Kotarbiński’s Ontology of Humanities

What is left of this initial project once Kotarbiński’s textbook became obsolete – as Kotarbiński himself claims, perhaps too modestly, in the preface of its second edition, in 1959 – and also given the strong criticism of reism, particularly by Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz [1966]? My answer is that the philosophical project of reism then became a methodological framework for intellectual work in general, and in particular for humanistic studies, or what we today call the Human and Social Sciences

Against Theological Fictionalism

According to theological fictionalism, God has the same status as a fictional character in a novel or a movie. Such a claim has been defended by Robin Le Poidevin on the basis of Kendall Walton’s theory of make believe. But it is not only a philosophical esoteric account of religious beliefs, it is now an exoteric view, sometimes accepted by "believers" themselves, and so could even be considered a postmodern heresy. But theological fictionalism does not work: faith is real assent and not make believe; belief is different from acceptance; belief and faith are dispositional, but make believe seems to presuppose an account of beliefs as occurrent states; we cannot anymore imagine at will than we can believe at wil

Atheists and Believers: Worst Friends or Best Enemies?

This article examines the question of whether the atheist and the believer can understand each other, to the point of being friends intellectually. The answer is no. The atheist and the believer can be best enemies, but their epistemic disagreement is definitely radical. For it is not a disagreement on religious belief itself, but about what allows the believer to believe. The article examines some aspects of John Greco’s concept of ”friendly theism’, the discussion of conciliationism and anti-conciliatonism, and the epistemic role of the Holy Spirit

On the Polish Roots of the Analytic Philosophy of Religion

Philosophers of religion of the Cracow Circle (1934-1944) are the principal precursors of what is now called the analytic philosophy of religion. The widespread claim that the analytic philosophy of religion was from the beginning an Anglo-American affair is an ill-informed one. It is demonstrable that the enterprise, although not the label "analytic philosophy of religion," appeared in Poland in the 1930’s. Józef Bochenski’s postwar work is a development of the Cracow Circle’s prewar work in the analytic philosophy of religion, or at least of important elements of that earlier work. Bochenski’s approach in his ’Logic of Religion’ is quite original and might still be profitably studied and discussed by philosophers of religion of the analytic persuasio

On the Way Works of Art Exist

A clarification of our ideas about the ontology of works of art should help to better formulate, and even solve, many aesthetic issues. This persuasion may not be peculiar to Richard Wollheim, but it is nevertheless singularly asserted by L’art et ses objets, a classic of Anglo-Saxon aesthetics finally available in translation. The ontology of works of art proposed by Wollheim starts from “the hypothesis whereby [they] are physical objects” (p.17). True, this is a bold hypothesis, as we shall..

Du mode d’existence des œuvres d’art

Clarifier nos idées concernant l’ontologie des œuvres d’art devrait permettre de mieux poser, voire de résoudre, maints problèmes esthétiques. Cette conviction, si elle n’est propre à Richard Wollheim, n’en est pas moins particulièrement affirmée par L’art et ses objets, un classique de l’esthétique anglo-saxonne enfin traduit. L’ontologie des œuvres d’art proposée par Willheim part de « l’hypothèse selon laquelle [elles] sont des objets physiques » (p.17), hypothèse certes osée, on le verra,..

Le droit de (ne pas) croire. Une réponse à Pascal Engel

Pascal Engel a publié un article intitulé « Le droit de ne pas croire ». Il y défend la thèse que les croyances religieuses sont incapables de satisfaire la norme épistémique de preuve ou de raison suffisante. Dès lors, elles seraient irrationnelles. Ne peut-on pas mettre en question une telle norme ? Les croyances religieuses ne sont certes pas légitimes si elles sont fausses. Mais elles n’ont pas besoin d’être justifiées pour être rationnelles. Ma réponse à Pascal Engel suppose une épistémologie différente de celle qu’il défend. Pascal Engel se situe dans un cadre déontologique, alors que je défends une conception arétique en épistémologie. À travers la question de la légitimité des croyances religieuses, c’est aussi ce que peut être l’épistémologie qui est examiné.Pascal Engel published an article entitled “Le droit de ne pas croire” [The Right not to Believe]. He argues that religious beliefs are incapable of satisfying the epistemic standard of proof or sufficient reason and as such are irrational. May we not question such a standard? Religious beliefs are certainly not legitimate if they are false but they do not need to be justified to be rational. My answer to Pascal Engel is based on a different epistemology from that which he defends. Pascal Engel adopts a deontological conception of epistemology, while I defend a virtue epistemology. Through the question of the legitimacy of religious beliefs, the idea of what epistemology can be is examined

El tomismo analítico en Cracovia y en otros lugares

En un pequeño libro, publicado en 1997, Après Wittgenstein, saint Thomas** (Pouivet, 1997a), he presentado lo que se llama el tomismo analítico*** en el dominio de la filosofía de la mente. Aquí, el acento será colocado sobre otro aspecto del tomismo analítico, más esperado tal vez, su lugar en la filosofía de la religión. No se trata de la filosofía medieval. Conviene más bien hablar de una modesta contribución a la historia de la filosofía del siglo XX. El tomismo analítico ha tomado dos formas. La primera le fue dada por los filósofos polacos del Círculo de Cracovia en los años treinta. La segunda se comenzó en Gran Bretaña en los años cincuenta, con Elizabeth Anscombe, Peter Geach o Anthony Kenny. Se desarrolla hoy principalmente dentro de la filosofía de lengua inglesa. A pesar de su carácter contemporáneo, el tomismo analítico ha preservado el espíritu de los problemas filosóficos planteados por el Aquinate, sin por lo tantoligarse a lo escrito. Neotomismo y filosofía DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.22518/16578953.19