How norms can generate conflict

Norms play an important role in establishing social order. The current literature focuses on the emergence, maintenance and impact of norms with regard to coordination and cooperation. However, the issue of norm-related conflict deserves more attention. We develop a general theory of "normative conflict" by differentiating between two different kinds of conflict. The first results from distinct expectations of which means should be chosen to fulfil the norm, the second from distinct expectations of how strong the norm should restrain the self-interest. We demonstrate the empirical relevance of normative conflict in an experiment that applies the "strategy method" to the ultimatum game. Our data reveal normative conflict among different types of actors, in particular among egoistic, equity, equality and "cherry picker" types.Social norms, normative conflict, cooperation, ultimatum game, strategy method, equity

Lifting the veil of ignorance: An experiment on the contagiousness of norm violations

Norm violations can be contagious. Previous research analyzed two mechanisms of why knowledge about others’ norm violations triggers its spread: (1) Actors lower their subjective beliefs about the probability or severity of punishment, or (2) they condition their compliance on others’ compliance. While earlier field studies could hardly disentangle both effects, we use a laboratory experiment which eliminated any punishment threat. Subjects (n = 466) could commit a violation of the honesty norm. They threw a die and were paid according to their reported number. Our design ruled out any possibility of personal identification so that subjects could lie about their thrown number and claim inflated payoffs without risking detection. The aggregate distribution of reported payoffs allowed determining the extent of liars in the population. Two treatments in which subjects were informed about lying behavior of others were compared to a control condition without information feedback. Distributions from a subsequent dice throw revealed that knowledge about liars triggered the spread of lying compared to the control condition. Our results demonstrate the contagiousness of norm violations, where actors imitate norm violations of others under the exclusion of strategic motives.Social norms, social influence, cheating, lying, experimental sociology, conditional cooperation, Heinrich Popitz

The emergence of norms from conflicts over just distributions

Why is it that well-intentioned actions can create persistent conflicts? While norms are widely regarded as a source for cooperation, this article proposes a novel theory in which the emergence of norms can be understood as a bargaining process in which normative conflicts explain the finally emerging norm. The theory is tested with a dynamical experiment on conflicts over the consideration of equality, effort or efficiency for the distribution of joint earnings. Normative conflict is measured by the number of rejected offers in a recursive bargaining game. The emerging normative system is analyzed by feedback cycles between micro- and macro-level. It is demonstrated that more normative cues cause more normative conflict. Further, under the structural conditions of either simple or complex situations, the convergence towards a simple and widely shared norm is likely. In contrast, in moderately complex situations, convergence is unlikely and several equally reasonable norms co-exist. The findings are discussed with respect to the integration of sociological conflict theory with the bargaining concept in economic theory.social norms, normative conflict, bargaining, cooperation, experiment

Die Durchsetzung sozialer Normen in Low-Cost und High-Cost Situationen

In Feldstudien konnte häufig mittels der Low-Cost Hypothese gezeigt werden, dass normkonformes Verhalten von den dafür aufzuwendenden Kosten abhängt. Doch die Gültigkeit der Low-Cost Hypothese ist bei der Durchsetzung sozialer Normen bislang wenig erforscht. In unserer Studie werden diese kollektiven Güter zweiter Ordnung anhand nachbarschaftlicher Kontrollen analysiert. Es werden Daten einer postalischen Befragung von 631 Personen in Leipzig aus dem Jahr 2001 ausgewertet. Der Zusammenhang zwischen der Befürwortung sozialer Kontrollen und der Bereitschaft, soziale Kontrollen zu dulden, sinkt mit steigenden Kosten der zu duldenden Kontrollen. Zudem lässt sich die Logik der Low-Cost Hypothese auf andere soziologische Konstrukte übertragen: Die Wirkung von Kriminalitätsfurcht und Autoritarismus ist umso weniger relevant für die Duldung sozialer Kontrollen, je höher die Kosten dafür werden. Unsere Befunde demonstrieren somit die Gültigkeit der Low-Cost Hypothese im Zusammenhang mit kollektiven Gütern zweiter Ordnung

Does ignorance promote norm compliance?

