The Economic Adjustment Program for Portugal : assessing welfare impact in a heterogeneous-agent framework

The sovereign debt crisis, triggered by the 2007-08 global financial cri- sis, has affected several European Union (EU) countries, leading to unprecedented financial assistance programs. In May 2011, the Portuguese Government set an agreement with the Troika (a supranational institution composed by the European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)), through which, in exchange for external help, the Portuguese author- ities committed to an Economic Adjustment Program (EAP). In order to assess the impacts of the EAP on welfare and, in particular, on inequality, this paper simulates the debt consolidation strategy proposed by the Troika using a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents. The model enables to explore the impacts of the fiscal adjustment on the endogenous cross-section distribution of income, wealth and welfare. Our results predict a positive net welfare gain, despite the existence of sig- nificant transition costs in terms of output losses and inequality, especially during the first years of implementation. Overall, the net positive welfare gains are biased towards the poorer, which means that the consolidation plan will be, in the end, equality-enhancing. These results reflect the instruments involved in the consolida- tion strategy: productive and unproductive expenditure cuts combined with a slight increase in social transfers. Furthermore, the simulation predicts a positive impact on the Portuguese net foreign asset (NFA) position. Assuming this prediction is correct, this strongly supports the motivation for the adoption of the Economic Adjustment Program which considers the large external indebtedness of Portugal as a central issue in the economic diagnosis.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Unemployment, crime and social insurance

We study an individual's incentive to search for a job in the presence of random criminal opportunities. These opportunities extenuate moral hazard, as the individual sometimes commits crime rather than searching. Even when he searches, he applies less effort. We then revisit the design of optimal unemployment insurance in this environment. If the individual is more likely to remain unemployed and unpunished when he commits crime than when he searches for a job (as suggested by empirical studies), declining unemployment benefits reduce the payoff from crime relative to that from searching. Compared to the canonical models of optimal unemployment insurance, this provides a further incentive to reduce benefits over time

The Farm, the city, and the emergence of social security

We study the social, demographic and economic origins of social security. The data for the U.S. and for a cross section of countries suggest that urbanization and industrialization are associated with the rise of social insurance. We describe an OLG model in which demographics, technology, and social security are linked together in a political economy equilibrium. In the model economy, there are two locations (sectors), the farm (agricultural) and the city (industrial) and the decision to migrate from rural to urban locations is endogenous and linked to productivity differences between the two locations and survival probabilities. Farmers rely on land inheritance for their old age and do not support a pay-as-you-go social security system. With structural change, people migrate to the city, the land loses its importance and support for social security arises. We show that a calibrated version of this economy, where social security taxes are determined by majority voting, is consistent with the historical transformation in the United States