The Headscarf as Threat? A Comparison of German and American Legal Discourses

In this article I compare how American and German judges conceptualize the harm the headscarf poses to society. My examples are the 2003 Ludin case, in which the German Federal Constitutional Court held that the civil service, in the absence of state regulation, could not reject a woman from a civil service teaching position solely because she would not remove her headscarf while teaching; and State v. Freeman, in which a Florida court held that a woman could not pose for a drivers license wearing a garment (the niqab) that covered all of her face except her eyes. While judges and legal critics in both countries tended to see the headscarf as threatening, Germans were more likely to see it as a symbol of political Islam, while Americans saw it a tool used by potential terrorist

Does It Matter How One Opposes Memory Bans? A Commentary on Liberte Pour L’Histoire

This Article examines Liberté pour l’Histoire, a group of French historians who led the charge against that nation’s memory laws and, in the process, raised unique arguments not found elsewhere in the debate over hate speech regulation. Some of these arguments—such as a focus on how the constitutional structure of the Fifth Republic encouraged memory laws—advance our understanding of the connection between hate speech bans and political institutions. Other arguments, however, are more problematic. In particular, Liberté historians struggle to distinguish the Holocaust (which is illegal to deny) from the Armenian Genocide (which is not). The Liberté historians are also hostile toward multiculturalism. While this reflects the French culture in which the historians operate, it is normatively unappealing. This is especially true given the existence of other, more inclusive European arguments against hate speech regulation, such as those of Danish cartoon publisher Flemming Rose and Maltese Judge Giovanni Bonello

The Taylor rule and the practice of central banking

The Taylor rule has revolutionized the way many policymakers at central banks think about monetary policy. It has framed policy actions as a systematic response to incoming information about economic conditions, as opposed to a period-by-period optimization problem. It has emphasized the importance of adjusting policy rates more than one-for-one in response to an increase in inflation. And, various versions of the Taylor rule have been incorporated into macroeconomic models that are used at central banks to understand and forecast the economy. ; This paper examines how the Taylor rule is used as an input in monetary policy deliberations and decision-making at central banks. The paper characterizes the policy environment at the time of the development of the Taylor rule and describes how and why the Taylor rule became integrated into policy discussions and, in some cases, the policy framework itself. Speeches by policymakers and transcripts and minutes of policy meetings are examined to explore the practical uses of the Taylor rule by central bankers. While many issues remain unresolved and views still differ about how the Taylor rule can best be applied in practice, the paper shows that the rule has advanced the practice of central banking.