Women on boards in finance and STEM industries

We document that women are less represented on corporate boards in Finance and more traditional STEM industry sectors. Even after controlling for differences in firm and country characteristics, average diversity in these sectors is 24% lower than the mean. Our findings suggest that well-documented gender differences in STEM university enrolments and occupations have long-term consequences for female business leadership. The leadership gap in Finance and STEM may be difficult to eliminate using blanket boardroom diversity policies. Diversity policies are also likely to have a different impact on firms in these sectors than in non-STEM sectors

Fallible Executives, Centralization of Decision-Making and Corporate Performance

In this paper we explore some possible consequences of fallibility in managerial decision making for firm performance. Based on Sah and Stiglitz (1991), we develop the hypothesis that if managers are fallible, firm performance will be more variable as the number of managers participating in decision-making decreases, i.e. as the firm becomes more centralized. We use characteristics of the Executive Office to develop a proxy for the number of executives participating in top decision-making. For example, we argue that if the Chairman of the Board is not the CEO, decision-making in the firm will be more decentralized because the Chairman will also participate in decision-making. We test our hypothesis using this proxy (which we call the centralization index), and find that the evidence is consistent with our hypothesis. Firm performance (measured by Tobin s Q, stock returns and ROA) is significantly more variable for firms with greater values of our centralization index. The results are consistent across various tests designed to detect differences in variability

Understanding the Relationship between Founder-CEOs and Firm Performance

While previous empirical literature has examined the effect of founder-CEOs on firm perfor- mance, it has largely ignored the effect of firm performance on founder-CEO status. In this paper, we use instrumental variables methods to better understand the relationship between founder-CEOs and performance. Using the proportion of the firm’s founders that are dead and the number of people who founded the company as instruments for founder-CEO status, we Þnd strong evidence that founder-CEO status is endogenous in performance regressions. This implies that the direct effect of founder-CEOs on firm performance cannot be esti- mated correctly without accounting for the endogeneity of founder-CEO status. Perhaps surprisingly, we Þnd that performance is negatively related to the likelihood that founders retain the CEO title. This result appears to be driven primarily by founder departures after periods of good performance, rather than by an entrenchment effect that allows founders to remain as CEOs following poor performance. After factoring out the effect of performance on founder-CEO status, we find a residual positive correlation between founder-CEO status and firm performance. This finding suggests that there is a positive causal link from founder-CEOs to firm performance

FALLIBLE EXECUTIVES, CENTRALIZATION OF DECISION-MAKING AND CORPORATE PERFORMANCE

In this paper we explore some possible consequences of fallibility in managerial decisionmaking for firm performance. Based on Sah and Stiglitz (1991), we develop the hypothesis that if managers are fallible, firm performance will be more variable as the number of managers participating in decision-making decreases, i.e. as the Þrm becomes more centralized. We use characteristics of the Executive Office to develop a proxy for the number of executives participating in top decision-making. For example, we argue that if the Chairman of the Board is not the CEO, decision-making in the Þrm will be more decentralized because the Chairman will also participate in decision-making. We test our hypothesis using this proxy (which we call the centralization index), and find that the evidence is consistent with our hypothesis. Firm performance (measured by Tobin s Q, stock returns and ROA) is signif- icantly more variable for Þrms with greater values of our centralization index. The results are consistent across various tests designed to detect differences in variability

UNDERSTANDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FOUNDER-CEOS AND FIRM PERFORMANCE

While previous empirical literature has examined the effect of founder-CEOs on firm performance, it has largely ignored the effect of firm performance on founder-CEO status. In this paper, we use instrumental variables methods to better understand the relationship between founder-CEOs and performance. Using the proportion of the Þrm s founders that are dead and the number of people who founded the company as instruments for founder-CEO status, we find strong evidence that founder-CEO status is endogenous in performance regressions. This implies that the direct effect of founder-CEOs on firm performance cannot be estimated correctly without accounting for the endogeneity of founder-CEO status. Perhaps surprisingly, we find that performance is negatively related to the likelihood that founders retain the CEO title. This result appears to be driven primarily by founder departures after periods of good performance, rather than by an entrenchment effect that allows founders to remain as CEOs following poor performance. After factoring out the effect of performance on founder-CEO status, we find a residual positive correlation between founder-CEO status and firm performance. This finding suggests that there is a positive causal link from founder-CEOs to Þrm performance

