Attenuation of PTEN increases p21 stability and cytosolic localization in kidney cancer cells: a potential mechanism of apoptosis resistance

BACKGROUND: The PTEN (Phosphatase and Tensin homolog deleted on chromosome Ten) tumor suppressor gene is frequently mutated or deleted in a wide variety of solid tumors, and these cancers are generally more aggressive and difficult to treat than those possessing wild type PTEN. While PTEN lies upstream of the phosphoinositide-3 kinase signaling pathway, the mechanisms that mediate its effects on tumor survival remain incompletely understood. Renal cell carcinoma (RCC) is associated with frequent treatment failures (~90% in metastatic cases), and these tumors frequently contain PTEN abnormalities. RESULTS: Using the ACHN cell line containing wild type PTEN, we generated a stable PTEN knockdown RCC cell line using RNA interference. We then used this PTEN knockdown cell line to show that PTEN attenuation increases resistance to cisplatin-induced apoptosis, a finding associated with increased levels of the cyclin kinase inhibitor p21. Elevated levels of p21 result from stabilization of the protein, and they are dependent on the activities of phosphoinositide-3 kinase and Akt. More specifically, the accumulation of p21 occurs preferentially in the cytosolic compartment, which likely contributes to both cell cycle progression and resistance to apoptosis. CONCLUSION: Since p21 regulates a decision point between repair and apoptosis after DNA damage, our data suggest that p21 plays a key role in mechanisms used by PTEN-deficient tumors to escape chemotherapy. This in turn raises the possibility to use p21 attenuators as chemotherapy sensitizers, an area under active continuing investigation in our laboratories

Tradable Pollution Permits and the Regulatory Game

This paper analyzes polluters\u27 incentives to move from a traditional command and control (CAC) environmental regulatory regime to a tradable permits (TPP) regime. Existing work in environmental economics does not model how firms contest and bargain over actual regulatory implementation in CAC regimes, and therefore fail to compare TPP regimes with any CAC regime that is actually observed. This paper models CAC environmental regulation as a bargaining game over pollution entitlements. Using a reduced form model of the regulatory contest, it shows that CAC regulatory bargaining likely generates a regulatory status quo under which firms with the highest compliance costs bargain for the smallest pollution reductions, or even no reduction at all. As for a tradable permits regime, it is shown that all firms are better off under such a regime than they would be under an idealized CAC regime that set and enforced a uniform pollution standard, but permit sellers (low compliance cost firms) may actually be better off under a TPP regime with relaxed aggregate pollution levels. Most importantly, because high cost firms (or facilities) are the most weakly regulated in the equilibrium under negotiated or bargained CAC regimes, they may be net losers in a proposed move to a TPP regime. When equilibrium costs under a TPP regime are compared with equilibrium costs under a status quo CAC regime, several otherwise paradoxical aspects of firm attitudes toward TPP type reforms can be explained. In particular, the otherwise paradoxical pattern of allowances awarded under Phase II of the 1990 Clean Air Act\u27s acid rain program, a pattern tending to favor (in Phase II) cleaner, newer generating units, is explained by the fact that under the status quo regime, a kind of bargained CAC, it was the newer cleaner units that were regulated, and which therefore had higher marginal control costs than did the largely unregulated older, plants. As a normative matter, the analysis here implies that the proper baseline for evaluating TPP regimes such as those contained in the Bush Administration\u27s recent Clear Skies initiative is not idealized, but nonexistent CAC regulatory outcomes, but rather the outcomes that have resulted from the bargaining game set up by CAC laws and regulations