Illusory-correlation effects on implicit and explicit evaluation

Research suggests that people sometimes perceive a relationship between stimuli when no such relationship exists (i.e., illusory correlation). Illusory-correlation effects are thought to play a central role in the formation of stereotypes and evaluations of minority versus majority groups, often leading to less favorable impressions of minorities. Extant theories differ in terms of whether they attribute illusory-correlation effects to processes operating during learning (belief formation) or measurement (belief expression), and whether different evaluation measures should be differentially sensitive to illusory-correlation effects. Past research found mixed evidence for dissociative effects of illusory-correlation manipulations on measures of implicit (i.e., automatic) and explicit (i.e., controlled) evaluation. Four high-powered studies obtained illusory-correlation effects on explicit evaluations, but not implicit evaluations probed with an Implicit Association Test, Evaluative Priming Task, and Affect Misattribution Procedure. The results are consistent with theories that attribute illusory-correlation effects to processes during belief expression

Investigating variation in replicability

Although replication is a central tenet of science, direct replications are rare in psychology. This research tested variation in the replicability of 13 classic and contemporary effects across 36 independent samples totaling 6,344 participants. In the aggregate, 10 effects replicated consistently. One effect – imagined contact reducing prejudice – showed weak support for replicability. And two effects – flag priming influencing conservatism and currency priming influencing system justification – did not replicate. We compared whether the conditions such as lab versus online or US versus international sample predicted effect magnitudes. By and large they did not. The results of this small sample of effects suggest that replicability is more dependent on the effect itself than on the sample and setting used to investigate the effect

Finishing the euchromatic sequence of the human genome

The sequence of the human genome encodes the genetic instructions for human physiology, as well as rich information about human evolution. In 2001, the International Human Genome Sequencing Consortium reported a draft sequence of the euchromatic portion of the human genome. Since then, the international collaboration has worked to convert this draft into a genome sequence with high accuracy and nearly complete coverage. Here, we report the result of this finishing process. The current genome sequence (Build 35) contains 2.85 billion nucleotides interrupted by only 341 gaps. It covers ∼99% of the euchromatic genome and is accurate to an error rate of ∼1 event per 100,000 bases. Many of the remaining euchromatic gaps are associated with segmental duplications and will require focused work with new methods. The near-complete sequence, the first for a vertebrate, greatly improves the precision of biological analyses of the human genome including studies of gene number, birth and death. Notably, the human enome seems to encode only 20,000-25,000 protein-coding genes. The genome sequence reported here should serve as a firm foundation for biomedical research in the decades ahead

Replication data for: Ratliff & Nosek (2011): Negativity and outgroup biases in attitude formation and transfer.

Two studies used an illusory correlation procedure to test whether distinct implicit and explicit evaluations could result from the same learning episode. All participants learned twice as much about the qualities of one group (majority) than another (minority). In one condition, the ratio of positive to negative information was equal between groups. In other conditions, the majority group showed proportionally more positive qualities than the minority group, or vice versa. Participants in the pro-majority and pro-minority conditions formed both implicit and explicit attitudes consistent with the attitude induction. Participants in the illusory correlation condition showed the expected preference for the majority group (the illusory bias), but showed no implicit preference, suggesting distinct influences on implicit and explicit attitude formation. The effects are consistent with dual-process models wherein implicit attitudes reflect accounting of covariation and explicit attitudes reflect interpretative judgments of that covariation

Perceptions of feminist beliefs influence ratings of warmth and competence

Six studies test whether women who label themselves feminists are judged as warmer and less competent than women who express gender-equality beliefs but do not label themselves. An integrative data analysis shows that women who label themselves feminists are seen as less warm and more competent than women who express gender-equality beliefs but do not label themselves. This difference in evaluations is caused by the fact that women who label themselves feminists are seen as having stronger feminist beliefs than women who belief in gender equality but do not use the feminist label. This idea is confirmed by showing that women with strong feminist beliefs are seen as warmer and less competent than women with weak feminist beliefs. In summary, women who label themselves feminists are seen as warmer and less competent than women who express gender-equality beliefs, because it is inferred that the feminist labeler does not have the same, but stronger gender-equality beliefs