The political economy of public research investment and commodity policies in agriculture: an empirical study.

The paper tests a political economy theory of simultaneous government decision-making on income redistribution through commodity policies and on public research investment in agriculture. We use data from 37 countries on agricultural protection and public agricultural research expenditures (PARI). The empirical results are consistent with the political economy hypotheses. The analysis suggest that structural changes in the economy have important effects on the political incentives for governments not only to subsidize or tax farmers, but also to invest in public agricultural research. Furthermore, the analysis supports the hypotheses that the impact of such structural changes on government decision-making on PARI is non-linear and conditional on other factors. Regarding the impact of political institutions, the results suggest that more democracy neither leads to more distortionary transfers (agricultural protection), nor to lower investment in public goods (PARI)

Slippage in the Conservation Reserve Program or Spurious Correlation? A Comment

The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) pays farmers about $2 billion per year to retire cropland under ten- to fifteen-year contracts. Recent research by Wu found that slippage—an unintended stimulus of new plantings—offsets some of CRP's environmental benefits. Wu does not account for the endogeneity of CRP enrollments. Furthermore, the data used by Wu cannot be used to estimate slippage arising from a price feedback effect. We replicate Wu's findings, demonstrate the possible presence of spurious correlation, and construct new estimates with corrections for endogeneity and other econometric problems. We find no convincing evidence of slippage. Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.

Structure et pouvoir dans les négociations multi-latérales : une application à la politique de l'eau en France

International audienceEnvironmental policies are characterized by a growing emphasis on participation, devolution and negotiated decision making. There is therefore a rising demand for applied simulation models which can be used as 'negotiation-support tools' to analyse the impact of the negotiation structure on the negotiated outcome. In this paper, we apply a computable non cooperative bargaining model designed to study complex real world multi-agent, multi-issue negotiation problems, to a specific negotiation process, involving water use and storage capacity. The application is on the upper part of the Adour Basin in south-western France. The case study is modelled with seven aggregate players (three aggregate farmers representing three sub-basins - upstream, midstream and downstream - two environmental lobbies, the taxpayer and the water manager), and with up to nine negotiated variables (water quotas and water prices in each sub-basin, and the capacities of three dams). Comparative statics experiments highlight a number of aspects of the relationship between negotiation structure and bargaining power

[Structure et pouvoir de marchandage dans les négociations multilatérales : application à la gestion de l'eau en France]

International audienceLe document explore les sources de pouvoir dans une négociation sur la gestion de l'eau en Adour à partir d'un modèle de marchandage multilatéral et multidimensionnel. Il analyse plus spécifiquement les pouvoirs liés au "poids" de la partie-prenante (sa capacité à faire des propositions), aux stratégies de délégation à un allié ou à un porte-parole, à la construction de l'espace négociable