A new law on advance directives in Germany

This article presents the new German law on advance directives from 1 September 2009. The history of the parliamentary process of this law is described, the present regulations are explained, their relevance for medical practice discussed and shortcomings are identified. Finally, the new law is compared with other regulations in the international context. Previously established legal practice in Germany has now become largely confirmed by the new law: An advanced directive must be respected in any decision concerning medical treatment, regardless of the stage of the illness. It can be informally revoked at any time, even with limited decision-making capacity. Nobody may be obliged to issue a directive in any way. Advance directives do not need notarisation or routine updating after certain time intervals. Provided that the patient, who is no longer mentally competent, has issued a lasting power of attorney (Bevollmachtiger), or provided that the patient has been appointed a healthcare proxy by the courts (Betreuer), this authorised surrogate must assert the patient's will. The role of the guardianship court is clarified: it only needs to be involved in cases of disagreement as to the patient's will. The new German law thus combines more legal certainty with a liberal emphasis on patient autonomy and flexible, adaptable regulations

How family caregivers' medical and moral assumptions influence decision making for patients in the vegetative state: a qualitative interview study

Background Decisions on limiting life-sustaining treatment for patients in the vegetative state (VS) are emotionally and morally challenging. In Germany, doctors have to discuss, together with the legal surrogate (often a family member), whether the proposed treatment is in accordance with the patient's will. However, it is unknown whether family members of the patient in the VS actually base their decisions on the patient's wishes. Objective To examine the role of advance directives, orally expressed wishes, or the presumed will of patients in a VS for family caregivers' decisions on life-sustaining treatment. Methods and sample A qualitative interview study with 14 next of kin of patients in a VS in a long-term care setting was conducted; 13 participants were the patient's legal surrogates. Interviews were analysed according to qualitative content analysis. Results The majority of family caregivers said that they were aware of aforementioned wishes of the patient that could be applied to the VS condition, but did not base their decisions primarily on these wishes. They gave three reasons for this: (a) the expectation of clinical improvement, (b) the caregivers' definition of life-sustaining treatments and (c) the moral obligation not to harm the patient. If the patient's wishes were not known or not revealed, the caregivers interpreted a will to live into the patient's survival and non-verbal behaviour. Conclusions Whether or not prior treatment wishes of patients in a VS are respected depends on their applicability, and also on the medical assumptions and moral attitudes of the surrogates. We recommend repeated communication, support for the caregivers and advance care planning

Voluntary stopping of eating and drinking: is medical support ethically justified?

Background Physician-assisted dying has been the subject of extensive discussion and legislative activity both in Europe and North America. In this context, dying by voluntary stopping of eating and drinking (VSED) is often proposed, and practiced, as an alternative method of self-determined dying, with medical support for VSED being regarded as ethically and legally justified. Argument In our opinion, this view is flawed. First, we argue that VSED falls within the concept of suicide, albeit with certain unique features (non-invasiveness, initial reversibility, resemblance to the natural dying process). Second, we demonstrate, on the basis of paradigmatic clinical cases, that medically supported VSED is, at least in some instances, tantamount to assisted suicide. This is especially the case if a patient’s choice of VSED depends on the physician’s assurance to provide medical support. Conclusion Thus, for many jurisdictions worldwide, medically supported VSED may fall within the legal prohibitions on suicide assistance. Physicians, lawmakers, and societies should discuss specific ways of regulating medical support for VSED in order to provide clear guidance for both patients and healthcare professionals

The Notion of Neutrality in Clinical Ethics Consultation

Clinical ethics consultation (CEC), as an activity that may be provided by clinical ethics committees and consultants, is nowadays a well-established practice in North America. Although it has been increasingly implemented in Europe and elsewhere, no agreement can be found among scholars and practitioners on the appropriate role or approach the consultant should play when ethically problematic cases involving conflicts and uncertainties come up. In particular, there is no consensus on the acceptability of consultants making recommendations, offering moral advice upon request, and expressing personal opinions. We translate these issues into the question of whether the consultant should be neutral when performing an ethics consultation. We argue that the notion of neutrality 1) functions as a hermeneutical key to review the history of CEC as a whole;2) may be enlightened by a precise assessment of the nature and goals of CEC;3) refers to the normative dimension of CEC. Here, we distinguish four different meanings of neutrality: a neutral stance toward the parties involved in clinical decision making, toward the arguments offered to frame the discussion, toward the values and norms involved in the case, and toward the outcome of decision making, that is to say the final decision and action that will be implemented. Lastly, we suggest a non-authoritarian way to intend the term "recommendation" in the context of clinical ethics consultation

