Hantavirus and Arenavirus Antibodies in Persons with Occupational Rodent Exposure, North America

Rodents are the principal hosts of Sin Nombre virus, 4 other hantaviruses known to cause hantavirus pulmonary syndrome in North America, and the 3 North American arenaviruses. Serum samples from 757 persons who had worked with rodents in North America and handled neotomine or sigmodontine rodents were tested for antibodies against Sin Nombre virus, Whitewater Arroyo virus, Guanarito virus, and lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus. Antibodies against Sin Nombre virus were found in 4 persons, against Whitewater Arroyo virus or Guanarito virus in 2 persons, and against lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus in none. These results suggest that risk for infection with hantaviruses or arenaviruses usually is low in persons whose occupations entail close physical contact with neotomine or sigmodontine rodents in North Americ

Seroprevalence of human T-Lymphotropic virus type I (HTLV-I) in Costa Rica

artículo -- Universidad de Costa Rica. Instituto de Investigaciones en Salud,1990Infection within the human T linphotropic virus type I (HTLV-I), a virus associated with two diseases, adult T-cell leukemia lyriphornal and tropical spastic paraparesis/HTLV-I associated myelopathy,2 is prevalent in Panama' and Colombia. To determine if HTLV-I is present in neighboring Costa Rica, we tested 436 sera from women who participated, between 1984 and 198.5, in a case-control study of cervical cancer in Costa Rica. These sera were all that were still available to us from the 765 collected from control participants in the study. Study participants had all been interviewed and tested for several serologic markers of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs).Universidad de Costa Rica. Instituto de Investigaciones en SaludUCR::Vicerrectoría de Investigación::Unidades de Investigación::Ciencias de la Salud::Instituto de Investigaciones en Salud (INISA

Hantavirus and Arenavirus Antibodies in Persons with Occupational Rodent Exposure, North America

Risk for infection was low among those who handled neotomine or sigmodontine rodents on the job

Inhalational Anthrax Outbreak among Postal Workers, Washington, D.C., 2001

In October 2001, four cases of inhalational anthrax occurred in workers in a Washington, D.C., mail facility that processed envelopes containing Bacillus anthracis spores. We reviewed the envelopes’ paths and obtained exposure histories and nasal swab cultures from postal workers. Environmental sampling was performed. A sample of employees was assessed for antibody concentrations to B. anthracis protective antigen. Case-patients worked on nonoverlapping shifts throughout the facility. Environmental sampling showed diffuse contamination of the facility, suggesting multiple aerosolization events. Potential workplace exposures were similar for the case-patients and the sample of workers. All nasal swab cultures and serum antibody tests were negative. Available tools could not identify subgroups of employees at higher risk for exposure or disease. Prophylaxis was necessary for all employees. To protect postal workers against bioterrorism, measures to reduce the risk of occupational exposure are necessary

The Public Health Response and Epidemiologic Investigation Related to the Opening of a Bacillus anthracis–Containing Envelope, Capitol Hill, Washington, D.C.

On October 15, 2001, a U.S. Senate staff member opened an envelope containing Bacillus anthracis spores. Chemoprophylaxis was promptly initiated and nasal swabs obtained for all persons in the immediate area. An epidemiologic investigation was conducted to define exposure areas and identify persons who should receive prolonged chemoprophylaxis, based on their exposure risk. Persons immediately exposed to B. anthracis spores were interviewed; records were reviewed to identify additional persons in this area. Persons with positive nasal swabs had repeat swabs and serial serologic evaluation to measure antibodies to B. anthracis protective antigen (anti-PA). A total of 625 persons were identified as requiring prolonged chemoprophylaxis; 28 had positive nasal swabs. Repeat nasal swabs were negative at 7 days; none had developed anti-PA antibodies by 42 days after exposure. Early nasal swab testing is a useful epidemiologic tool to assess risk of exposure to aerosolized B. anthracis. Early, wide chemoprophylaxis may have averted an outbreak of anthrax in this population

SARS Surveillance during Emergency Public Health Response, United States, March–July 2003

In response to the emergence of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), the United States established national surveillance using a sensitive case definition incorporating clinical, epidemiologic, and laboratory criteria. Of 1,460 unexplained respiratory illnesses reported by state and local health departments to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention from March 17 to July 30, 2003, a total of 398 (27%) met clinical and epidemiologic SARS case criteria. Of these, 72 (18%) were probable cases with radiographic evidence of pneumonia. Eight (2%) were laboratory-confirmed SARS-coronavirus (SARS-CoV) infections, 206 (52%) were SARS-CoV negative, and 184 (46%) had undetermined SARS-CoV status because of missing convalescent-phase serum specimens. Thirty-one percent (124/398) of case-patients were hospitalized; none died. Travel was the most common epidemiologic link (329/398, 83%), and mainland China was the affected area most commonly visited. One case of possible household transmission was reported, and no laboratory-confirmed infections occurred among healthcare workers. Successes and limitations of this emergency surveillance can guide preparations for future outbreaks of SARS or respiratory diseases of unknown etiology

Guidelines for counseling human T‐lymphotropic virus type I (HTLV‐I)‐ and HTLV type II‐infected persons

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