A large extent of undetected norm violations may have positive effects for society. If many norm violations are hidden, society seems to be in good order so that actors are more willing to comply with the norms themselves. In this sense, ignorance promotes norm compliance. We challenge this view by arguing that in scenarios, in which norms are controlled and enforced by third parties who receive rewards for their success, the opposite is true: Ignorance promotes norm violations. The reason is that unsuspicious inspectors who believe that little hidden norm violations are committed will spend less effort for detection, some formerly detected norm violations will go undetected, norm targets will be less deterred from the lower detection probability and will commit more norm violations over time. This article develops a respective mathematical model and confirms the above described intuitio

How Norms Can Generate Conflict: An Experiment on the Failure of Cooperative Micro-motives on the Macro-level

Why does the adherence to norms not prevent conflict? While the current literature focuses on the emergence, maintenance and impact of norms with regard to cooperation, the issue of norm-related conflict deserves more attention. We develop a general game theoretical model of "normative conflict” and explain how transaction failures on the macrolevel can result from cooperative motives on the microlevel. We differentiate between two kinds of conflict. The first results from distinct expectations regarding the way in which general normative obligations should be fulfilled, the second from distinct expectations as to how the norm should restrain actions based on self-interest. We demonstrate the empirical relevance of normative conflict in a version of the ultimatum game. Our data reveal widespread normative conflict among different types of actors - egoistic, equity, equality and cherry picker. Our findings demonstrate how cooperative intentions about how to divide a collectively produced good may fail to produce cooperative outcome

The framing of risks and the communication of subjective probabilities for victimizations

What does ‘likely' mean, when respondents estimate the risk to become a victim of crime? Victimization risks can either be interpreted as gains ("being spared of offences”) or as losses ("becoming a victim of crime”). Because losses are perceived as more severe, respondents will state lower subjective victimization probabilities in the loss-frame, compared to the gain-frame. We demonstrate such a framing-effect with data from an experimental survey. Furthermore, we show that the meaning of vague quantifiers varies with the frequency and the severity of the event. Respondents assign to the same vague quantifiers (e.g. ‘unlikely') higher likelihoods in terms of percentages for frequent and for less severe events than for infrequent and for severe events. In conclusion, respondents do not use vague quantifiers consistently so that it is problematic to compare subjective risks for different victimization

Evading the Algorithm: Increased Propensity for Tax Evasion and Norm Violations in Human-Computer Interactions

Today's modern world is characterized by an increasing shift from human-to-human interaction toward human-computer-interaction (HCI). With the implementation of artificial agents as inspectors, as can be seen in today's airports, supermarkets, or, most recently, within the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, our everyday life is progressively shaped around interacting with automated agents. While our understanding of HCI is evolving, it is still in nascent stages. This is particularly true in the sphere of non-cooperative strategic interactions between humans and automated agents, which remains largely unexplored and calls for further investigation. A deeper understanding of the factors influencing strategic decision-making processes within HCI situations, and how perceptions of automated agents' capabilities might influence these decisions, is required. This gap is addressed by extending a non-cooperative inspection-game experiment with a tax-evasion frame, implementing automated agents as inspectors. Here, a within-subject design is used to investigate (1) how HCI differs from human-to-human interactions in this context and (2) how the complexity and perceived capabilities of automated agents affect human decision-making. The results indicate significant differences in decisions to evade taxes, with participants more likely to evade taxes when they are inspected by automated agents rather than by humans. These results may also be transferred to norm violations more generally, which may become more likely when participants are controlled by computers rather than by humans. Our results further show that participants were less likely to evade taxes when playing against an automated agent described as a complex AI, compared to an automated agent described as a simple algorithm, once they had experienced different agents

Too sophisticated even for highly educated survey respondents? A qualitative assessment of indirect question formats for sensitive questions