Behandlungsfehler in der Psychotherapie: ein empirischer Beitrag zum Fehlerbegriff und seinen ethischen Aspekten

Zusammenfassung: Behandlungsfehler in der Psychotherapie sind bisher kaum erforscht. Eine empirisch gestützte Kategorisierung von Behandlungsfehlern stellt einen ersten Schritt dar, sich evidenzbasierten ethischen Empfehlungen zum Umgang mit solchen Fehlern zu nähern. Zielsetzung dieser Arbeit ist es, dafür erste Grundlagen zu erarbeiten, die auf Erfahrungen von Praktikern Bezug nehmen. Nach einer systematischen Literaturrecherche wurden 30 semistrukturierte Interviews mit approbierten Psychotherapeuten unterschiedlicher Ausrichtungen (Schulen) geführt und anhand der qualitativen Inhaltsanalyse nach Mayring ausgewertet. Die beschriebenen, alltäglich auftretenden Behandlungsfehler konnten in technische, normative, Einschätzungs- und Systemfehler klassifiziert werden. Viele der technischen und Einschätzungsfehler wurden als reversibel angesehen; sie könnten sogar konstruktiv für die Behandlung nutzbar gemacht werden. Das Versäumnis, einen Fehler zu korrigieren, wurde als Hauptfehler betrachtet. Bei normativen Fehlern sei mit rechtlichen oder berufspolitischen Konsequenzen, aber auch mit Vertrauensverlust und Therapieabbruch zu rechnen. Für Systemfehler fühlten sich die befragten Therapeuten nicht verantwortlich; hier seien berufspolitische Änderungen nötig. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Befragten zu der Empfehlung tendieren, Psychotherapiepatienten in passender Form über Behandlungsfehler aufzuklären und in die entstehenden Konsequenzen einzubeziehen. Fazit: Psychotherapeuten äußern sich aufgeschlossen gegenüber einer transparenten, konstruktiven Fehlerkultur - eine wesentliche Voraussetzung für Fehlerprävention. Häufig resultiert erst durch die fehlende Korrektur eines (alltäglichen) Fehlers ein Behandlungsfehler, der Konsequenzen hat (z.B. Scheitern der Therapie). Um diesem entgegenzuwirken, zeichnet sich eine Befürwortung für eine passende Form der Patientenaufklärung über Fehler ab

Physicians' attitudes toward medical and ethical challenges for patients in the vegetative state: comparing Canadian and German perspectives in a vignette survey

Background: Physicians treating patients in the vegetative state (VS) must deal with uncertainty in diagnosis and prognosis, as well as ethical issues. We examined whether physicians' attitudes toward medical and ethical challenges vary across two national medical practice settings. Methods: A comparative survey was conducted among German and Canadian specialty physicians, based on a case vignette about the VS. Similarities and differences of participants' attitudes toward medical and ethical challenges between the two samples were analyzed with non-parametric tests (Mann-Whitney-U-Test). Results: The overall response rate was 13.4%. Eighty percent of all participants correctly applied the diagnostic category of VS with no significant differences between countries. Many of the participants who chose the correct diagnosis of VS attributed capabilities to the patient, particularly the ability to feel pain (70%), touch (51%) and to experience hunger and thirst (35%). A large majority of participants (94%) considered the limitation of life-sustaining treatment (LST) under certain circumstances, but more Canadian participants were in favor of always limiting LST (32% vs. 12%; Chi-square: p < 0.001). Finding long-term care placement was considered more challenging by Canadian participants whereas discontinuing LST was much more challenging for German participants. Conclusions: Differences were found between two national medical practice settings with respect to physicians' experiences and attitudes about treatment limitation about VS in spite of comparable diagnostic knowledge

Do New Neuroimaging Findings Challenge the Ethical Basis of Advance Directives in Disorders of Consciousness?

Some authors have questioned the moral authority of advance directives (ADs) in cases in which it is not clear if the author of the AD is identical to the person to whom it later applies. This article focuses on the question of whether the latest results of neuroimaging studies have moral significance with regard to the moral authority of ADs in patients with disorders of consciousness (DOCs). Some neuroimaging findings could provide novel insights into the question of whether patients with DOCs exhibit sufficient psychological continuity to be ascribed diachronic personal identity. If those studies were to indicate that psychological continuity is present, they could justify the moral authority of ADs in patients with DOCs. This holds at least if respect for self-determination is considered as the foundation for the moral authority of ADs. The non-identity thesis in DOCs could no longer be applied, in line with clinical and social practice