Trade of Permits for Greenhouse Gas Emissions; Bilateral Trade Need not Be the Answer

The Kyoto Protocol sets national quotas on CO2 emissions and allows international trade of these quotas. We argue that this trade is characterized by asymmetric, identity-dependent externalities, and show that bilateral trade may not be sufficient for an efficient allocation of emissions. We derive conditions under which bilateral trade does improve the allocation of permits. The conditions are strong. In this sense, we argue that, for emissions permits, market design matters.Terms of trade, asymmetric externalities, permits trade

Simultaneous Nash Bargaining with Consistent Beliefs

We propose and analyze a new solution concept, the R solution, for three-person, transferable utility, cooperative games. In the spirit of the Nash Bargaining Solution, our concept is founded on the predicted outcomes of simultaneous, two-party negotiations that would be the alternative to the grand coalition. These possibly probabilistic predictions are based on consistent beliefs. We analyze the properties of the R solution and compare it with the Shapley value and other concepts. The R solution exists and is unique. It belongs to the bargaining set and to the core whenever the latter is not empty. In fact, when the grand coalition can simply execute one of the three possible bilateral trades, the R solution is the most egalitarian selection of the bargaining set. Finally, we discuss how the R solution changes important conclusions of several well known Industrial Organization models.cooperative games, bargaining, endogenous fall-back options, consistent beliefs, R solution.

Bribery and Favoritism by Auctioneers in Sealed Bid Auctions

No abstract.

Seeds of hope: Assessing the effect of development aid on the reduction of child mortality

The Millennium Declaration (2000) set as one of its targets a substantial reduction in child mortality. This paper studies whether the massive increase in development aid can account for part of the reduction in child mortality observed in developing countries since the year 2000. To do so, we analyze a panel of more than 130 developing countries over the 2000-2008 period. We use the time trend evolution of aid to identify an exogenous source of variation. Total aid has had no statistically significant effect on child mortality. However, a disaggregate analysis identifies certain sectors of aid that have had a significant impact. The effects have been larger in high mortality countries, including Sub-Saharan Africa. Projections based on our estimates strongly support the concern that most countries in that region will miss the Millennium Goals target on child mortality.ODA, child mortality, aid effectiveness.

Procurement Design with Corruption

This paper investigates the design of optimal procurement mechanisms in the presence of corruption. After the sponsor and the contractor sign the contract, the latter may bribe the inspector to misrepresent quality. Thus, the mechanism affects whether bribery occurs. I show how to include bribery as an additional constraint in the optimal-control problem that the sponsor solves, and characterize the optimal contract. I discuss both the case of fixed bribes and bribes that depend on the size of the quality misrepresentation, and also uncertainty about the size of the bribe. In all cases, the optimal contract curtails quality not only for low efficiency contractors but also for the most efficient contractors. Implementation is also discussedI acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (Grant: ECO2011-29663), and the Generalitat de Catalunya (SGR 2014-2017)Peer Reviewe

License Prices for Financially Constrained Firms

It is often alleged that high auction prices inhibit service deployment. We investigate this claim under the extreme case of financially constrained bidders. If demand is just slightly elastic, auctions maximize consumer surplus if consumer surplus is a convex function of quantity (a common assumption), or if consumer surplus is concave and the proportion of expenditure spent on deployment is greater than one over the elasticity of demand. The latter condition appears to be true for most of the large telecom auctions in the US and Europe. Thus, even if high auction prices inhibit service deployment, auctions appear to be optimal from the consumers' point of view.

Preferred Suppliers in Auction Markets

In a procurement setting, this paper examines agreements between a buyer and one of the suppliers which would increase their joint surplus. The provisions of such agreements depend on the buyer's ability to design the rules of the final procurement auction. When the buyer has no such ability, their joint surplus can be increased by an agreement which grants to the preferred supplier a right-of-first-refusal on the lowest price offer from the other suppliers. When the buyer does have this ability, one agreement which maximizes their joint surplus includes a revelation game for the cost of the preferred supplier and a reserve price in the procurement auction based on that cost.procurement auctions, bilateral agreements

Bargaining Failures and Merger Policy

Publicado como: Barcelona GSE Working Paper Series nº 633. Barcelona: Barcelona Graduate School of Economics, 2014Comunicación presentada en la Competition and Regulation European Summer School and Conference (CRESSE 2013), 8th International Conference on Competition and Regulation, celebrada del 5 al 7 de julio de 2013 en Corfu (Grecia)We study approval rules in a model where horizontal merger proposals arise endogenously as the outcome of negotiations among the Örms in the industry. We make two main points. First, relatively ine¢ cient merger proposals succeed with positive probability. That is, the negotiation process may result in a particular merger agreement despite the existence of an alternative one that would generate higher proÖts and higher consumer surplus. Second, the antitrust authority should optimally commit to an approval rule that is more stringent for all mergers than the optimal ex-post ruleAlso we acknowledge support of Generalitat de Catalunya and the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (ECO2011-29663).Peer Reviewe

Limited Liability and Mechanism Design in Procurement

In the presence of cost uncertainty, limited liability introduces the possibility of default in procurement with its associated bank-ruptcy costs. When financial soundness is not perfectly observable, we show that incentive compatibility implies that financially less sound contractors are selected with higher probability in any feasible mechanism. Informational rents are associated with unsound financial situations. By selecting the financially weakest contractor, stronger price competition (auctions) may not only increase the probability of default but also expected rents. Thus, weak conditions are suffcient for auctions to be suboptimal. In particular, we show that pooling firms with higher assets may reduce the cost of procurement even when default is costless for the sponsor.Procurement, limited liability, bankruptcy

Seeds of hope: Assessing the effect of development aid on the reduction of child mortality

JEL classification numbers: O11, O15, I1The Millennium Declaration (2000) set as one of its targets a substantial reduction in child mortality. This paper studies whether the massive increase in development aid can account for part of the reduction in child mortality observed in developing countries since the year 2000. To do so, we analyze a panel of more than 130 developing countries over the 2000-2008 period. We use the time trend evolution of aid to identify an exogenous source of variation. Total aid has had no statistically significant effect on child mortality. However, a disaggregate analysis identifies certain sectors of aid that have had a significant impact. The effects have been larger in high mortality countries, including Sub-Saharan Africa. Projections based on our estimates strongly support the concern that most countries in that region will miss the Millennium Goals target on child mortality.Financial aid from the Spanish Ministry of Education, grant ECO2008-04837. Burguet worked on this paper under a contract with the Asian Development BankPeer reviewe