Self-organization of punishment in structured populations

Cooperation is crucial for the remarkable evolutionary success of the human species. Not surprisingly, some individuals are willing to bare additional costs in order to punish defectors. Current models assume that, once set, the fine and cost of punishment do not change over time. Here we show that relaxing this assumption by allowing players to adapt their sanctioning efforts in dependence on the success of cooperation can explain both, the spontaneous emergence of punishment, as well as its ability to deter defectors and those unwilling to punish them with globally negligible investments. By means of phase diagrams and the analysis of emerging spatial patterns, we demonstrate that adaptive punishment promotes public cooperation either through the invigoration of spatial reciprocity, the prevention of the emergence of cyclic dominance, or through the provision of competitive advantages to those that sanction antisocial behavior. Presented results indicate that the process of self-organization significantly elevates the effectiveness of punishment, and they reveal new mechanisms by means of which this fascinating and widespread social behavior could have evolved.Comment: 13 pages, 4 figures; accepted for publication in New Journal of Physic

Cancer phenotype as the outcome of an evolutionary game between normal and malignant cells

There is variability in the cancer phenotype across individuals: two patients with the same tumour may experience different disease life histories, resulting from genetic variation within the tumour and from the interaction between tumour and host. Until now, phenotypic variability has precluded a clear-cut identification of the fundamental characteristics of a given tumour type.Journal ArticleResearch Support, Non-U.S. Gov'tSCOPUS: ar.jinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishe

Evolutionary advantages of adaptive rewarding

Our wellbeing depends as much on our personal success, as it does on the success of our society. The realization of this fact makes cooperation a very much needed trait. Experiments have shown that rewards can elevate our readiness to cooperate, but since giving a reward inevitably entails paying a cost for it, the emergence and stability of such behavior remain elusive. Here we show that allowing for the act of rewarding to self-organize in dependence on the success of cooperation creates several evolutionary advantages that instill new ways through which collaborative efforts are promoted. Ranging from indirect territorial battle to the spontaneous emergence and destruction of coexistence, phase diagrams and the underlying spatial patterns reveal fascinatingly reach social dynamics that explains why this costly behavior has evolved and persevered. Comparisons with adaptive punishment, however, uncover an Achilles heel of adaptive rewarding that is due to over-aggression, which in turn hinders optimal utilization of network reciprocity. This may explain why, despite of its success, rewarding is not as firmly weaved into our societal organization as punishment.Comment: 14 pages, 8 figures; accepted for publication in New Journal of Physic

Counterfactual thinking in cooperation dynamics

Counterfactual Thinking is a human cognitive ability studied in a wide variety of domains. It captures the process of reasoning about a past event that did not occur, namely what would have happened had this event occurred, or, otherwise, to reason about an event that did occur but what would ensue had it not. Given the wide cognitive empowerment of counterfactual reasoning in the human individual, the question arises of how the presence of individuals with this capability may improve cooperation in populations of self-regarding individuals. Here we propose a mathematical model, grounded on Evolutionary Game Theory, to examine the population dynamics emerging from the interplay between counterfactual thinking and social learning (i.e., individuals that learn from the actions and success of others) whenever the individuals in the population face a collective dilemma. Our results suggest that counterfactual reasoning fosters coordination in collective action problems occurring in large populations, and has a limited impact on cooperation dilemmas in which coordination is not required. Moreover, we show that a small prevalence of individuals resorting to counterfactual thinking is enough to nudge an entire population towards highly cooperative standards.Comment: 18 page

Effects of dimers on cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game

We investigate the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game in structured populations by introducing dimers, which are defined as that two players in each dimer always hold a same strategy. We find that influences of dimers on cooperation depend on the type of dimers and the population structure. For those dimers in which players interact with each other, the cooperation level increases with the number of dimers though the cooperation improvement level depends on the type of network structures. On the other hand, the dimers, in which there are not mutual interactions, will not do any good to the cooperation level in a single community, but interestingly, will improve the cooperation level in a population with two communities. We explore the relationship between dimers and self-interactions and find that the effects of dimers are similar to that of self-interactions. Also, we find that the dimers, which are established over two communities in a multi-community network, act as one type of interaction through which information between communities is communicated by the requirement that two players in a dimer hold a same strategy.Comment: 12 pages and 3 figure