FALLIBLE EXECUTIVES, CENTRALIZATION OF DECISION-MAKING AND CORPORATE PERFORMANCE

In this paper we explore some possible consequences of fallibility in managerial decisionmaking for firm performance. Based on Sah and Stiglitz (1991), we develop the hypothesis that if managers are fallible, firm performance will be more variable as the number of managers participating in decision-making decreases, i.e. as the Þrm becomes more centralized. We use characteristics of the Executive Office to develop a proxy for the number of executives participating in top decision-making. For example, we argue that if the Chairman of the Board is not the CEO, decision-making in the Þrm will be more decentralized because the Chairman will also participate in decision-making. We test our hypothesis using this proxy (which we call the centralization index), and find that the evidence is consistent with our hypothesis. Firm performance (measured by Tobin s Q, stock returns and ROA) is signif- icantly more variable for Þrms with greater values of our centralization index. The results are consistent across various tests designed to detect differences in variability

Fallible Executives, Centralization of Decision-Making and Corporate Performance

In this paper we explore some possible consequences of fallibility in managerial decision making for firm performance. Based on Sah and Stiglitz (1991), we develop the hypothesis that if managers are fallible, firm performance will be more variable as the number of managers participating in decision-making decreases, i.e. as the firm becomes more centralized. We use characteristics of the Executive Office to develop a proxy for the number of executives participating in top decision-making. For example, we argue that if the Chairman of the Board is not the CEO, decision-making in the firm will be more decentralized because the Chairman will also participate in decision-making. We test our hypothesis using this proxy (which we call the centralization index), and find that the evidence is consistent with our hypothesis. Firm performance (measured by Tobin s Q, stock returns and ROA) is significantly more variable for firms with greater values of our centralization index. The results are consistent across various tests designed to detect differences in variability

Director skill sets

Directors are not one-dimensional. We characterize their skill sets by exploiting Regulation S-K’s 2009 requirement that U.S. firms must disclose the experience, qualifications, attributes or skills that led the nominating committee to choose an individual as a director. We then examine how skills cluster on and across boards. Factor analysis indicates that the main dimension along which boards vary is in the diversity of skills of their directors. We find that firm performance increases when director skill sets exhibit more commonality

Engineering of Three-Finger Fold Toxins Creates Ligands with Original Pharmacological Profiles for Muscarinic and Adrenergic Receptors

Protein engineering approaches are often a combination of rational design and directed evolution using display technologies. Here, we test “loop grafting,” a rational design method, on three-finger fold proteins. These small reticulated proteins have exceptional affinity and specificity for their diverse molecular targets, display protease-resistance, and are highly stable and poorly immunogenic. The wealth of structural knowledge makes them good candidates for protein engineering of new functionality. Our goal is to enhance the efficacy of these mini-proteins by modifying their pharmacological properties in order to extend their use in imaging, diagnostics and therapeutic applications. Using the interaction of three-finger fold toxins with muscarinic and adrenergic receptors as a model, chimeric toxins have been engineered by substituting loops on toxin MT7 by those from toxin MT1. The pharmacological impact of these grafts was examined using binding experiments on muscarinic receptors M1 and M4 and on the α1A-adrenoceptor. Some of the designed chimeric proteins have impressive gain of function on certain receptor subtypes achieving an original selectivity profile with high affinity for muscarinic receptor M1 and α1A-adrenoceptor. Structure-function analysis supported by crystallographic data for MT1 and two chimeras permits a molecular based interpretation of these gains and details the merits of this protein engineering technique. The results obtained shed light on how loop permutation can be used to design new three-finger proteins with original pharmacological profiles