No Utilitarians in a Pandemic? Shifts in Moral Reasoning during the COVID-19 Global Health Crisis

The COVID-19 pandemic poses many real-world moral dilemmas, which can pit the needs and rights of the many against the needs and rights of the few. We investigated the influence of this contemporary global crisis on moral judgments in older adults, who are at greatest personal risk from the pandemic. We hypothesized that during this pandemic, individuals would give fewer utilitarian responses to hypothetical dilemmas, accompanied by higher levels of confidence and emotion elicitation. Our pre-registered analysis (https://osf.io/g2wtp) involved two waves of data collection, before (2014) and during (2020) the COVID-19 pandemic, regarding three categories of moral dilemmas (personal rights, agent-centered permissions, and special obligations). While utilitarian responses considered across all categories of dilemma did not differ, participants during the 2020 wave gave fewer utilitarian responses to dilemmas involving personal rights; that is, they were less willing to violate the personal rights of others to produce the best overall outcomes

Age related processes impacting cognitive processing speed: a diffusion model analysis

The time it takes an individual to perform a cognitive task has been shown to increase with age. The drift diffusion model decomposes processes that may contribute to age-related slowing, with the drift rate parameter reflecting the rate of information accumulation until a response decision is made. This age-related slowing is hypothesized to relate to the loss of cerebral white matter integrity. Our aim was to evaluate the trajectory of processes underlying age-related slowing in older adults and explore the role of white matter integrity in such age-related slowing. We found age to be associated with drift rate in an emotion recognition and a memory task but not in a delay discounting task; and we found that global fractional anisotropy partially mediates this association in the emotion recognition task. Our results suggest that there is a slowing of information processing with age that may be specific to certain domains. A fuller understanding of the mechanisms of cognitive slowing with age will help tailor intervention strategies to specific mechanisms, and could inform environmental modifications to promote older adults’ functional independence and quality of life

Reduced utilitarian willingness to violate personal rights during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The COVID-19 pandemic poses many real-world moral dilemmas, which can pit the needs and rights of the many against the needs and rights of the few. We investigated moral judgments in the context of the contemporary global crisis among older adults, who are at greatest personal risk from the pandemic. We hypothesized that during this pandemic, individuals would give fewer utilitarian responses to hypothetical dilemmas, accompanied by higher levels of confidence and emotion elicitation. Our pre-registered analysis (https://osf.io/g2wtp) involved two waves of data collection, before (2014) and during (2020) the COVID-19 pandemic, regarding three categories of moral dilemmas (personal rights, agent-centered permissions, and special obligations). While utilitarian responses considered across all categories of dilemma did not differ, participants during the 2020 wave gave fewer utilitarian responses to dilemmas involving personal rights; that is, they were less willing to violate the personal rights of others to produce the best overall outcomes

Contrasting Two Models of Utilitarian Reasoning

One influential framework for examining human moral cognition has been a dual process model, in which utilitarian judgment (e.g., infliction of harm for the greater good) is associated with cognitive control processes, while non-utilitarian judgment (e.g., avoiding such harms) is associated with emotional, automatic processes. Another framework of moral cognition, the two-dimensional model of utilitarian psychology, posits that utilitarian choices may reflect either instrumental harm, i.e., inflicting harm on an individual for the greater good; or impartial beneficence, i.e., impartially and altruistically acting for the benefit of the overall welfare. We evaluated preregistered hypotheses (https://osf.io/m425d) derived from these models of moral cognition in a sample of 275 neurologically healthy older adults. Our results suggest that both the dual process and two-dimensional models provided insights regarding utilitarian reasoning, including three cardinal domains of conflict between utilitarianism and common-sense morality: agent-centered permissions, special obligations, and personal rights. One prediction of the dual process-based model was supported by our findings, with higher emotionality associated with decreased endorsement of utilitarian judgments (b = - 0.12, p < .001). We also found partial support for the two-dimensional model, as utilitarian judgments about dilemmas involving agent-centered permissions and personal rights were dissociated; however, both sets of judgments were associated with utilitarian judgments involving special obligations (p < .001 and p = .008, respectively). We propose that our findings, with support for some elements of the dual process and two-dimensional models, can be integrated into a revised two-dimensional model of utilitarian judgment as including impartial beneficence and acceptance of attributable harms

Contrasting two models of utilitarian reasoning

One influential framework for examining human moral cognition has been a dual process model, in which utilitarian judgment (e.g., infliction of harm for the greater good) is associated with cognitive control processes, while non-utilitarian judgment (e.g., avoiding such harms) is associated with emotional, automatic processes. Another framework of moral cognition, the two-dimensional model of utilitarian psychology, posits that utilitarian choices may reflect either instrumental harm, i.e., inflicting harm on an individual for the greater good; or impartial beneficence, i.e., impartially and altruistically acting for the benefit of the overall welfare. We evaluated preregistered hypotheses (https://osf.io/m425d) derived from these models of moral cognition in a sample of 275 neurologically healthy older adults. Our results suggest that both the dual process and two-dimensional models provided insights regarding utilitarian reasoning, including three cardinal domains of conflict between utilitarianism and common-sense morality: agent-centered permissions, special obligations, and personal rights. One prediction of the dual process-based model was supported by our findings, with higher emotionality associated with decreased endorsement of utilitarian judgments (b = - 0.12, p < .001). We also found partial support for the two-dimensional model, as utilitarian judgments about dilemmas involving agent-centered permissions and personal rights were dissociated; however, both sets of judgments were associated with utilitarian judgments involving special obligations (p < .001 and p = .008, respectively). We propose that our findings, with support for some elements of the dual process and two-dimensional models, can be integrated into a revised two-dimensional model of utilitarian judgment as including impartial beneficence and acceptance of attributable harms

