1,451 research outputs found
Scintillation efficiency of liquid argon in low energy neutron-argon scattering
Experiments searching for weak interacting massive particles with noble gases
such as liquid argon require very low detection thresholds for nuclear recoils.
A determination of the scintillation efficiency is crucial to quantify the
response of the detector at low energy. We report the results obtained with a
small liquid argon cell using a monoenergetic neutron beam produced by a
deuterium-deuterium fusion source. The light yield relative to electrons was
measured for six argon recoil energies between 11 and 120 keV at zero electric
drift field.Comment: 21 pages, 19 figures, 4 table
Power-Law Distributions in a Two-sided Market and Net Neutrality
"Net neutrality" often refers to the policy dictating that an Internet
service provider (ISP) cannot charge content providers (CPs) for delivering
their content to consumers. Many past quantitative models designed to determine
whether net neutrality is a good idea have been rather equivocal in their
conclusions. Here we propose a very simple two-sided market model, in which the
types of the consumers and the CPs are {\em power-law distributed} --- a kind
of distribution known to often arise precisely in connection with
Internet-related phenomena. We derive mostly analytical, closed-form results
for several regimes: (a) Net neutrality, (b) social optimum, (c) maximum
revenue by the ISP, or (d) maximum ISP revenue under quality differentiation.
One unexpected conclusion is that (a) and (b) will differ significantly, unless
average CP productivity is very high
Setting Fees in Competing Double Auction Marketplaces: An Equilibrium Analysis
In this paper, we analyse competing double auction marketplaces that vie for traders and need to set appropriate fees to make a profit. Specifically, we show how competing marketplaces should set their fees by analysing the equilibrium behaviour of two competing marketplaces. In doing so, we focus on two different types of market fees: registration fees charged to traders when they enter the marketplace, and profit fees charged to traders when they make transactions. In more detail, given the market fees, we first derive equations to calculate the marketplaces expected profits. Then we analyse the equilibrium charging behaviour of marketplaces in two different cases: where competing marketplaces can only charge the same type of fees and where competing marketplaces can charge different types of fees. This analysis provides insights which can be used to guide the charging behaviour of competing marketplaces. We also analyse whether two marketplaces can co-exist in equilibrium. We find that, when both marketplaces are limited to charging the same type of fees, traders will eventually converge to one marketplace. However, when different types of fees are allowed, traders may converge to different marketplaces (i.e. multiple marketplaces can co-exist). © 2012 Springer-Verlag
Thermodynamics of aggregation of two proteins
We investigate aggregation mechanism of two proteins in a thermodynamically
unambiguous manner by considering the finite size effect of free energy
landscape of HP lattice protein model. Multi-Self-Overlap-Ensemble Monte Carlo
method is used for numerical calculations. We find that a dimer can be formed
spontaneously as a thermodynamically stable state when the system is small
enough. It implies the possibility that the aggregation of proteins in a cell
is triggered when they are confined in a small region by, for example, being
surrounded by other macromolecules.We also find that the dimer exhibits a
transition between unstable state and metastable state in the infinite system.Comment: jpsj2.cls, 7 pages, 14 figures; misconfigurations of Fig.Nos.
correcte
Elimination of Competitors: Some Economics of Payment Card Associations
This paper analyzes platforms and rejections in two-sided markets with network externalities, using the specific context of a payment card association. We study the cooperative antitrust determination of the interchange fee by member banks. We use a framework in which banks and merchants may have market power and consumers and merchants decide rationally on whether to buy or accept a payment card developed by Rochet and Tirole (2002). After drawing the welfare implications of a cooperative determination of the interchange fee and antitrust conducts, we describe in detail the factors affecting merchant resistance, compare cooperative and for-profit business models, and make a first cut in the analysis of system competition
Study of nuclear recoils in liquid argon with monoenergetic neutrons
For the development of liquid argon dark matter detectors we assembled a
setup in the laboratory to scatter neutrons on a small liquid argon target. The
neutrons are produced mono-energetically (E_kin=2.45 MeV) by nuclear fusion in
a deuterium plasma and are collimated onto a 3" liquid argon cell operating in
single-phase mode (zero electric field). Organic liquid scintillators are used
to tag scattered neutrons and to provide a time-of-flight measurement. The
setup is designed to study light pulse shapes and scintillation yields from
nuclear and electronic recoils as well as from {\alpha}-particles at working
points relevant to dark matter searches. Liquid argon offers the possibility to
scrutinise scintillation yields in noble liquids with respect to the
populations of the two fundamental excimer states. Here we present experimental
methods and first results from recent data towards such studies.Comment: 9 pages, 8 figures, proceedings of TAUP 2011, to be published in
Journal of Physics: Conference Series (JCPS
Intermediated vs. Direct Sales and a No-Discrimination Rule
When sellers join a platform to sell their products, the platform operator may restrict their strategic decisions. In fact, several platform operators impose most-favored treatment or no-discrimination rules (NDRs), asking sellers not to offer better sales conditions elsewhere. In this paper, I analyze a model that allows for an endogenous split-up of consumers between sales channels. Competing sellers might set different prices across channels, depending on the platform tariff and presence of aNDR. I find that the platform operator imposes a NDR if he faces high transaction costs, if seller competition is weak, and if the initial distribution of consumers on channels is strongly skewed. Prohibiting NDRs can have both positive and negative effects on welfare
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