Environmental regulatory enforcement with "green" consumers

We consider a standard probabilistic model of random monitoring to analyze the interactions between a firm and a monitoring agency in the presence of ¿green¿ consumers when compliance payoffs are contingent on monitoring and monitoring costs are shared by the monitoring agency and the firm. When the amount paid by the firms if monitored is exogenously fixed, we find that full compliance is implemented with a finite fine. If there is an upper bound for the fine and the regulator determines endogenously the fine and the amount paid by the firms if monitored, we find that full compliance is also achieved, although the optimal fine is now set at its maximum level. The optimal amount paid by the firms if monitored is lower than the environmental premium the compliant firm gets

Comentario. Coste-efectividad e impacto presupuestario en la toma de decisiones de introducción de nuevas tecnologías: comentarios al artículo de Pinto et al

En los últimos años se ha observado en España un notable aumento del número de estudios sobre evaluación económica de tecnologías sanitarias, así como de su calidad y valide

A hybrid equilibrium in segmented markets: the three-firm case

segmentation, loyalty, mixed strategy, D43, L13,

Risk-Sharing Agreements in Pharmaceutical Markets

En este artículo, se modela la relación entre una autoridad sanitaria y una empresa farmacéutica cuando la eficacia del medicamento producido por la empresa es incierta. La información ex-ante sobre la eficacia viene dada por los resultados de un ensayo clínico. Se analizan dos tipos de contratos. Por una parte, las autoridades sanitarias pueden fijar un precio unitario independientemente de la efectividad real ex-post del medicamento (no riesgo compartido). Alternativamente, la autoridad sanitaria puede condicionar el precio a la efectividad ex-post observada (contrato de riesgo compartido). El contrato óptimo depende de la relación entre los costes de monitorización, los costes marginales de producción y el coste sanitario derivado del fallo del tratamiento. Cuando la eficacia del medicamento en el ensayo clínico es relativamente alta, un contrato de no riesgo compartido es óptimo para valores relativamente bajos del coste marginal. Cuando la eficacia en el ensayo clínico es relativamente baja, la autoridad sanitaria siempre prefiere condicionar los pagos a los resultados de efectividad.In this article, we model the relationship between a health authority and a pharmaceutical firm when the real efficacy of the drug manufactured by the firm is uncertain. The ex-ante information on the efficacy of the new drug is provided by the outcomes of a clinical trial. We focus on two types of contracts. On the one hand, the health authority can set a unit price regardless of the ex-post real effectiveness of the drug (traditional contract, i.e. no risk sharing). Alternatively, the health authority can make the payments contingent upon the observed ex-post effectiveness (risk-sharing contract). The optimal contract depends on the trade-off between the monitoring costs, the marginal production cost and the health cost derived from treatment failure. When the efficacy of the drug in the clinical trial is relatively high, a traditional contract is optimal for relatively low marginal costs. When the efficacy in the clinical trial is relatively low, the health authority always prefers to condition the payments upon the effectiveness outcomes