Democracies, Autocracies, and Political Stability

Does democracy promote political instability? Research by pre-eminent scholars demonstrate how nascent democracies may be disadvantaged in promoting political stability because of the pluralist and populist demands that citizens may place on the state that can generate large-scale social rigidities. Furthermore, recent scholarship has shown that nascent democracies are prone to having ethnic dominant minorities that precipitate large scale violence against them as they control most of the wealth, while ethnic dominant majorities resist income inequities. Autocracies are also considered to be more stable over time because of its virtual monopoly on the centralized use of force and its quick suppression of dissent and opposition. Certain autocracies also remain politically stable over time because of the perpetuation of Rentier-state economic systems. The article examines the research question using cases from 122 developing states where large variations exist in terms of its regime systems and levels of political stability. Cross-national regression analysis shows that democracies are more likely to be politically stable. Thus, autocracies in the developing world are more prone to political instability because oppressed citizenries and displaced groups have no other mechanism to voice dissent other than active mobilization in the streets or subversive activities against the state

The effect of civil society on governance and institutional performance in third- and fourth-Wave democracies

The entire dissertation/thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file (which also appears in the research.pdf); a non-technical general description, or public abstract, appears in the public.pdf file.Title from title screen of research.pdf file (viewed on August 4, 2009)Vita.Includes bibliographical references.Thesis (Ph. D.) University of Missouri-Columbia 2008.Dissertations, Academic -- University of Missouri--Columbia -- Political science.[ACCESS RESTRICTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI AT AUTHOR'S REQUEST.] This dissertation project draws on extant civil society theories in explaining how strong and dense civil societies help enhance the sustainability of democracy by improving governance and state institutional performance. Despite mounting criticism that civil society can be inimical to the stability of democracies and lead into institutional mal-performance, I argue that a strong civil society (even in the absence of a strong state) is a necessary element in the consolidation of democracies. I investigate the empirical question by using a nested approach of combining a large cross-national study that is supplemented by case study evidence in Nigeria, the Philippines, South Korea, Brazil and Russia. The project's major implication is to provide empirical support to theoretical propositions on civil society's 'supposed' beneficial effect on democratic governance that has never been empirically evaluated and assessed. The findings show that the pre-transition and post-transitional strength of civil society among more than 60 transitional democracies have a positive effect in promoting better governance and institutional performance

The Effect of Historical Pact Making and Civic Associations on Democratic Outcomes

© 2016 Policy Studies Organization Scholarship in comparative democratization finds that dialogue between the opposition and the old regime before the advent of democratic elections has consistently produced stable democracies least susceptible to reversals. This is because such “pacted” transitions promote values such as conciliation, compromise building, and consensus seeking. Yet the debate concerning how historical pact making affects the quality of democracy remains mainly anecdotal. Using a dataset of transitional states, I find that not all variants of pacted transitions facilitate consolidation. Pacted transitions initiated by the ancien régime are susceptible to democratic reversal, while transitions where the balance of power between the ancien régime and civic forces is equal in initiating regime change are associated with better democratic outcomes least susceptible to democratic collapse. The article also shows that regime transitions are very much influenced by other historical path-dependent factors—specifically the role of civic associations and coalitions during the transitional process. Related Articles: Sarquís, David. 2012. “Democratization after the Arab spring: The Case of Egypt\u27s Political Transition.” Politics & Policy 40 (5): 871–903. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2012.00381.x/full. Beal, Amanda, and Leah Graham. 2014. “Foundations for Change: Rule of Law, Development, and Democratization.” Politics & Policy 41 (3): 311–345. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/polp.12077/full. Luckhurst, Jonathan. 2012. “Governance and Democratization since the 2008 Financial Crisis.” Politics & Policy 40 (5): 958–977. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2012.00386.x/full. Related Media: National Endowment for Democracy. 2013. “Reconsidering Democratic Transitions 2 Francis Fukuyama, Donald Horowitz, Larry Diamond.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cDUwmxcx_UI. TU8964. 2015. “Transitions from above Pacted Transitions.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e-GPhuDWb3w. Coleman, Isobel. 2014. “Democracy Can Still Deliver.” Council on Foreign Relations. http://blogs.cfr.org/coleman/category/democratization/