Cooperation, Punishment, Emergence of Government, and the Tragedy of Authorities

Under the conditions prevalent in the late Pleistocene epoch (small hunter-gatherer groups and frequent inter-group conflicts), coevolution of gene-related behavior and culturally transmitted group-level institutions provides a plausible explanation for the parochial altruistic and reciprocator traits of most modern humans. When, with the agricultural revolution, societies became larger and more complex, the collective nature of the monitoring and punishment of norm violators was no longer effective. This led to the emergence of new institutions of governance and social hierarchies. The transition from an egalitarian society and the acceptance of the new institutions may have been possible only if, in the majority of the population, the reciprocator trait had become an internalized norm. However, the new ruling class has its own dynamics, which in turn may lead to a new social crisis. Using a simple model inspired by previous work by Bowles and Gintis, these effects are studied here

An econophysics approach to analyse uncertainty in financial markets: an application to the Portuguese stock market

In recent years there has been a closer interrelationship between several scientific areas trying to obtain a more realistic and rich explanation of the natural and social phenomena. Among these it should be emphasized the increasing interrelationship between physics and financial theory. In this field the analysis of uncertainty, which is crucial in financial analysis, can be made using measures of physics statistics and information theory, namely the Shannon entropy. One advantage of this approach is that the entropy is a more general measure than the variance, since it accounts for higher order moments of a probability distribution function. An empirical application was made using data collected from the Portuguese Stock Market.Comment: 8 pages, 2 figures, presented in the conference Next Sigma-Phi 200