The effect of pension rules on retirement monetary incentives with an application to pension reforms in Spain

In this work we theoretically disentangle the effects of pension provisions on a variety of financial incentives to retirement, trying to reconcile them with some key Spanish retirement patterns. We find that the "average" individual, who is never affected by any cap of contributions or benefits, has weak incentives to retire early and strong incentives to retire at the normal retirement age. Alternatively, individuals at the bottom of the wage distribution have strong incentives to retire as early as possible, because ot the interaction between age-related penalties and the minimun pension. Both findings perfectly accommodate the retirement hazard of medium and low earners respectively. In contrast, high earners (those that have their contributions capped) despite having strong incentives to retire at the Early Retirement Age, do not do so. This is because, for those workers, financial incentives are not a good proxy for the marginal utility from working. Finally, we analyze the reasons behind the failure of the 1997 reform in improving the sustainability of the Spanish public pension system

Endogenous retirement and public pension system reform in Spain

All around the world , developed countries have resorted to parametric reforms of their Social Security systems, in an attempt to lessen the impact of the population aging. In particular, pension formulae have been modified to reduce the generosity of the systems and to induce longer working careers. In this paper we explore the capacity of these reforms to alleviate the expected financial difficulties of current PAYG systems. This is accomplished by developing and Heterogeneous Agents, Applied General Equilibrium model where individuals can freely adjust their retirement ages in response to the incentives provided by the pension regulations. This inclusion is relevant, as parametric changes tend to significantly alter retirement incentives. We find that the calibrated model successfully reproduces the basic stylized facts of retirement behavior in Spain. In particular, it mimics the early retirement pattern of low income workers under the effects of minimum pensions. The model is then used to explore the effects of several changes in pension formula, including the reform actually implemented in 1997. The general conclusion is that parametric changes can significantly improve the financial condition of the system, but are far away from being able to fully restoring it

The effect of pension rules on retirement monetary incentives with an application to pension reforms in Spain

In this work we theoretically disentangle the effects of pension provisions on a variety of financial incentives to retirement, trying to reconcile them with some key Spanish retirement patterns. We find that the «average» individual, who is never affected by any cap of contributions or benefits, has weak incentives to retire early and strong incentives to retire at the normal retirement age. Alternatively, individuals at the bottom of the wage distribution have strong incentives to retire as early as possible, as a result of the interaction between age-related penalties and the minimum pension. Both findings perfectly accommodate the retirement hazard of medium and low earners respectively. In contrast, high earners (those that have their contributions capped) do not retire early despite having strong incentives to do so. This is because, for those workers, financial incentives are not a good proxy for the marginal utility from working. Finally, we analyze the reasons behind the failure of the 1997 reform in improving the sustainability of the Spanish public pension system.retirement, Social Security, Monetary incentives, Pension Reform, Spain

The effect of pension rules on retirement monetary incentives with an application to pension reforms in Spain.

In this work we theoretically disentangle the effects of pension provisions on a variety of financial incentives to retirement, trying to reconcile them with some key Spanish retirement patterns. We find that the "average" individual, who is never affected by any cap of contributions or benefits, has weak incentives to retire early and strong incentives to retire at the normal retirement age. Alternatively, individuals at the bottom of the wage distribution have strong incentives to retire as early as possible, because ot the interaction between age-related penalties and the minimun pension. Both findings perfectly accommodate the retirement hazard of medium and low earners respectively. In contrast, high earners (those that have their contributions capped) despite having strong incentives to retire at the Early Retirement Age, do not do so. This is because, for those workers, financial incentives are not a good proxy for the marginal utility from working. Finally, we analyze the reasons behind the failure of the 1997 reform in improving the sustainability of the Spanish public pension system.

Demographic change, pension reform and redistribution in Spain

Recent demographic changes have spurred pension reforms aimed at restoring the financial sustainability of PAYG systems. In Spain, the most significant reforms were undertaken in 1997 and in 2002, entailing an increase in the length of the averaging period in the pension formula, an increase in the penalties for early retirement and for retirement with short contributive records, a bonus for retirement after the age of 65, and a change in the eligibility conditions. In this paper we use an Applied General Equilibrium model populated by two-earners households to evaluate the redistributive impact of the pension system and the financial and welfare consequences of these reforms on households that differ in their education, region of residence and year of birth. The initial redistribution is assessed by comparing the internal rate of return provided to different households. We find that they vary considerable depending on education and cohort. Regarding the reforms, we find an increase in the implicit debt of the pension system after the reforms, and important changes in welfare. Households up to secondary education born between 1935 and 1975 are predicted to benefit from the reform, while the welfare of younger cohorts will be hit by higher taxes and unfavorable macroeconomic changes.Social Security, Pension Reform, Applied General Equilibrium, Redistribution

Investigation on the structural and magnetic properties of sputtered TbFe2/Fe3Ga heterostructures

We have analyzed the structural and magnetic properties of as-grown and annealed [TbFe2/Fe3Ga]n heterostructures grown by sputtering. Evidence of the bcc structure in the Fe3Ga layers has been found. The diffraction peak related to this structure shifts to high angles with the annealing temperature. Also, we have observed a change in the microstructure of the Tb-Fe layers when the thickness layer is reduced in the as-grown heterostructures. Moreover, the Tb content is lower than 33% of the TbFe2 Laves phase and it depends on the layer thickness. The thermal treatments promote the increase of the Tb content, but only in the heterostructures with thick layers. The strong lattice mismatch between the Tb-Fe and Fe-Ga layers seems to prevent a complete Tb diffusion upon the annealing process. Thus, the crystallization of the TbFe2 Laves phase is inhibited in the heterostructures with thin layers, although our experimental results indicate the presence of potential magnetostrictive TbFeGa alloy

Culturas deportivas y valores sociales: una aproximación a la dimensión social del deporte

El artículo tematiza las transformaciones del sistema deportivo y su progresiva complejización-personalización en relación al desarrollo y cambio de la propia sociedad con la que mantiene una relación de isomorfismo sistémico. El proceso de descentramiento y autonomización de los diferentes subsistemas sociales ha hecho del sistema deportivo una institución social clave en la (re)producción de sentido y lo ha convertido en un aparato semántico básico en la transmisión de valores. En efecto, el deporte como un mecanismo social central de expresión, interpretación y configuración de significados y valores en la sociedad contemporánea se complejiza mediante la diferenciación-individualización de una profusión de diversas culturas deportivas que permiten (in)corporar, hacer cuerpo, la estructuración de universos simbólicos personales a partir de un universo fragmentado de constelaciones éticas y simbólicas donde el individuo reflexivo (pos-tradicional) decide. Así, se pasa del nosotros colectivo al individuo múltiple y plural. De la identidad a la idenficación. Del cuerpo-destino al cuerpo-responsable. La prospectiva del sistema deportivo y de los modelos corporales asociados no hace sino anticipar el futuro social del que se retroalimentan