Introduction

EnThe aim of this paper is to present a principal and two agents model,by which to assess the role of the political cycle in determining the design of the institutions of monetary and of regulatory policy.In particular the specific issue is: should the responsibility of the two policies be concentrated in the hands of the central bank or not? In examining the policymaker's choice between single and multiple authority,two phases are identified,the electoral and non-electoral periods.The conclusion reached is that the electoral cycle is irrelevant,while what is relevant are the costs of "capture"involved in the different institutional scenarios

A stochastic model for financiers

In this work, two models for legal and illegal financiers are presented. The aim of the financiers are different: a bank try to minimize the defalt probabilityof the funded company, while the illegal financier aims to bring the company to bankruptcy and, at the same time, to obtain the maximum level of the firm's guarantee wealth. A couple of stochastic dynamic optimization problems are solved. The illegal case let intervene a numerical analysis of the microeconomic situation of the firm, strating fromreal data and writing new simulation�procedure in Matlab and GAMS. The legal case has been solved in closed-form, by using stochastic control theory.

Introduction: COVID-19 Models and the Difficult Balance between Methods and Values

The article addresses some of the most urgent and pressing issues emerging from the pandemic, tackling them from both an epistemological and an epidemiological point of view, with a focus on different forms of modeling and the impacts they can have in the construction of a common understanding of the disease and its transmission