Policy trade-offs between climate mitigation and clean cook-stove access in South Asia

Household air pollution from traditional cook stoves presents a greater health hazard than any other environmental factor. Despite government efforts to support clean-burning cooking fuels, over 700 million people in South Asia could still rely on traditional stoves in 2030. This number could rise if climate change mitigation efforts increase energy costs. Here we quantify the costs of support policies to make clean cooking affordable to all South Asians under four increasingly stringent climate policy scenarios. Our most sringent mitigation scenario increases clean fuel costs 38% in 2030 relative to the baseline, keeping 21% more South Asians on traditional stoves or increasing the minimum support policy cost to achieve universal clean cooking by up to 44%. The extent of this increase depends on how poliymakers allocate subsidies between clean fuels and stoves. These additional costs are within the range of financial transfers to South Asia estimated in efforts-sharing scenarios of international climate agreements. Three billion people globally burn solid fuels such as firewood, charcoal, coal, dung, and crop resides in open fires and traditional stoves for cooking and heating. Household air pollution from the incomplete combustion of these fuels globally leads to 4.3 million premature deaths each year, with 1.7 million of those in South Asia. This exceeds the burden of disease from any other energy-related or environmental risk factor. Solid-fuel use also perpetuates income and gender inequality by forcing users, mostly poor women and children, to spend long hours collecting fuels and to suffer from its adverse health effects. To address this problem, the United Nations Secretary-General's Sustainable Energy for All (SE4All) initiative and the new Sustainable Development Goals aim to achieve universal access to modern energy services by 2030. Numerous intervention efforts have focused on distributing more efficient and cleaner burning biomass stoves, but several of these programmes have had little or no demonstrable impact on health outcomes. In India, the nation with the largest population of solid-fuel users globally, government interventions have sought to make petroleum-based fuels, such as kerosene and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), more affordable through subsidy at an estimated cost of over US$6 billion per year. Although LPG use has grown rapidly, particularly in rural areas, over 72% of Indians continued to rely primarily on solid fuels in 2012. In the future, expanding clean cooking may become more challenging if climate policies increase the cost of fuels. Previous research has found that greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reductions in Asia and Africa would increase the cost of kerosene and LPG. However, these studies do not explore compensatory policies that could counteract these effects, and assess only a limited set of climate mitigation scenarios. Only two studies explore normative scenarios that achieve access and climate goals simultanously, both of which do not explore the cost-effectiveness or distributional impacts on population subgroups of these policies. Meanwhile, studies that have evaluated the cost-effectiveness of energy access policies have not considered the impact of climate policy. Te latest assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) concludes that we have only low confidence in our understanding of the possible impacts of climate policy on access to modern energy services, and medium confidence in the policies needed to counteract them. In this study, we contribute new insights to the interaction of climate policy and clean cooking acces policies by quantifying the feasibility and costs of achieving universal access by 2030 for a range of climate policy stringencies, and under a wide range of fuel and stove price support policies. Our analysis suggests that the potential trade-offs between the two goals might be arger than suggested by previous studies. However, we find that efficient policy design could partially compensate for the additional access policy costs associated with climate mitigation. Furthermore, these costs fall below the level of potential financial transfers to South Asia that may result from international climate agreements

Demand-side approaches for limiting global warming to 1.5 °C

The Paris Climate Agreement defined an ambition of limiting global warming to 1.5 °C above preindustrial levels. This has triggered research on stringent emission reduction targets and corresponding mitigation pathways across energy economy and societal systems. Driven by methodological considerations, supply side and carbon dioxide removal options feature prominently in the emerging pathway literature, while much less attention has been given to the role of demand-side approaches. This special issue addresses this gap, and aims to broaden and strengthen the knowledge base in this key research and policy area. This editorial paper synthesizes the special issue’s contributions horizontally through three shared themes we identify: policy interventions, demand-side measures, and methodological approaches. The review of articles is supplemented by insights from other relevant literature. Overall, our paper underlines that stringent demand-side policy portfolios are required to drive the pace and direction of deep decarbonization pathways and keep the 1.5 °C target within reach. It confirms that insufficient attention has been paid to demand-side measures, which are found to be inextricably linked to supply-side decarbonization and able to complement supply-side measures. The paper also shows that there is an abundance of demand-side measures to limit warming to 1.5 °C, but it warns that not all of these options are “seen” or captured by current quantitative tools or progress indicators, and some remain insufficiently represented in the current policy discourse. Based on the set of papers presented in the special issue, we conclude that demand-side mitigation in line with the 1.5 °C goal is possible; however, it remains enormously challenging and dependent on both innovative technologies and policies, and behavioral change. Limiting warming to 1.5 °C requires, more than ever, a plurality of methods and integrated behavioral and technology approaches to better support policymaking and resulting policy interventions

