The avatars in the machine : dreaming as a simulation of social reality

The idea that dreaming is a simulation of the waking world is currently becoming a far more widely shared and accepted view among dream researchers. Several philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists have recently characterized dreaming in terms of virtual reality, immersive spatiotemporal simulation, or realistic and useful world simulation. Thus, the conception of dreaming as a simulated world now unifies definitions of the basic nature of dreaming within dream and consciousness research. This novel concept of dreaming has consequently led to the idea that social interactions in dreams, known to be a universal and abundant feature of human dream content, can best be characterized as a simulation of human social reality, simulating the social skills, bonds, interactions, and networks that we engage in during our waking lives. Yet this tempting idea has never before been formulated into a clear and empirically testable theory of dreaming. Here we show that a testable Social Simulation Theory (SST) of dreaming can be formulated, from which empirical predictions can be derived. Some of the predictions can gain initial support by relying on already existing data in the literature, but many more remain to be tested by further research. We argue that the SST should be tested by directly contrasting its predictions with the major competing theories on the nature and function of dreaming, such as the Continuity Hypothesis (CH) and the Threat Simulation Theory (TST). These three major theories of dreaming make differing predictions as to the quality and the quantity of social simulations in dreams. We will outline the first steps towards a theory-and-hypothesis-driven research program in dream research that treats dreaming as a simulated world in general and as a social simulation in particular. By following this research program it will be possible to find out whether dreaming is a relatively unselective and thus probably non-functional simulation of the waking world (CH), a simulation primarily specialized in the simulation of dangerous and threatening events that present important challenges for our survival and prosperity (TST), or whether it is a simulation primarily specialized in training the social skills and bonds most important for us humans as a social species (SST). Whatever the evidence for or against the specific theories turn out to be, in any case the conception of dreaming as a simulated world has already proved to be a fruitful theoretical approach to understanding the nature of dreaming and consciousness

The simulation theories of dreaming : how to make theoretical progress in dream science ; a reply to Martin Dresler

Among the most pressing challenges for dream science is the difficulty of establishing theoretical unification between the various theories, ideas, and findings that have been presented in the literature to answer the question of how it is possible to construct a solid scientific theory with predictive and explanatory power in dream science. We suggest that the concept of “world-simulation” serves as the core concept for a theoretically unified paradigm to describe and explain dreaming. From this general concept, more specific theories of the function of dreaming can be derived, such as the Threat Simulation Theory (TST) and the Social Simulation Theory (SST), as we argued in our target article. We agree with Dresler that these two functions may not be the only functions of dreaming, but we still have grounds to believe that they are the strongest contenders. In our reply we first clarify why the functions of sleep should be considered separately from the functions of dreaming. Second, we outline what a good scientific theory of dreaming should be like and what it should be capable of. Furthermore, we evaluate the current state of simulation theories within this context. To conclude, we propose that instead of a general multifunctional theory of sleep and dreaming, where no hypothesis is excluded, the future progress of dream science will benefit more from opposing, competing and mutually exclusive theories about the specific functions of dreaming. This, however, demands that the opposing theories and their predictions must be risky, clearly formulated, and empirically testable

Encyclopedia of Consciousness

The first part of this article focuses on summarizing the empirical findings on dream content, such as the universality of dream themes, the specific but general dream elements, and the occurrence and content of bad dreams and nightmares. The second part of the article reviews the currently influential theories explaining dream content data, for instance, psychoanalytic theories, random activation theories, continuity hypothesis, psychological healing function of dreams, and several theories on the evolutionary functions of dreams. © 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.</p

Peace of mind and anxiety in the waking state are related to the affective content of dreams

