs differ from dogs receiving placebo at onset of CHF. Animals: Three hundred and fifty-four dogs with MMVD and cardiomegaly. Materials and Methods: Prospective, blinded study with dogs randomized (ratio 1:1) to pimobendan (0.4-0.6 mg/kg/d) or placebo. Clinical, laboratory, and heart-size variables in both groups were measured and compared at different time points (day 35 and onset of CHF) and over the study duration. Relationships between short-term changes in echocardiographic variables and time to CHF or CRD were explored. Results: At day 35, heart size had reduced in the pimobendan group:median change in (Delta) LVIDDN -0.06 (IQR:-0.15 to + 0.02), P < 0.0001, and LA:Ao -0.08 (IQR:-0.23 to + 0.03), P < 0.0001. Reduction in heart size was associated with increased time to CHF or CRD. Hazard ratio for a 0.1 increase in Delta LVIDDN was 1.26, P = 0.0003. Hazard ratio for a 0.1 increase in Delta LA:Ao was 1.14, P = 0.0002. At onset of CHF, groups were similar. Conclusions and Clinical Importance: Pimobendan treatment reduces heart size. Reduced heart size is associated with improved outcome. At the onset of CHF, dogs treated with pimobendan were indistinguishable from those receiving placebo

Uniform, Equal Division, and Other Envy-Free Rules between The Two

This paper studies the problem of fairly allocating an amount of a divisible resource when preferences are single-peaked. We characterize the class of envy-free and peak-only rules and show that the class forms a complete lattice with respect to a dominance relation. We also pin down the subclass of strategy-proof rules and show that the subclass also forms a complete lattice. In both cases, the upper bound is the uniform rule, the lower bound is the equal division rule, and any other rule is between the two