Downscaling down under: towards degrowth in integrated assessment models

IPCC reports, to date, have not featured ambitious mitigation scenarios with degrowth in high-income regions. Here, using MESSAGEix-Australia, we create 51 emissions scenarios for Australia with near-term GDP growth going from +3%/year to rapid reductions (−5%/year) to explore how a traditional integrated assessment model (IAM) represents degrowth from an economic starting point, not just energy demand reduction. We find that stagnating GDP per capita reduces the mid-century need for upscaling solar and wind energy by about 40% compared to the SSP2 growth baseline, and limits future material needs for renewables. Still, solar and wind energy in 2030 is more than quadruple that of 2020. Faster reductions in energy demand may entail higher socio-cultural feasibility concerns, depending on the policies involved. Strong reductions in inequality reduce the risk of lowered access to decent living services. We discuss research needs and possible IAM extensions to improve post-growth and degrowth scenario modelling

A Human Development Framework for CO2 Reductions

Although developing countries are called to participate in CO2 emission reduction efforts to avoid dangerous climate change, the implications of proposed reduction schemes in human development standards of developing countries remain a matter of debate. We show the existence of a positive and time-dependent correlation between the Human Development Index (HDI) and per capita CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion. Employing this empirical relation, extrapolating the HDI, and using three population scenarios, the cumulative CO2 emissions necessary for developing countries to achieve particular HDI thresholds are assessed following a Development As Usual approach (DAU). If current demographic and development trends are maintained, we estimate that by 2050 around 85% of the world's population will live in countries with high HDI (above 0.8). In particular, 300Gt of cumulative CO2 emissions between 2000 and 2050 are estimated to be necessary for the development of 104 developing countries in the year 2000. This value represents between 20% to 30% of previously calculated CO2 budgets limiting global warming to 2{\deg}C. These constraints and results are incorporated into a CO2 reduction framework involving four domains of climate action for individual countries. The framework reserves a fair emission path for developing countries to proceed with their development by indexing country-dependent reduction rates proportional to the HDI in order to preserve the 2{\deg}C target after a particular development threshold is reached. Under this approach, global cumulative emissions by 2050 are estimated to range from 850 up to 1100Gt of CO2. These values are within the uncertainty range of emissions to limit global temperatures to 2{\deg}C.Comment: 14 pages, 7 figures, 1 tabl

How Low Can We Go? The Implications of Delayed Ratcheting and Negative Emissions Technologies on Achieving Well Below 2 °C

Pledges embodied in the nationally determined contributions (NDCs) represent an interim step from a global “no policy” path towards an optimal long-term global mitigation path. However, the goals of the Paris Agreement highlight that current pledges are insufficient. It is, therefore, necessary to ratchet-up parties’ future mitigation pledges in the near-term. The ambitious goals of remaining well below 2 °C and pursuing reductions towards 1.5 °C mean that any delay in ratcheting-up commitments could be extremely costly or may even make the targets unachievable. In this chapter, we consider the impacts of delaying ratcheting until 2030 on global emissions trajectories towards 2 °C and 1.5 °C, and the role of offsets via negative emissions technologies (NETs). The analysis suggests that delaying action makes pursuing the 1.5 °C goal especially difficult without extremely high levels of negative emissions technologies (NETs), such as carbon capture and storage combined with bioenergy (BECCS). Depending on the availability of biomass, other NETs beyond BECCS will be required. Policymakers must also realise that the outlook for fossil fuels are closely linked to the prospects for NETs. If NETs cannot be scaled, the levels of fossil fuels suggested in this analysis are not compatible with the Paris Agreement goals i.e. there are risks of lock-in to a high fossil future. Decision makers must, therefore, comprehend fully the risks of different strategies