Game Based Learning for Safety and Security Education

Safety and security education are important part of technology related education, because of recent number of increase in safety and security related incidents. Game based learning is an emerging and rapidly advancing forms of computer-assisted instruction. Game based learning for safety and security education enables students to learn concepts and skills without the risk of physical injury and security breach. In this paper, a pedestal grinder safety game and physical security game have been developed using industrial standard modeling and game development software. The average score of the knowledge test of grinder safety game was 82%, which is higher than traditional lecture only instruction method. In addition, the survey of physical security game shows 84% average satisfaction ratio from high school students who played the game during the summer camp. The results of these studies indicated that game based learning method can enhance students' learning without potential harm to the students

Associated consistency and values for TU games

In the framework of the solution theory for cooperative transferable utility games, Hamiache axiomatized the well-known Shapley value as the unique one-point solution verifying the inessential game property, continuity, and associated consistency. The purpose of this paper is to extend Hamiache's axiomatization to the class of efficient, symmetric, and linear values, of which the Shapley value is the most important representative. For this enlarged class of values, explicit relationships to the Shapley value are exploited in order to axiomatize such values with reference to a slightly adapted inessential game property, continuity, and a similar associated consistency. The latter axiom requires that the solutions of the initial game and its associated game (with the same player set, but a different characteristic function) coincide

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The Prediction value

We introduce the prediction value (PV) as a measure of players' informational importance in probabilistic TU games. The latter combine a standard TU game and a probability distribution over the set of coalitions. Player $i$'s prediction value equals the difference between the conditional expectations of $v(S)$ when $i$ cooperates or not. We characterize the prediction value as a special member of the class of (extended) values which satisfy anonymity, linearity and a consistency property. Every $n$-player binomial semivalue coincides with the PV for a particular family of probability distributions over coalitions. The PV can thus be regarded as a power index in specific cases. Conversely, some semivalues -- including the Banzhaf but not the Shapley value -- can be interpreted in terms of informational importance.Comment: 26 pages, 2 table

Regression games

The solution of a TU cooperative game can be a distribution of the value of the grand coalition, i.e. it can be a distribution of the payo (utility) all the players together achieve. In a regression model, the evaluation of the explanatory variables can be a distribution of the overall t, i.e. the t of the model every regressor variable is involved. Furthermore, we can take regression models as TU cooperative games where the explanatory (regressor) variables are the players. In this paper we introduce the class of regression games, characterize it and apply the Shapley value to evaluating the explanatory variables in regression models. In order to support our approach we consider Young (1985)'s axiomatization of the Shapley value, and conclude that the Shapley value is a reasonable tool to evaluate the explanatory variables of regression models

Power-Law distributions and Fisher's information measure

We show that thermodynamic uncertainties (TU) it preserve their form in passing from Boltzmann-Gibbs' statistics to Tsallis' one provided that we express these TU in terms of the appropriate variable conjugate to the temperature in a nonextensive context.Comment: accepted for publication in Physica

Value, complement reduction and interval TU games

In the framework of interval transferable-utility (TU) games, we introduce a generalization of the equal allocation of nonseparable cost (EANSC). Further, we extend the reduced game introduced by Moulin (1985) to interval TU games. By applying this extended reduction, two axiomatizations of this extended EANSC are proposed.Interval TU games, the equal allocation of nonseparable cost, reduced game.