Sorry, not sorry: apologies and denials in the #MeToo movement

The #MeToo-movement publically confronts alleged perpetrators of sexual misconduct with their transgressions. In return, the accused often struggle with the question of how to reply. What can research about trust and forgiveness teach us about the do’s and don’ts of their responses

Verontschuldigingen in het kader van #MeToo: een psychologische analyse

De #metoo-beweging confronteert vermeende daders publiekelijk met hun vermeende wangedrag. Beschuldigden worstelen met de vraag hoe op zulke beschuldigingen te reageren. Wat kan sociaalpsychologisch onderzoek over vertrouwen en vergiffenis ons leren over de do’s en don’ts van hun reacties

An exploration of the motivational basis of take-some and give-some games

Surprisingly little research has investigated the particular motives that underlie choice behavior in social dilemma situations. The main aim of the present research was to ask whether behavior in take-some games (such as the multiple-person Commons Dilemma Game and the two-person Bandit Game) and give-some games (such as the multiple-person Public Goods Dilemma Game and the two-person Dictator Game) is differently affected by proself and prosocial motives. Two experimental studies were conducted. Our first experiment used a trait-based assessment of the motives, whereas in our second experiment the motives were measured as state variables. The results of both experiments revealed that proself and prosocial motives did not explain much difference between taking and giving when comparing the Commons Dilemma Game and the Public Goods Dilemma Game. Yet, our second experiment revealed that these motives did differentiate choices in the Bandit Game and the Dictator Game. More specifically, prosocial motives are more strongly related to giving behavior in the Dictator Game than to taking behavior in the Bandit Game. As such, it can be concluded that in dyadic games (but not in multiple-person games) prosocial motives (but not proself motives) predict choice behavior in a game-specific way

Do multiple-trial games better reflect prosocial behavior than single-trial games?

Most prior research on the external validity of mixed-motive games has studied only one single game version and/or one specific type of real-life prosocial behavior. The present study employs a different approach. We used multiple game trials - with different payoff structures - to measure participants' behavior in the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Commons Dilemma, and the Public Goods Dilemma We then examined the associations between these aggregated game behaviors and a wide set of self-reported prosocial behaviors such as donations, commuting, and environmental behaviors. We also related these prosocial behavior measures to a dispositional measure of prosociality, social value orientation. We report evidence that the weak statistical relationships routinely observed in prior studies are at least partially a consequence of failures to aggregate. More specifically, our results show that aggregation over multiple game trials was especially effective for the Prisoner's Dilemma, whereas it was somewhat effective for the Public Goods Dilemma Yet, aggregation on the side of the prosocial behaviors was effective for both these games, as well as for social value orientation. The Commons Dilemma, however, turned out to yield invariably poor relationships with prosocial behavior, regardless of the level of aggregation. Based on these findings, we conclude that the use of multiple instances of game behavior and prosocial behavior is preferable to the use of only a single measurement

The underlying motives of different mixed-motive games

Haesevoets, Reinders Folmer, and Van Hiel (2015) have shown limited consistency of people’s behaviour across various mixed-motive games. According to these authors, the modest relationships among these games call into question the general idea that all mixedmotive games render the conflict between selfish interests and concern for others equally salient. Thielmann, Böhm, and Hilbig (2015), however, argued that these findings can be explained in terms of the motivational differences that underlie the games. In this article, we demonstrate that Thielmann et al.’s descriptive model of the different motives underlying selfish and prosocial choices cannot be straightforwardly applied to the empirical data at hand. Analogous to our previous article, we again stress the need for further empirical research investigating the underlying motivational basis of each mixed-motive game. Keywords: mixed-motive games, motivational basis, selfish choice, prosocial choic

More Money, More Trust? Target and Observer Differences in the Effectiveness of Financial Overcompensation to Restore Trust.

Recent research revealed that despite its financial costs, overcompensation is not more effective to restore trust in the perpetrator than equal compensation. In a lab experiment (N = 115), we compared the effects of these compensation sizes for both targets of the compensation and noninvolved observers. It was revealed that overcompensation did not yield superior outcomes than equal compensation. Specifically, for targets overcompensation resulted in lower levels of trust than equal compensation, while for observers equal compensation and overcompensation resulted in similar levels of trust. This finding suggests that overcompensation is not a cost-effective trust repair strategy, neither for the targets nor for third party observers. Other implications are discussed as well

Is trust for sale? The effectiveness of financial compensation for repairing competence-versus integrity-based trust violations

Despite the popularity of financial compensation as a means for addressing trust violations, the question whether (more) money can indeed buy trust back remains largely unexplored. In the present research, we focus on the role of violation type and compensation size. The results of a scenario study and a laboratory experiment show that financial compensation can effectively promote the restoration of trust for transgressions that indicate a lack of competence. Conversely, for transgressions which signal a lack of integrity, financial compensation is not an effective tool to repair trust. Moreover, our findings indicate that for both violation types, overcompensation has no positive effects on top of the impact of equal compensation. These findings therefore show that when it comes to trust, money cannot buy everything

Evaluating social investment in disability policy

Disability policy in European countries is displaying a shift towards social investment: increasing human capital and access to the labour market. The reasoning that underlies this transition is that disabled persons would benefit from mainstream employment, but are impeded in traditional policy by deficiencies in labour supply and demand. However, the shift towards more activating policies in many countries is accompanied by a decline in social protection. It is unclear whether social investment may effectively promote the employment chances of disabled persons within this context. The present research examines this question through a quantitative, cross-sectional, multilevel analysis on microdata from 22 EU countries. Our findings suggest greater activation to predict lower employment chances, while reducing passive support shows mixed effects. Conversely, measures for facilitation in daily life predict greater employment chances, as do measures for sheltered work. These findings raise questions over the value of social investment for disabled persons—and underline the need to overcome broader barriers in the labour market and in society