Computational Soundness of Non-Malleable Commitments

Contains fulltext : 72073.pdf (author's version ) (Open Access)4th International Conference, ISPEC 2008, 21 april 200

The survival rate of bridges : A study of 1674 bridges in 40 Dutch general practices

Contains fulltext : 21353.PD.PDF (publisher's version ) (Open Access

Coordinates in two variables over a Q-algebra

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Dismantling SecureMemory, CryptoMemory and CryptoRF

Contains fulltext : 83892.pdf (publisher's version ) (Open Access

Nova Micro--Hypervisor Verification

Contains fulltext : 72725.pdf (author's version ) (Open Access)61 p

Provable anonymity

This paper provides a formal framework for the analysis\ud of information hiding properties of anonymous communication\ud protocols in terms of epistemic logic. The key ingredient\ud is our notion of observational equivalence, which is\ud based on the cryptographic structure of messages and relations\ud between otherwise random looking messages. Two\ud runs are considered observationally equivalent if a spy cannot\ud discover any meaningful distinction between them. We\ud illustrate our approach by proving sender anonymity and\ud unlinkability for two anonymizing protocols, Onion Routing\ud and Crowds. Moreover, we consider a version of Onion\ud Routing in which we inject a subtle error and show how our\ud framework is capable of capturing this flaw