The Legal Boundaries of (Digital) Information or Psychological Operations Under International Humanitarian Law

“Information operations” or “psychological operations” have long been part of armed conflicts. Among Western militaries, they are commonly understood as the employment of communication or other means to influence the views, attitudes, or behavior of adversaries or civilian populations to achieve political and military objectives. Chinese military strategy describes “psychological offense and defense” as “a combat action that uses specific information and media to influence the psychology and behavior of the target object through rational propaganda, deterrence and emotional guidance based on strategic intentions and combat missions.” Likewise, Russian military doctrine elaborates on concepts such as “psychological warfare” and on “war against mentality.” Non-State armed groups conduct such operations, too. With the rapid growth of information and communication technology over the past decade, the scale, speed, and reach of information or psychological operations have increased significantly, raising concerns about their possible humanitarian impact. While international humanitarian law permits information and psychological operations that are militarily necessary as part of military operations, it imposes limits, in particular, on those that are directed against either civilians or military personnel hors de combat and can be reasonably expected to cause harm. This article analyzes these and other limits that international humanitarian law sets on information or psychological operations during armed conflicts

International legal obligations of armed opposition groups in Syria

Starting with peaceful protests of people demanding democratic reforms and fundamental rights from the regime in Damascus, the Syria crisis developed into a full-fledged civil war causing largescale death, injury, and displacement. During the first year of the crisis, violence in Syria was marked by the brutal crackdown of regime forces on protesters. Confronted with a high degree of violence from state forces, opposition groups gradually organized politically and militarily. This article focuses on international legal obligations of armed opposition groups in the course of this crisis. Such obligations are clearly contained in international humanitarian law, and arguably also in international human rights law. In order to determine the applicable law, the classification of the situation as either an armed conflict or one of internal tensions and disturbances is fundamental but controversial. This article examines at what stage of the crisis international human rights obligations and international humanitarian law obligations of non-state armed groups became pertinent, and provides reasons why this is the case. It shall be argued that even before the Syria crisis turned into a non-international armed conflict, opposition groups were bound by fundamental rules of international human rights law. In addition to these rules, all parties to the armed conflict became bound by international humanitarian law once the situation reached a sufficient degree of violence, and the non-state groups a sufficient degree of organization. By examining the Syria crisis, this article shall show what these abstract criteria mean in practice

Leben in Nordrhein-Westfalen: Subjektive Einschätzungen als Teil der Wohlfahrtsmessung

Die Debatte um (andere) Indikatoren zur Messung gesellschaftlicher Wohlfahrt und eines „guten Lebens“ hat in den vergangenen Jahren deutlich an Fahrt aufgenommen. Und das nicht nur auf Bundesebene. Auch auf der Ebene der Bundesländer wächst die Nachfrage nach solchen Indikatoren. Im Rahmen einer Studie zur Berechnung des Regionalen Wohlfahrtsindex (RWI) wurden deswegen zum ersten Mal auch subjektive Befragungsdaten des Sozio-Ökonomischen Panels (SOEP) für das Bundesland Nordrhein-Westfalen (NRW) ausgewertet. 1 Neben NRW-spezifischen Auswertungen wurden zur Einordnung der Ergebnisse auch bundesdeutsche Werte (exkl. NRW) berechnet. Betrachtet werden für den Zeitraum 1984-2013 (SOEP v30) die Bereiche Zufriedenheit (allgemein/Bereiche), Sorgen, Wichtigkeit, Interesse für Politik und Gefühle. Die Auswertungen ergeben unter anderem, dass die durchschnittliche gegenwärtige Lebenszufriedenheit (+0,1) und die Zukunftszuversicht (+0,2) in NRW leicht höher liegen als im bundesdeutschen Durchschnitt. Allerdings machten sich die Menschen in NRW im Jahr 2013 größere Sorgen in den Bereichen „Zuwanderung“, „globaler Terrorismus“ und „Kriminalitätsentwicklung“ als im Rest Deutschlands. Schließlich werden die Entwicklungen des Bruttoinlandsprodukts (BIP), des Regionalen Wohlfahrtsindex (RWI) und der allgemeinen Lebenszufriedenheit in NRW für den Zeitraum 1999-2013 miteinander verglichen. Es zeigen sich deutliche Unterschiede.In recent years, the debate about alternative measures of welfare ('beyond GDP') has con-siderably gained momentum in Germany. This was the case not only on the national level: The demand for such measures has risen on the federal states level, too. For that reason, and in the context of a study whose main purpose was to calculate the Regional Welfare Index (RWI) for North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), we also analyzed survey data from the So-cio-Economic Panel (SOEP) for NRW and - in order the compare and classify the results - for the rest of Germany. The observation period ranges from 1984 to 2013 (SOEP v30). The re-search topics include satisfaction (life in general/specific areas; current/anticipated), con-cerns, importance, interest for politics and feelings. The evaluation shows among other find-ings that in 2013 the current general life satisfaction (+0,1) and the anticipated general life satisfaction in five years (+0,2) were slightly but significantly higher in NRW than in the rest of Germany. At the same time, people in NRW voiced higher concerns about the issues 'im-migration to Germany', 'global terrorism' and 'crime in Germany'. At the end of this con-tribution, the trends of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the Regional Welfare Index (RWI) and the current general life satisfaction are compared. They differ significantly from each other