Contrasting two models of utilitarian reasoning

One influential framework for examining human moral cognition has been a dual process model, in which utilitarian judgment (e.g., infliction of harm for the greater good) is associated with cognitive control processes, while non-utilitarian judgment (e.g., avoiding such harms) is associated with emotional, automatic processes. Another framework of moral cognition, the two-dimensional model of utilitarian psychology, posits that utilitarian choices may reflect either instrumental harm, i.e., inflicting harm on an individual for the greater good; or impartial beneficence, i.e., impartially and altruistically acting for the benefit of the overall welfare. We evaluated preregistered hypotheses (https://osf.io/m425d) derived from these models of moral cognition in a sample of 275 neurologically healthy older adults. Our results suggest that both the dual process and two-dimensional models provided insights regarding utilitarian reasoning, including three cardinal domains of conflict between utilitarianism and common-sense morality: agent-centered permissions, special obligations, and personal rights. One prediction of the dual process-based model was supported by our findings, with higher emotionality associated with decreased endorsement of utilitarian judgments (b = - 0.12, p < .001). We also found partial support for the two-dimensional model, as utilitarian judgments about dilemmas involving agent-centered permissions and personal rights were dissociated; however, both sets of judgments were associated with utilitarian judgments involving special obligations (p < .001 and p = .008, respectively). We propose that our findings, with support for some elements of the dual process and two-dimensional models, can be integrated into a revised two-dimensional model of utilitarian judgment as including impartial beneficence and acceptance of attributable harms

Wisdom and fluid intelligence are dissociable in healthy older adults.

ObjectivesThe relationship between wisdom and fluid intelligence (Gf) is poorly understood, particularly in older adults. We empirically tested the magnitude of the correlation between wisdom and Gf to help determine the extent of overlap between these two constructs.DesignCross-sectional study with preregistered hypotheses and well-powered analytic plan (https://osf.io/h3pjx).SettingMemory and Aging Center at the University of California San Francisco, located in the USA.Participants141 healthy older adults (mean age = 76 years; 56% female).MeasurementsWisdom was quantified using a well-validated self-report-based scale (San Diego Wisdom Scale or SD-WISE). Gf was assessed via composite measures of processing speed (Gf-PS) and executive functioning (Gf-EF). The relationships of SD-WISE scores to Gf-PS and Gf-EF were tested in bivariate correlational analyses and multiple regression models adjusted for demographics (age, sex, and education). Exploratory analyses evaluated the relationships between SD-WISE and age, episodic memory performance, and dorsolateral and ventromedial prefrontal cortical volumes on magnetic resonance imaging.ResultsWisdom showed a small, positive association with Gf-EF (r = 0.181 [95% CI 0.016, 0.336], p = .031), which was reduced to nonsignificance upon controlling for demographics, and no association with Gf-PS (r = 0.019 [95% CI -0.179, 0.216], p = .854). Wisdom demonstrated a small, negative correlation with age (r = -0.197 [95% CI -0.351, -0.033], p = .019), but was not significantly related to episodic memory or prefrontal volumes.ConclusionsOur findings indicate that most of the variance in wisdom (&gt;95%) is unaccounted for by Gf. The independence of wisdom from cognitive functions that reliably show age-associated declines suggests that it may hold unique potential to bolster decision-making, interpersonal functioning, and other everyday activities in older adults

Wisdom and fluid intelligence are dissociable in healthy older adults.

ObjectivesThe relationship between wisdom and fluid intelligence (Gf) is poorly understood, particularly in older adults. We empirically tested the magnitude of the correlation between wisdom and Gf to help determine the extent of overlap between these two constructs.DesignCross-sectional study with preregistered hypotheses and well-powered analytic plan (https://osf.io/h3pjx).SettingMemory and Aging Center at the University of California San Francisco, located in the USA.Participants141 healthy older adults (mean age = 76 years; 56% female).MeasurementsWisdom was quantified using a well-validated self-report-based scale (San Diego Wisdom Scale or SD-WISE). Gf was assessed via composite measures of processing speed (Gf-PS) and executive functioning (Gf-EF). The relationships of SD-WISE scores to Gf-PS and Gf-EF were tested in bivariate correlational analyses and multiple regression models adjusted for demographics (age, sex, and education). Exploratory analyses evaluated the relationships between SD-WISE and age, episodic memory performance, and dorsolateral and ventromedial prefrontal cortical volumes on magnetic resonance imaging.ResultsWisdom showed a small, positive association with Gf-EF (r = 0.181 [95% CI 0.016, 0.336], p = .031), which was reduced to nonsignificance upon controlling for demographics, and no association with Gf-PS (r = 0.019 [95% CI -0.179, 0.216], p = .854). Wisdom demonstrated a small, negative correlation with age (r = -0.197 [95% CI -0.351, -0.033], p = .019), but was not significantly related to episodic memory or prefrontal volumes.ConclusionsOur findings indicate that most of the variance in wisdom (&gt;95%) is unaccounted for by Gf. The independence of wisdom from cognitive functions that reliably show age-associated declines suggests that it may hold unique potential to bolster decision-making, interpersonal functioning, and other everyday activities in older adults