Acknowledgements We thank the anonymous reviewers for their concise comments and constructive feedback on our work. We also thank Nicola Babamov, Christophe Heger, Beatrice Schulz, Madeleine Siegel, Nikita Sorgatz, and Anastasiia Tcypina for their assistance with the transcription of the interviews as well as Brian Cooper for proofreading. David Johann would like to thank the German Center for higher Education Research and Science (DZHW) for their support in providing fund for interviewing and transcription. Kathrin Thomas was Research Associate at City, University of London, when the initial phase of the project started and would like to thank City for its support. Heiko Rauhut acknowledges funding from the SNSF by the Starting Grant BSS-GIO 155981 “Social norms, cooperation and conflict in scientific collaborations”. Authors in alphabetical order. Idea: David Johann. Design: Julia Jerke, David Johann, Heiko Rauhut, Kathrin Thomas. Interviews: Julia Jerke, David Johann, Kathrin Thomas. Coding and Analysis: Julia Jerke, David Johann, Heiko Rauhut, Kathrin Thomas. Text: Julia Jerke, David Johann, Heiko Rauhut, Kathrin Thomas. Final approval of the paper: Julia Jerke, David Johann, Heiko Rauhut, Kathrin ThomasPeer reviewedPublisher PD

Ökonomie der Moral: ein Test der Low–Cost Hypothese zur Durchsetzung sozialer Normen

In Feldstudien konnte häufig mittels der Low–Cost Hypothese gezeigt werden, dass normatives Verhalten von den dafür aufzuwendenden Kosten abhängt. Doch hängt die Durchsetzung einer Norm ebenfalls von der Höhe der Kosten ab? Die Gültigkeit der Low – Cost Hypothese bei diesen kollektiven Gütern zweiter Ordnung ist bislang im Feld wenig erforscht. In unserer Studie wird die Durchsetzung sozialer Normen anhand nachbarschaftlicher Kontrollen analysiert. Es werden Daten einer postalischen Befragung von 631 Personen in Leipzig aus dem Jahr 2001 ausgewertet: Der Zusammenhang zwischen der Befürwortung sozialer Kontrollen und der Bereitschaft, soziale Kontrollen tatsächlich an sich zu erdulden, wird mit steigenden Kosten der zu erduldenden Kontrollhandlungen schwächer. Zudem lässt sich die Logik der Low – Cost Hypothese auf andere soziologische Konstrukte übertragen: Die Wirkung von Kriminalitätsfurcht und Autoritarismus ist umso weniger handlungsrelevant, je höher die Kosten der zu erduldenden Kontrollhandlungen sind. Diese Befunde demonstrieren die Gültigkeit der Low–Cost Hypothese im Zusammenhang mit kollektiven Gütern zweiter Ordnung.:Einleitung; Die Übertragung der Low – Cost Hypothese auf die Durchsetzung sozialer Normen; Datenbasis und Operationalisierung; Schlussfolgerung und AusblickIn field studies, there is evidence that the occurrence of normative behaviour is dependent on its costs. This effect is known as the low cost hypothesis. However, is the enforcement of social norms as well dependent on its costs? So far, there has been little research on the validity of the low – cost hypothesis for so called second order collective goods. In our work, the enforcement of social norms is studied by means of analyzing social control in neighbourhoods. We use data of a mail survey conducted in 2001 in Leipzig, Germany, with 631 respondents: Correlations between approval of social control and willingness to tolerate social control personally decrease with increasing costs to tolerate these control activities. Additionally, the logic of low – cost is transferable to other sociological constructs: The effect of fear of crime and authoritarianism is the less relevant for tolerating social control activities, the higher the costs for these control activities. These empirical findings confirm the low cost hypothesis for the production of second order collective goods.:Einleitung; Die Übertragung der Low – Cost Hypothese auf die Durchsetzung sozialer Normen; Datenbasis und Operationalisierung; Schlussfolgerung und Ausblic