Reply: Evolutionary game theory: lessons and limitations, a cancer perspective

SCOPUS: le.jinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishe

Wisdom of groups promotes cooperation in evolutionary social dilemmas

Whether or not to change strategy depends not only on the personal success of each individual, but also on the success of others. Using this as motivation, we study the evolution of cooperation in games that describe social dilemmas, where the propensity to adopt a different strategy depends both on individual fitness as well as on the strategies of neighbors. Regardless of whether the evolutionary process is governed by pairwise or group interactions, we show that plugging into the "wisdom of groups" strongly promotes cooperative behavior. The more the wider knowledge is taken into account the more the evolution of defectors is impaired. We explain this by revealing a dynamically decelerated invasion process, by means of which interfaces separating different domains remain smooth and defectors therefore become unable to efficiently invade cooperators. This in turn invigorates spatial reciprocity and establishes decentralized decision making as very beneficial for resolving social dilemmas.Comment: 8 two-column pages, 7 figures; accepted for publication in Scientific Report

Adaptive Contact Networks Change Effective Disease Infectiousness and Dynamics

Human societies are organized in complex webs that are constantly reshaped by a social dynamic which is influenced by the information individuals have about others. Similarly, epidemic spreading may be affected by local information that makes individuals aware of the health status of their social contacts, allowing them to avoid contact with those infected and to remain in touch with the healthy. Here we study disease dynamics in finite populations in which infection occurs along the links of a dynamical contact network whose reshaping may be biased based on each individual's health status. We adopt some of the most widely used epidemiological models, investigating the impact of the reshaping of the contact network on the disease dynamics. We derive analytical results in the limit where network reshaping occurs much faster than disease spreading and demonstrate numerically that this limit extends to a much wider range of time scales than one might anticipate. Specifically, we show that from a population-level description, disease propagation in a quickly adapting network can be formulated equivalently as disease spreading on a well-mixed population but with a rescaled infectiousness. We find that for all models studied here – SI, SIS and SIR – the effective infectiousness of a disease depends on the population size, the number of infected in the population, and the capacity of healthy individuals to sever contacts with the infected. Importantly, we indicate how the use of available information hinders disease progression, either by reducing the average time required to eradicate a disease (in case recovery is possible), or by increasing the average time needed for a disease to spread to the entire population (in case recovery or immunity is impossible)

Multi-level evidence of an allelic hierarchy of USH2A variants in hearing, auditory processing and speech/language outcomes.

Language development builds upon a complex network of interacting subservient systems. It therefore follows that variations in, and subclinical disruptions of, these systems may have secondary effects on emergent language. In this paper, we consider the relationship between genetic variants, hearing, auditory processing and language development. We employ whole genome sequencing in a discovery family to target association and gene x environment interaction analyses in two large population cohorts; the Avon Longitudinal Study of Parents and Children (ALSPAC) and UK10K. These investigations indicate that USH2A variants are associated with altered low-frequency sound perception which, in turn, increases the risk of developmental language disorder. We further show that Ush2a heterozygote mice have low-level hearing impairments, persistent higher-order acoustic processing deficits and altered vocalizations. These findings provide new insights into the complexity of genetic mechanisms serving language development and disorders and the relationships between developmental auditory and neural systems

Different reactions to adverse neighborhoods in games of cooperation

In social dilemmas, cooperation among randomly interacting individuals is often difficult to achieve. The situation changes if interactions take place in a network where the network structure jointly evolves with the behavioral strategies of the interacting individuals. In particular, cooperation can be stabilized if individuals tend to cut interaction links when facing adverse neighborhoods. Here we consider two different types of reaction to adverse neighborhoods, and all possible mixtures between these reactions. When faced with a gloomy outlook, players can either choose to cut and rewire some of their links to other individuals, or they can migrate to another location and establish new links in the new local neighborhood. We find that in general local rewiring is more favorable for the evolution of cooperation than emigration from adverse neighborhoods. Rewiring helps to maintain the diversity in the degree distribution of players and favors the spontaneous emergence of cooperative clusters. Both properties are known to favor the evolution of cooperation on networks. Interestingly, a mixture of migration and rewiring is even more favorable for the evolution of cooperation than rewiring on its own. While most models only consider a single type of reaction to adverse neighborhoods, the coexistence of several such reactions may actually be an optimal setting for the evolution of cooperation.Comment: 12 pages, 5 figures; accepted for publication in PLoS ON