On the relation between modality and tense

ABSTRACT We critically review two extant paradigms for understanding the systematic interaction between modality and tense, as well as their respective modifications designed to do justice to the contingency of time’s structure and composition. We show that on either type of theory, as well as their respective modifications, some principles prove logically valid whose truth might sensibly be questioned on metaphysical grounds. These considerations lead us to devise a more general logical framework that allows accommodation of those metaphysical views that its predecessors rule out by fiat

The Structure of Justification

The paper explores a structural account of propositional justification in terms of the notion of being in a position to know and negation. Combined with a non-normal logic for being in a position to know, the account allows for the derivation of plausible principles of justification. The account is neutral on whether justification is grounded in internally individuated mental states, and likewise on whether it is grounded in facts that are already accessible by introspection or reflection alone. To this extent, it is compatible both with internalism and with externalism about justification. Even so, the account allows for the proof of principles that are commonly conceived to depend on an internalist conception of justification. The account likewise coheres both with epistemic contextualism and with its rejection, and is compatible both with the knowledge-first approach and with its rejection. Despite its neutrality on these issues, the account makes propositional justification luminous and so is controversial. However, it proves quite resilient in the light of recent anti-luminosity arguments

Being in a Position to Know and Closure: Reply to Heylen

Reply to Heyle

Perspectives sobre el futur obert: Ockham, Peirce i Belnap

Aquest assaig presenta i discuteix críticament tres punts de vista diferents sobre la noció de futur obert i les seves conseqüències per als valors de veritat de les afirmacions contingents sobre el futur, i.e. aquelles afirmacions que diuen que hi ha quelcom que serà el cas però que això no està ja determinat per fets sobre el present i el passat. La primera d'aquestes perspectives, relacionada amb el filòsof pragmatista americà Charles Sanders Peirce, manté que les afirmacions contingents sobre el futur són uniformement falses. D'acord amb la segona perspectiva, defensada, entre molts d'altres, pel filòsof contemporani Nuel Belnap, les afirmacions contingents de futur no són ni vertaderes ni falses. Per tant, cap d'aquestes dues perspectives permet que les afirmacions contingents sobre el futur puguin ser vertaderes; i tal com mostrarem, ambdós punts de vista tenen conseqüències importants (i molt possiblement difícils d'acceptar) per a la lògica i la semàntica. En contrast amb això, la tercera perspectiva que considerarem, relacionada amb el filòsof medieval Guillem d'Ockham, permet que les afirmacions contingents de futur siguin vertaderes i evita aquestes conseqüències.This essay presents and critically discusses three different views on the open future and its consequences for the truth-values of future contingents, i.e. those statements that say that something is going to be the case which is not already predetermined to be going to be the case by facts about the present and past. The first of these views, associated with the American pragmatist philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce, holds that future contingents are uniformly false. According to the second view, defended, among many others, by the contemporary philosopher Nuel Belnap, future contingents turn out to be neither true nor false. Accordingly, neither of these first two views allows for the truth of future contingents; and as will be shown, both these views have important – and arguably unpalatable – consequences for logic and semantics. By contrast, the third of the views to be reviewed, which is associated with the medieval philosopher William of Ockham, allows for the truth of future contingents and avoids these consequences

The formalities of temporaryism without presentness

Temporaryism the view that not always everything always exists comes in two main versions: presentism and expansionism (aka the growing block theory of time). Both versions of the view are commonly formulated using the notion of being present, which we, among others, find problematic. Expan- sionism is also sometimes accused of requiring extraordinary conceptual tools for its formulation. In this paper, we put forward systematic characterisations of presentism and expansionism which involve neither the notion of being present nor unfamiliar conceptual tools. These characterisations are full blown logics, each logic comprising an axiomatic proof system and an intuitive semantics with respect to which the system is both sound and complete

Inexact Knowledge 2.0

Many of our sources of knowledge only afford us knowledge that is inexact. When trying to see how tall something is, or to hear how far away something is, or to remember how long something lasted, we may come to know some facts about the approximate size, distance or duration of the thing in question but we don’t come to know exactly what its size, distance or duration is. In some such situations we also have some pointed knowledge of how inexact our knowledge is. That is, we can knowledgeably pinpoint some exact claims that we do not know. We show that standard models of inexact knowledge leave little or no room for such pointed knowledge. We devise alternative models that are not afflicted by this shortcoming

Objectivity and realism : meeting the manifestation challenge

The anti-realist maintains that all thoughts that we may entertain are thoughts whose truth-values we can in principle come to recognise. The realist refuses to make any such claim about the limits of our thinking. The anti-realist purports to arrive at her position on the basis of considerations which relate to the manifestability of understanding, i.e. the idea that grasp of thoughts must be manifested in linguistic abilities. Thus she argues against the realist that this requirement cannot be met unless truth is understood not to extend beyond what we can know. Turning the tables, I argue that it is the antirealist who cannot vindicate her position on these grounds. Some thoughts are apt for objective truth; their truth cannot be equated with their current assertibility. Our grasp of such thoughts is not yet manifested in our ability to assert or deny sentences. Once we have identified patterns of linguistic usage which display our grasp of such thoughts however, it transpires that there is no reason either to believe that their truth-values can in principle be recognised

Perspectives sobre el futur obert: Ockham, Peirce i Belnap

Aquest assaig presenta i discuteix críticament tres punts de vista diferents sobre la noció de futur obert i les seves conseqüències per als valors de veritat de les afirmacions contingents sobre el futur, i.e. aquelles afirmacions que diuen que hi ha quelcom que serà el cas però que això no està ja determinat per fets sobre el present i el passat. La primera d'aquestes perspectives, relacionada amb el filòsof pragmatista americà Charles Sanders Peirce, manté que les afirmacions contingents sobre el futur són uniformement falses. D'acord amb la segona perspectiva, defensada, entre molts d'altres, pel filòsof contemporani Nuel Belnap, les afirmacions contingents de futur no són ni vertaderes ni falses. Per tant, cap d'aquestes dues perspectives permet que les afirmacions contingents sobre el futur puguin ser vertaderes; i tal com mostrarem, ambdós punts de vista tenen conseqüències importants (i molt possiblement difícils d'acceptar) per a la lògica i la semàntica. En contrast amb això, la tercera perspectiva que considerarem, relacionada amb el filòsof medieval Guillem d'Ockham, permet que les afirmacions contingents de futur siguin vertaderes i evita aquestes conseqüències