81 research outputs found
Local Interaction on Random Graphs
We analyze dynamic local interaction in population games where the local interaction structure (modeled as a graph) can change over time: A stochastic process generates a random sequence of graphs. This contrasts with models where the initial interaction structure (represented by a deterministic graph or the realization of a random graph) cannot change over time
It is Hobbes, not Rousseau:an experiment on voting and redistribution
We perform an experiment which provides a laboratory replica of some
important features of the welfare state. In the experiment, all individuals in a group
decide whether to make a costly effort, which produces a random (independent) outcome
for each one of them. The group members then vote on whether to redistribute
the resulting and commonly known total sum of earnings equally amongst themselves.
This game has two equilibria, if played once. In one of them, all players make
effort and there is little redistribution. In the other one, there is no effort and nothingWe thank Iris Bohnet, Tim Cason, David Cooper, John Duffy, Maia Guell, John Van Huyck and Robin Mason for helpful conversations and encouragement. The comments of the Editor and two referees helped improve the paper. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from Spain’s Ministry of Science and Innovation under grants CONSOLIDER INGENIO 2010 CSD2006-0016 (all authors), ECO2009-10531 (Cabrales), ECO2008-01768 (Nagel) and the Comunidad de Madrid under grant Excelecon (Cabrales), the Generalitat de Catalunya and the CREA program (Nagel), and project SEJ2007-64340 of Spain’s Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia (Rodríguez Mora).Publicad
Fashion, Cooperation, and Social Interactions
Fashion plays such a crucial rule in the evolution of culture and society
that it is regarded as a second nature to the human being. Also, its impact on
economy is quite nontrivial. On what is fashionable, interestingly, there are
two viewpoints that are both extremely widespread but almost opposite:
conformists think that what is popular is fashionable, while rebels believe
that being different is the essence. Fashion color is fashionable in the first
sense, and Lady Gaga in the second. We investigate a model where the population
consists of the afore-mentioned two groups of people that are located on social
networks (a spatial cellular automata network and small-world networks). This
model captures two fundamental kinds of social interactions (coordination and
anti-coordination) simultaneously, and also has its own interest to game
theory: it is a hybrid model of pure competition and pure cooperation. This is
true because when a conformist meets a rebel, they play the zero sum matching
pennies game, which is pure competition. When two conformists (rebels) meet,
they play the (anti-) coordination game, which is pure cooperation. Simulation
shows that simple social interactions greatly promote cooperation: in most
cases people can reach an extraordinarily high level of cooperation, through a
selfish, myopic, naive, and local interacting dynamic (the best response
dynamic). We find that degree of synchronization also plays a critical role,
but mostly on the negative side. Four indices, namely cooperation degree,
average satisfaction degree, equilibrium ratio and complete ratio, are defined
and applied to measure people's cooperation levels from various angles. Phase
transition, as well as emergence of many interesting geographic patterns in the
cellular automata network, is also observed.Comment: 21 pages, 12 figure
- …