369 research outputs found

    On the importance of prior relationships in bank loans to retail customers

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    This paper analyzes the importance of retail consumers’ banking relationships for loan defaults using a unique, comprehensive dataset of over one million loans by savings banks in Germany. We find that loans of retail customers, who have a relationship with their savings bank prior to applying for a loan, default significantly less than customers with no prior relationship. We find relationships matter in different forms, scope, and depth. Importantly, though, even the simplest forms of relationships such as transaction accounts are economically meaningful in reducing defaults, even after controlling for other borrower characteristics as well as internal and external credit scores. Our results suggest that relationships of all kinds have inherent private information and are valuable in screening, in monitoring, and in reducing consumers’ incentives to default. JEL Classification: G20, G21default rates, monitoring, relationships, Retail banking, screening

    Application of direct-inverse techniques to airfoil analysis and design

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    The direct-inverse technique was developed into a numerical method, called TRANDES, that is suitable for the analysis and design of subsonic and transonic airfoils and for the evaluation of design concepts. A general description of the method is given and its application to a design analysis type of problem is demonstrated. A usage of the method for the low speed high lift case is discussed

    The price of liquidity: the effects of market conditions and bank characteristics

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    We study the prices that individual banks pay for liquidity (captured by borrowing rates in repos with the central bank and benchmarked by the overnight index swap) as a function of market conditions and bank characteristics. These prices depend in particular on the distribution of liquidity across banks, which is calculated over time using individual banklevel data on reserve requirements and actual holdings. Banks pay more for liquidity when positions are more imbalanced across banks, consistent with the existence of short squeezing. We also show that small banks pay more for liquidity and are more vulnerable to squeezes. Healthier banks pay less but, contrary to what one might expect, banks in formal liquidity networks do not. State guarantees reduce the price of liquidity but do not protect against squeezes. JEL Classification: G12, G21, E43, E58, D44banks, imbalance, liquidity, money markets, repos

    The price of liquidity: bank characteristics and market conditions

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    We study differences in the price paid for liquidity across banks using price data at the individual bank level. Unique to this paper, we also have data on individual banks' reserve requirements and actual reserve holdings, thus allowing us to gauge the extent to which a bank is short or long liquidity. We find that the price a bank pays for liquidity depends on the liquidity positions of other banks, as well as its own. There is evidence that liquidity squeezes occasionally occur and short banks pay more the larger is the potential for a squeeze. The price paid for liquidity is decreasing in bank size and small banks are more adversely affected by an increased potential for a squeeze. Contrary to what one might expect, banks in formal liquidity networks do not pay less. --liquidity,banking,squeezes,money markets,repo auctions

    The true significance of the EFSF downgrade

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    Discriminatory auctions with seller discretion: evidence from German treasury auctions

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    This paper examines the results of 93 discriminatory German Treasury auctions between 1998 and 2002. It documents the seller's use of discretion and its influence on auction outcomes and bidding strategies. The evidence suggests that the seller uses its discretion frequently and substantially. It does not maximize revenues in a single-period game, but moves up in the competitive demand curve to set the auction price close to the market price. Bidders do not make profits in German auctions on average, while their bidding strategies reflect the uncertainty created by the seller's discretion. The paper extends and tests the multi-unit auction model by Lengwiler (1999). The empirical evidence is consistent with the implication that the market-clearing price depends on the seller's marginal cost rather than on the submitted demand. --Discriminatory auctions,Winner's curse,Seller discretion

    How to make crowdfunding work in Europe. Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue n˚6 | March 2019

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    Crowdfunding markets around the world have experienced significant growth rates in recent years. With an aggregate amount of almost €50 billion raised worldwide between 2010 and 2017, crowdfunding has attracted increasing economic, political and regulatory attention on the international level. However, many questions remain open on the proper design, implementation and feasibility of these markets, of which there are four general types: debt, rewards, equity, and charity (ranked by their respective volumes). The first three types of crowdfunding are comparable to existing sources of traditional financing and either complement or substitute for these sources. Investors thus expect returns or other financial benefits from these types of crowdfunding. The fourth type – charity-based crowdfunding – is purely philanthropic

    Financial market integration in the EU: A practical inventory of benefits and hurdles in the Single Market

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    It is 25 years since the European Union (EU) agreed to complete the European Single Market (SM) in goods, ser- vices, people, and capital. While many barriers to the free movement of capital across borders have been removed, some important practical hurdles are still in place. The euro crisis has shown that the European finan- cial sector in particular remains vulnerable and fragmented and this poses serious risks to the stability of both national economies and the euro area as a whole. In 2015, the European Commission therefore set out a list of measures to establish an integrated capital market in the EU by 2019. The first part of this policy paper analyzes the channels through which financial integration affects growth, stabil- ity, and convergence in the EU, including capital allocation, production specialization, diversification of risk, and access to investment opportunities. The second part takes stock of persisting administrative and legal hurdles that impede full market integration. In particular, this paper distinguishes between a firm-level perspective, inves- tors, and banks in its analysis. The final part provides some specific recommendations to improve the internal market for capital in the EU
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