Consumers' Perception of Sustainably Produced Food: The case of local and organic production technologies

This paper identifies ways to improve on the current literature regarding sustainable production technologies, in this case, organic and local products. A survey method is used to examine organic and local markets in place of a single product to gain a better understanding of consumers‟ response to these products, their reactions to price differences of these products, and how their preferences change based on changing income level and prices. The sample was drawn from a commercial database and was attempted to be made random across the U.S. population. In place of results, hypotheses are presented as data were late coming back.consumer preferences, sustainability, organic, local, willingness to value, Agribusiness, Demand and Price Analysis, Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety, Marketing,

Do Inspection and Traceability Provide Incentives for Food Safety?

One of the goals of inspection and traceability is to motivate suppliers to deliver safer food. The ability of these policies to motivate suppliers depends on the accuracy of the inspection, the cost of failing inspection, the cost of causing a foodborne illness, and the proportion of these costs paid by the supplier. We develop a model of the supplier's expected cost as a function of inspection accuracy, the cost of failure, and the proportion of the failure cost that is allocated to suppliers. The model is used to identify the conditions under which the supplier is motivated to deliver uncontaminated lots. Surprisingly, our results show that when safety failure costs can be allocated to suppliers, minimum levels of inspection error are required to motivate a supplier to deliver uncontaminated lots. This result does not hold when costs cannot be allocated to suppliers. As a case study, we use our results to analyze the technical requirements for suppliers of frozen beef to the USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service.diagnostic error, food safety, inspection, sampling error, traceability, Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety,

Traceability, Moral Hazard, and Food Safety

Errors in traceability can significantly impact the moral hazard associated with producing safe food. The effect of moral hazard depends on the proportion of unsafe food costs that can be allocated to the responsible producer, which depends on the efficiency of the traceability system. In this paper, we develop a model that identifies the minimum level of traceability needed to mitigate moral hazard and motivate suppliers to produce safe food. Regulators and consumer can use the results of this research to design regulations and contracts that mitigate moral hazard and motivate producers to deliver safe food.Food safety, traceability, moral hazard, Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety,

The African Surgical OutcomeS-2 (ASOS-2) Pilot Trial, a mixed-methods implementation study

Background: The African Surgical Outcomes Study (ASOS) showed that surgical patients in Africa have a mortality twice the global average. The working hypothesis is that patients die as a result of failure to rescue following complications in the postoperative period. The African Surgical OutcomeS-2 (ASOS-2) Trial plans to test the efficacy of increased postoperative surveillance in high risk patients for decreasing perioperative morbidity and mortality. This pilot trial aimed i) to evaluate the adequacy of data produced by the data collection strategies of the ASOS-2 Trial, ii) to evaluate the fidelity of implementation of the increased postoperative surveillance intervention, and iii) to understand the acceptability, appropriateness and feasibility of the intervention and the trial processes.Methods: The ASOS-2 Pilot Trial was a mixed-methods (quantitative-qualitative) implementation study focusing on the intervention arm of the proposed ASOS-2 Trial. The intervention is increased postoperative surveillance for high-risk surgical patients. The intervention protocol was implemented at all sites for a seven-day period. A post pilot trial survey was used to collect data on the implementation outcomes.Results: 803 patients were recruited from 16 hospitals in eight African countries. The sampling and data collection strategies provided 98% complete data collection. Seventy-three percent of respondents believed that they truly provided increased postoperative surveillance to high risk patients. In reality 83/125 (66%) of high-risk patients received some form of increased postoperative surveillance. However, the individual components of the increased postoperative surveillance intervention were implemented in less than 50% of high-risk patients (excepting increasing nursing observations). The components most frequently unavailable were the ability to provide care in a higher care ward (32.1%) and assigning the patient to a bed in view of the nurses’ station (28.4%). Failure to comply with available components of the intervention ranged from 27.5% to 54.3%. The post pilot survey had a response rate of 30/40 (75%). In Likert scale questions about acceptability, appropriateness, and feasibility of the ASOS-2 intervention, 63% to 87% of respondents indicated agreement. Respondents reported barriers related to resources, trial processes, teamwork and communication as reasons for disagreement.Conclusions: The proposed ASOS-2 Trial appears to be appropriate, acceptable and feasible in Africa. This pilot trial provides support for the proposed ASOS-2 Trial. It emphasises the need for establishing trial site teams which address the needs of all stakeholders during the trial. A concerted effort must be made to help participating hospitals to increase compliance with all the components of the proposed intervention of ‘increased postoperative surveillance’ during the ASOS-2 Trial.Keywords: Trial, cluster randomised, Trial, pilot, Implementation science, Mixed methods, Mortality, Surger

The African surgical outcomes-2 (Asos-2) pilot trial, a mixed-methods implementation study

Funding Information: The ASOS-2 Pilot Trial was supported by a grant (OPP#1161108) from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.Peer reviewe

Do Inspection and Traceability Provide Incentives for Food Safety?

One of the goals of inspection and traceability is to motivate suppliers to deliver safer food. The ability of these policies to motivate suppliers depends on the accuracy of the inspection, the cost of failing inspection, the cost of causing a foodborne illness, and the proportion of these costs paid by the supplier. We develop a model of the supplier's expected cost as a function of inspection accuracy, the cost of failure, and the proportion of the failure cost that is allocated to suppliers. The model is used to identify the conditions under which the supplier is motivated to deliver uncontaminated lots. Surprisingly, our results show that when safety failure costs can be allocated to suppliers, minimum levels of inspection error are required to motivate a supplier to deliver uncontaminated lots. This result does not hold when costs cannot be allocated to suppliers. As a case study, we use our results to analyze the technical requirements for suppliers of frozen beef to the USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service

Consumers' Perception of Sustainably Produced Food: The case of local and organic production technologies

This paper identifies ways to improve on the current literature regarding sustainable production technologies, in this case, organic and local products. A survey method is used to examine organic and local markets in place of a single product to gain a better understanding of consumers‟ response to these products, their reactions to price differences of these products, and how their preferences change based on changing income level and prices. The sample was drawn from a commercial database and was attempted to be made random across the U.S. population. In place of results, hypotheses are presented as data were late coming back

TRACEABILITY, INSPECTION, AND FOOD SAFETY

Traceability exists in many food supply chains for valid economic reasons, one of which is improving food safety and quality. Some politicians and consumer groups are calling for increased identity preservation in systems where traceability has not yet been adopted. In this paper, we explore the implications of adding traceability to a food supply chain that already includes an inspection protocol. Our objective is to determine whether the addition of traceability will change the feasibility of a market for safer food and whether it will change the allocation of profits between producers and processors. We find that the addition of traceability to this system does influence whether or not the market will be feasible. If traceability is too high, then processors will not demand safer food, and if traceability is too low, then producers will not deliver safer food. We also show that the feasibility of the market depends on the sensitivity of the test used to inspect foo

Contract Selectivity, Food Safety, and Traceability

Contracts are an increasingly common method for coordinating exchange in the food industry. Contracts often include specifications for product attributes including food safety. One of the goals of explicit safety specifications is to discourage or deter suppliers who would deliver unsafe food. In this article, we use a principal-agent model in the context of adverse selection to examine how contracts that include traceability can be used to select against producers who cannot meet a processor's safety specifications. We find that the motivation to select against unsafe producers depends on the magnitude of the failure costs and the proportion of the failure costs allocated to producers. We also identify the conditions under which the processor selects against unsafe producers regardless of traceability. Our results are important to regulators and negotiators who want to support safe producers and deter unsafe producers.