Book Review-Competition Law and the European Union

Richard Whish & David Bailey, Competition Law, Oxford University Press, New York, 2012; ISBN: 978-0-19-958655-

Exclusive Dealing Agreements Under EEC Competition Law

The study discusses exclusive dealing agreements relating to vertical distribution. It examines exclusive dealing agreements in their economic as well as legal contexts

Profitability Measures and Competition Law

The paper outlines various measures of profitability and considers what role they can play in competition law. We argue that profitability measures can provide a good answer to the wrong question and a much less good answer to the question we really want to answer. Using appropriate definitions of asset value it is possible to identify whether a firm earns more than the absolute minimum needed to cover cost and compensate for risk, i.e., whether profitability measures such as the internal rate of return and the accounting rate of return are above the cost of capital. However, both the empirical evidence we present and theory indicates that this does not really help in most cases. Knowing that a firm is earning say, half a percent more than the cost of capital is not really much help in almost all competition law cases. But we show that once the rate of return deviates from the cost of capital it becomes hard to measure. Using simple examples we show that shifts in cash flows that preserve the net present value of a project can have dramatic effects on profitability measures. Hence, it is hard to assess the quantity of the “excessive” return. Furthermore, this problem is likely to be far more prevalent today than in the past given the growth in outsourcing (since outsourcing has exactly this type of effect on cash flows). Despite such problems, we argue that the measurement of profit has a role to play in competition law but that the analysis is far more of an art form and far less of a simple statistical procedure.profitability measures, excess return, competition

A propósito de un elemento esencial de la defensa de la competencia en Europa: las facultades de investigación de la Comisión en materia de inspección

Auf der Grundlage der Erweiterung der Untersuchungsbefugnisse, die der EU-Kommisssion erteilt wurden, um die Existenz von Kollusionsvereinbarungen im EU-Rahmen zu bekämpfen, stellt der vorliegende Artikel die Bedingungen vor, unter denen die oberste kompetente EU-Instanz ihre Auβenprüfungen, die seitens der Unternehmer kritisch beäugt werden, durchführen muss. Es wird im Einzelnen der natürliche Widerspruch untersucht, der sich zwischen den Prüfungsabsichten der EU-Kommission und den beiden Grundpostulaten des Rechts auf Verteidigung zwangsläufig ergibt: Dem Berufsgeheimnis und dem Recht auf Aussageverweigerung bzw. der Verweigerung der Selbstbeschuldigung.On the basis of the extension of the faculties assigned to the EU Commission to fight the existence of collusive agreements within the eurozone, the current article shows the requirements in which the power to inspect, seen more sensitively within the business world, must be started up by the European Competition Authority while looking into the natural contradiction from the inspection’s own objectives and the two basic postulates related to the right of defense as are the professional secret and the right to remain silent or against self-incrimination.En base a la prolongación de las facultades de investigación que le han sido proporcionadas a la Comisión Europea para combatir la existencia de acuerdos colusorios en el ámbito comunitario, el presente artículo expone las condiciones en las cuales el poder percibido con mayor sensibilidad desde el terreno empresarial, la inspección, debe ser puesto en marcha por la máxima autoridad comunitaria de competencia, analizando en detalle la contradicción natural que se presenta entre los objetivos propios de la inspección y dos postulados básicos relacionados con el derecho de defensa, como lo son el secreto profesional y el derecho a guardar silencio o no autoinculparse

Derecho de competencia y economía digital en Ecuador: reflexiones sobre mercados relevantes y abusos de posición de dominio

In 2021, the peer review on Competition Law and Policy in Ecuador carried out by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) together with the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) was published. One of the conclusions reached by the report is that digital markets present competition authorities with a new set of challenges. This article provides an approach to such challenges. To do this, it revisits the concepts of market definition and abuse of a dominant position in light of current competition law. Likewise, it offers recommendations on the particularities that the Ecuadorian competition agency should consider when defining digital markets. Finally, it studies the main types of abuse that can take place in this kind of economies.En 2021 se publicó el examen inter-pares sobre el Derecho y Política de Competencia en Ecuador efectuado por la Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económicos (OCDE) junto con el Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID). Una de las conclusiones a las que arriba el informe es que los mercados digitales presentan a la autoridad de competencia un nuevo conjunto de desafíos. El presente artículo brinda una aproximación hacia ellos. Para esto, revisita los conceptos de definición de mercado y abuso de posición dominante a la luz de la actual ley de competencia. Así mismo, ofrece recomendaciones sobre las particularidades que la agencia de competencia ecuatoriana debería considerar a la hora de efectuar la definición de mercados digitales. Finalmente, estudia los principales tipos de abuso que pueden tener lugar en esta clase de economías