Wohlfahrtsmessung "beyond GDP": Der Nationale Wohlfahrtsindex (NWI2016)

Die vorliegende Studie geht von der These aus, dass das Bruttoinlandsprodukt (BIP) als Wohlstandsmaß nicht geeignet ist und daher zumindest einer Ergänzung bedarf. Ein von den Autoren schon 2009 entwickeltes alternatives Wohlstandsmaß, der Nationale Wohlfahrtsindex (NWI), wird erläutert und dem BIP gegenübergestellt. Erstmals können hier Ergebnisse des NWI bis zum Jahr 2014 präsentiert werden. Dabei zeigt sich, dass BIP und NWI insbesondere ab der Jahrtausendwende deutlich unterschiedliche Entwicklungen aufweisen. Während zwischen 1991 und 1999 beide Indikatoren weitgehend parallel ansteigen, sinkt der NWI während der Phase zwischen 1999 und 2005 stark, bei weiter fortgesetzter Steigerung des BIP. Zwischen 2005 und 2014 verändert sich der NWI kaum, auch nicht in den Wirtschaftskrisenjahren 2008/2009, in denen das BIP einen Einbruch erfährt, ansonsten aber deutlich weiter ansteigt. Aufgrund der hohen Bedeutung der Einkommensverteilung zur Erklärung der Unterschiede wird deren Einfluss und Messbarkeit gesondert dargestellt.The study assumes that conventional GDP is not a good indicator for wealth. Therefore an alternative indicator the National Welfare Index (NWI) is constructed. It includes next to consumption measures for environmental pollution and inequality. The NWI is compared to GDP development. It turns out that NWI was shrinking from 1999 to 2005 in contrast to GDP. After that it stagnated until 2011 and then increased slightly. The distribution of incomes has a particular strong influence on the NWI and is therefore discussed in depth

Orientierung an ewigem Wachstum oder gesellschaftlicher Wohlfahrt?

Wie gesellschaftliche Wohlfahrt gemessen wird, entscheidet über zukünftige Prioritätensetzungeneiner Gesellschaft. Mit dem Nationalen Wohlfahrtsindex wird die verengte Perspektive des traditionellen Leitindikators BIP sichtbar und der Blick auf darüber hinausgehende ökologische und soziale Aspekte gelenkt

THE EXPANDING PROTECTION OF MEMBERS OF A PARTY'S OWN ARMED FORCES UNDER INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

Does international law govern how states and armed groups treat their own forces? Do serious violations of the laws of war and human rights law that would otherwise constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity fall squarely outside the scope of international criminal law when committed against fellow members of the same armed forces? Orthodoxy considered that such forces were protected only under relevant domestic criminal law and/or human rights law. However, landmark decisions issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) suggest that crimes committed against members of the same armed forces are not automatically excluded from the scope of international criminal law. This article argues that, while there are some anomalies and gaps in the reasoning of both courts, there is a common overarching approach under which crimes by a member of an armed group against a person from the same forces can be prosecuted under international law. Starting from an assessment of the specific situation of the victim, this article conducts an in-depth analysis of the concepts of ‘hors de combat’ and ‘allegiance’ for war crimes and that of the ‘lawful target’ for crimes against humanity, providing an interpretative framework for the future prosecution of such crimes

Contents

2 Epistemic update 5 2.1 The update problem....................... 5 2.2 Update frames..........................