Waking mental well-being is assumed to be tightly linked to sleep and the affective content of dreams. However, empirical research is scant and has mostly focused on ill-being by studying the dreams of people with psychopathology. We explored the relationship between waking well-being and dream affect by measuring not only symptoms of ill-being but also different types and components of well-being. Importantly, this is the first time peace of mind was investigated as a distinct aspect of well-being in a Western sample and in relation to dream content. Healthy participants completed a well-being questionnaire, followed by a three-week daily dream diary and ratings of dream affect. Multilevel analyses showed that peace of mind was related to positive dream affect, whereas symptoms of anxiety were related to negative dream affect. Moreover, waking measures were better related to affect expressed in dream reports rather than participants’ self-ratings of dream affect. We propose that whereas anxiety may reflect affect dysregulation in waking and dreaming, peace of mind reflects enhanced affect regulation in both states of consciousness. Therefore, dream reports may possibly serve as markers of mental health. Finally, our study shows that peace of mind complements existing conceptualizations and measures of well-being.</p

EEG Frontal Alpha Asymmetry and Dream Affect: Alpha Oscillations over the Right Frontal Cortex during REM Sleep and Presleep Wakefulness Predict Angerin REM Sleep Dreams

Affective experiences are central not only to our waking life but also to rapid eye movement (REM) sleep dreams. Despite our increasing understanding of the neural correlates of dreaming, we know little about the neural correlates of dream affect. Frontal alpha asymmetry (FAA) is considered a marker of affective states and traits as well as affect regulation in the waking state. Here, we explored whether FAA during REM sleep and during evening resting wakefulness is related to affective experiences in REM sleep dreams. EEG recordings were obtained from 17 human participants (7men) who spent 2 nights in the sleep laboratory. Participants were awakened 5minafter the onset of every REM stage after which they provided a dream report and rated their dream affect. Two-minute preawakening EEG segments were analyzed. Additionally, 8 min of evening presleep and morning postsleep EEG were recorded during resting wakefulness. Mean spectral power in the alpha band (8 –13 Hz) and corresponding FAA were calculated over the frontal (F4-F3) sites. Results showed that FAA during REM sleep, and during evening resting wakefulness, predicted ratings of dream anger. This suggests that individuals with greater alpha power in the right frontal hemisphere may be less able to regulate (i.e., inhibit) strong affective states, such as anger, in dreams. Additionally, FAA was positively correlated across wakefulness and REM sleep. Together, these findings imply that FAA may serve as a neural correlate of affect regulation not only in the waking but also in the dreaming state.</p

What is an altered state of consciousness?

‘‘Altered State of Consciousness’’ (ASC) has been defined as a changed overall pattern of conscious experience, or as the subjective feeling and explicit recognition that one’s own subjective experience has changed. We argue that these traditional definitions fail to draw a clear line between altered and normal states of consciousness (NSC). We outline a new definition of ASC and argue that the proper way to understand the concept of ASC is to regard it as a representational notion: the alteration that has happened is not an alteration of consciousness (or subjective experience) per se, but an alteration in the informational or representational relationships between consciousness and the world. An altered state of consciousness is defined as a state in which the neurocognitive background mechanisms of consciousness have an increased tendency to produce misrepresentations such as hallucinations, delusions, and memory distortions. Paradigm examples of such generally misrepresentational, temporary, and reversible states are dreaming, psychotic episodes, psychedelic drug experiences, some epileptic seizures, and hypnosis in highly hypnotizable subjects. The representational definition of ASC should be applied in the theoretical and empirical studies of ASCs to unify and clarify the conceptual basis of ASC research.</div

Social contents in dreams: An empirical test of the Social Simulation Theory

Social Simulation Theory (SST) considers the function of dreaming to be the simulation of social events. The Sociality Bias and the Strengthening hypotheses of SST were tested. Social Content Scale (SCS) was developed to quantify social events. Additionally, we attempted to replicate a previous finding (McNamara et al., 2005, Psychological Science) of REM dreams as predisposed to aggressive , and NREM dreams to prosocial interactions. Further, we investigated the frequency and quality of interactions in late vs early REM and NREM dreams. Data consisted of wake, REM and NREM home dream reports (N = 232, 116, 116, respectively) from 15 students. Dreams overrepresented social events compared to wake reports, supporting the Sociality Bias hypothesis. However, the Strengthening Hypothesis was not supported. We weren't able to replicate the McNamara et al. finding, and no time of night effect was found. While SST gained partial support, further research on social contents in dreams is required .</p