AIDS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN SOUTH AFRICA

Morbidity and mortality effects are introduced into a three sector, Ramsey-type model of economic growth. The model is calibrated to South African national accounts data and used to examine the potential impact of HIV/AIDS on economic growth. Simulation results suggest a 10% decrease in the size of the effective labor force would lead to a 10% decrease in the long run (steady state) GDP levels. Similarly, a 10% decrease in the number of laborers would lead to an 11% drop in long run GDP.Health Economics and Policy, International Development, Labor and Human Capital,

BARRIERS TO EFFICIENCY AND THE PRIVATIZATION OF TOWNSHIP-VILLAGE ENTERPRISES

This paper uses Nerlovian type measures to compare the economic performance of private enterprises and Township-Village enterprises during the pre-1994 and post-1994 years, and introduces decomposition measures to help explain their relative performances.Community/Rural/Urban Development,

TRANSACTION COSTS AND AGRICULTURAL NONPOINT-SOURCE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL POLICIES

Mechanism design theory is used to develop the properties of optimal pollution control incentive schemes in the presence of adverse selection, moral hazard, and transaction costs. The model presented here shows (a) with no deadweight costs (transaction costs) , first-best allocations are always possible; (b) in the presence of transaction costs (caused by raising taxes), only second-best allocations are feasible; and (c) the conditions under which the optimal incentive scheme implementing second-best allocations will be a nonlinear tax, a standard(s), or a combination of both taxes and standard(s).Environmental Economics and Policy,

MULTIPLE AGENTS, AND AGRICULTURAL NONPOINT-SOURCE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL POLICIES

Assuming asymmetric information over farmer profits and zero transaction costs, prior literature has suggested that when regulating nonpoint source water pollution, a tax on management practices (inputs) can implement full-information allocations and is superior to a tax on estimated runoff. Using mechanism design theory under asymmetric information, this paper show that under the same assumptions, management practice taxes and taxes on estimated runoff are equally efficient.Environmental Economics and Policy,

INCORPORATING EPIDEMIOLOGICAL PROJECTIONS OF MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY INTO AN OPEN ECONOMY GROWTH MODEL: AIDS IN SOUTH AFRICA

HIV prevalence dynamics are introduced into a three sector, neoclassical growth model. The model is calibrated to South African national accounts data and used to examine the potential impact of HIV/AIDS on economic growth. Projections portend if left unchecked, the long run impact of HIV and AIDS could drive South African GDP to levels that are over 60% less than no-HIV levels, with AIDS death rates decreasing the long run stock of labor by over 60%.Health Economics and Policy,

The development of semi-parliamentarism in Australia

Steffen Ganghof has described the Australian system at both national and state levels as ‘semi-parliamentarian’ since governments do not need to maintain the confidence of the upper chambers to survive. Rodney Smith traces how Australia’s upper houses have evolved and established distinct, strengthened mechanisms of executive scrutiny

DO MISSING INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS BLOCK ENLARGEMENT OF WATER MARKETS?

As we consider the potential for expanding water markets as a means to help prevent water shortages, it is clear that there is resistance to such an expansion. This resistance should not be surprising given that there are likely to be both gainers and losers from expanded water markets. This papers shows that there are a number of potential market failures when water markets are expanded and that these failures are important to different stakeholder groups. These failures result from both technical and pecuniary externalities. If markets are to expand beyond the local level, new institutional arrangements will be needed that help reduce the negative impacts of the different market failures. In the past a number of institutional arrangements have been used by different stakeholder groups to block trading. We review some of these arrangements as well as institutional arrangements that can work to promote market expansion by mitigating market failures or by compensating damaged parties.Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,