SYNTHESIS AND EVALUATION ANALYSIS OF THE INDICATOR INFORMATION IN NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS APPLICATIONS BY COMPUTING WITH WORDS

This paper aims at the handling and treatment of nuclear safeguard relevant information by using a linguistic assessment approach. This is based on a hierarchical analysis of a State’s nuclear activities in a multi-layer structure of the evaluation model. After a hierarchical analysis of the State’s nuclear activities on the basis of the IAEA Physical Model, the addressed objective is divided into several less complex levels. The overall evaluation can be obtained step by step from those lower levels. Special emphasis is put on the synthesis and evaluation analysis of the Physical Model indicator information. Accordingly, the aggregation process with the consideration of the different kinds of qualitative criteria is in focus. Especially, the symbolic approach is considered by the direct computation on linguistic values instead of the approximation approach using the associated membership function. In this framework, several kinds of ordinal linguistic aggregation operators are presented and analyzed. The application of these linguistic aggregation operators to the combination of the Physical Model indicator information is provided. An example is given to support and clarify the mathematical formalism

Safeguards course in the framework of BNEN (Belgian Nuclear higher Education Network)

In the framework of BNEN, the Belgian Nuclear Higher Education Network, elective and/or advanced courses are offered to the students additional to the standard curriculum. This master after master is open for students that hold a university degree in engineering or equivalent. In December 2008 an advanced course was given at the Belgian Nuclear Research Centre SCK-CEN to BNEN students, complemented with professionals from the Institute of Reference Materials and Methods in Geel and SCK-CEN in Mol, Belgium. The advanced course dealt with safeguards (nuclear materials control), and covered all important areas of safeguards ranging from basic nuclear theory over nuclear measurement techniques for nuclear material control to (inter)national legislation on non-proliferation. The course was developed in the framework of the ESARDA Working Group on Training and Knowledge Management. ESARDA is the European SAfeguards Research and Development Association. A similar course was given in March 2009, but focused on a public of social scientists with no particular technical/engineering background. This course had a broader reference to radiation protection, while dealing with nuclear physics on a more elementary level.JRC.D.2-Standards for Innovation and sustainable Developmen

Belief rule-based inference methodology to improve nuclear safeguards information evaluation

A framework for modeling, analyzing and synthesizing nuclear safeguards information with various uncertainties is proposed by using a newly developed belief rule-base inference methodology (RIMER). After a hierarchical analysis of States' nuclear activities on the basis of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) physical model, the multi-layer structure of the evaluation model for States' nuclear activities is outlined. The special emphasis is given to the synthesis and evaluation analysis of the physical model indicator information by RIMER, which handles hybrid uncertain information in nuclear safeguards evaluation process. The proposed framework illustrates and clarifies the inference and synthesis formalism from a case study of nuclear safeguards information evaluation

Load cell monitoring in Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants: potentialities for improved safeguards verifications

This paper describes the principle of load cell monitoring in Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants (GCEP) and how this technique can be implemented in order to improve nuclear safeguards in this kind of installations. We present a few different possibilities of exploitation of the data that can be obtained by acquiring in continuous mode the weights of the cylinders in the feed and withdrawal (F/W) stations and how to derive conclusions concerning the operation of the plant (conformity or not with respect to ¿normal¿ operation). Finally the different diversion scenarios for GCEP are discussed and we show how mass monitoring techniques can contribute to detect each of them.JRC.DG.E.9-Nuclear security (Ispra

Investigation on the possibility to use fork detector for partial defect verification of spent LWR fuel assemblies:Final report on Task JNT A 1071 (BEL, FIN, SWE) of the Member States' Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards

The possibility to use a fork detector for partial defect verification of spent LWR fuel assemblies has been investigated in Task JNT A 1071 "Partial Defect Test on Spent Fuel LWRs". The task was arranged as a joint task between the Finnish, Swedish and Belgian support programmes to IAEA safeguards. This task studied the prospects of both a conventional fork detector and an enhancement where the gross gamma and neutron signals of a conventional fork are combined with simultaneous gamma spectrometry using a CdZnTe detector. The fork method was investigated by measuring BWR and VVER-440 spent fuel assemblies and a fresh MOX mock-up assembly. Correction methods were developed to improve the analysis of measurement results. Also model calculations were performed to clarify the effect of the geometrical configuration of the defect. The investigations have shown that a general partial defect test based on the fork method is not possible without making use of operator's declared data. There exist configurations even with 50% of pins removed, which cannot be detected, either with the conventional fork or with the enhanced fork detector. Using the operator declared data cannot be avoided due to the influence of both the fuel design and the irradiation history to the measured signals. If operator's data are available and considered reliable, the detection limit of a partial defect is at about 20% of pins missing for BWR assemblies with the burnup 18 MWd/kg or higher. For developing a reliable, operator data independent partial defect verification device a totally different approach must be applied

Investigation on the possibility to use fork detector for partial defect verification of spent LWR fuel assemblies:Final report on Task JNT A 1071 (BEL, FIN, SWE) of the Member States' Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards

The possibility to use a fork detector for partial defect verification of spent LWR fuel assemblies has been investigated in Task JNT A 1071 "Partial Defect Test on Spent Fuel LWRs". The task was arranged as a joint task between the Finnish, Swedish and Belgian support programmes to IAEA safeguards. This task studied the prospects of both a conventional fork detector and an enhancement where the gross gamma and neutron signals of a conventional fork are combined with simultaneous gamma spectrometry using a CdZnTe detector. The fork method was investigated by measuring BWR and VVER-440 spent fuel assemblies and a fresh MOX mock-up assembly. Correction methods were developed to improve the analysis of measurement results. Also model calculations were performed to clarify the effect of the geometrical configuration of the defect. The investigations have shown that a general partial defect test based on the fork method is not possible without making use of operator's declared data. There exist configurations even with 50% of pins removed, which cannot be detected, either with the conventional fork or with the enhanced fork detector. Using the operator declared data cannot be avoided due to the influence of both the fuel design and the irradiation history to the measured signals. If operator's data are available and considered reliable, the detection limit of a partial defect is at about 20% of pins missing for BWR assemblies with the burnup 18 MWd/kg or higher. For developing a reliable, operator data independent partial defect verification device a totally different approach must be applied