Autocratic Transitions and Growth

In this paper we use a transparent statistical methodology – synthetic control methods – to implement data-driven comparative studies about the impact of autocratic transition on real per capita GDP. The applied methodology compares the growth of countries that experienced a transition to autocracy with the growth of a convex combination of similar countries that remained democratic, and it accommodates for the time-varying impact of unobservable heterogeneity. To implement this statistical framework, in a panel of 160 countries, we focus on 14 episodes of transition from democracy to autocracy. We find that the effects of autocratic transitions come in all shapes and sizes, since our data are split in almost equal parts between insignificant, negative, and positive effects. We also find that negative effects tend to get worse over time, and that African countries are badly affected by the autocratic transition possibly because of a resource curse.autocracy, democracy, growth, synthetic control methods

The Political Resource Curse

The paper studies the effect of additional government revenues on political corruption and on the quality of politicians, both with theory and data. The theory is based on a version of the career concerns model of political agency with endogenous entry of political candidates. The evidence refers to municipalities in Brazil, where federal transfers to municipal governments change exogenously according to given population thresholds. We exploit a regression discontinuity design to test the implications of the theory and identify the causal effect of larger federal transfers on political corruption and the observed features of political candidates at the municipal level. In accordance with the predictions of the theory, we find that larger transfers increase political corruption and reduce the quality of candidates for mayor.government spending, corruption, political selection

The importance of betting early

We evaluate the impact of timing on decision outcomes when both the timing and the relevant decision are chosen under uncertainty. Sports betting provides the testing ground, as we exploit an original dataset containing more than one million online bets on games of the Italian Major Soccer League. We find that individuals perform systematically better when they place their bets farther away from the game day. The better performance of early bettors holds controlling for (time-invariant) unobservable ability, learning during the season, and timing of the odds. We attribute this result to the increase of noisy information on game day, which hampers the capacity of late (non-professional) bettors to use very simple prediction methods, such as team rankings or last game results. We also find that more successful bettors tend to bet in advance, focus on a smaller set of events, and prefer games associated with smaller betting odds

The Importance of Betting Early

We evaluate the impact of timing on decision outcomes when both the timing and the relevant decision are chosen under uncertainty. Sports betting provides the testing ground, as we exploit an original dataset containing more than one million online bets on games of the Italian Major Soccer League. We find that individuals perform systematically better when they place their bets farther away from the game day. The better performance of early bettors holds controlling for (time-invariant) unobservable ability, learning during the season, and timing of the odds. We attribute this result to the increase of noisy information on game day, which hampers the capacity of late (non-professional) bettors to use very simple prediction methods, such as team rankings or last game results. We also find that more successful bettors tend to bet in advance, focus on a smaller set of events, and prefer games associated with smaller betting odds

The Political Resource Curse

The paper studies the effect of additional government revenues on political corruption and on the quality of politicians, both with theory and data. The theory is based on a version of the career concerns model of political agency with endogenous entry of political candidates. The evidence refers to municipalities in Brazil, where federal transfers to municipal governments change exogenously according to given population thresholds. We exploit a regression discontinuity design to test the implications of the theory and identify the causal effect of larger federal transfers on political corruption and the observed features of political candidates at the municipal level. In accordance with the predictions of the theory, we find that larger transfers increase political corruption and reduce the quality of candidates for mayor.

The Political Resource Curse

The paper studies the effect of additional government revenues on political corruption and on the quality of politicians, both with theory and data. The theory is based on a version of the career concerns model of political agency with endogenous entry of political candidates. The evidence refers to municipalities in Brazil, where federal transfers to municipal governments change exogenously according to given population thresholds. We exploit a regression discontinuity design to test the implications of the theory and identify the causal effect of larger federal transfers on political corruption and the observed features of political candidates at the municipal level. In accordance with the predictions of the theory, we find that larger transfers increase political corruption and reduce the quality of candidates for mayor.corruption; government spending; political selection

The Political Resource Curse ∗

The paper studies the effect of additional government revenues on political corruption and on the quality of politicians, both with theory and data. The theory is based on a version of the career concerns model of political agency with endogenous entry of political candidates. The evidence refers to municipalities in Brazil, where federal transfers to municipal governments change exogenously according to given population thresholds. We exploit a regression discontinuity design to test the implications of the theory and identify the causal effect of larger federal transfers on political corruption and the observed features of political candidates at the municipal level. In accordance with the predictions of the theory, we find that larger transfers increase political corruption and reduce the quality of candidates for mayor

The Political Resource Curse

The paper studies the effect of additional government revenues on political corruption and on the quality of politicians, both with theory and data. The theory is based on a version of the career concerns model of political agency with endogenous entry of political candidates. The evidence refers to municipalities in Brazil, where federal transfers to municipal governments change exogenously according to given population thresholds. We exploit a regression discontinuity design to test the implications of the theory and identify the causal effect of larger federal transfers on political corruption and the observed features of political candidates at the municipal level. In accordance with the predictions of the theory, we find that larger transfers increase political corruption and reduce the quality of candidates for mayor.