17 research outputs found
Strategically Equivalent Contests
Using a two-player Tullock-type contest, we show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be strategically equivalent. Strategically equivalent contests generate the same best response functions and, as a result, the same equilibrium efforts. However, strategically equivalent contests may yield different equilibrium payoffs. We propose a simple two-step procedure to identify strategically equivalent contests. Using this procedure, we identify contests that are strategically equivalent to the original Tullock contest, and provide new examples of strategically equivalent contests. Finally, we discuss possible contest design applications and avenues for future theoretical and empirical research
The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information
Sequential all-pay auction, Complete information, Generalized cost, Generalized Stackelberg game, D72, D74,
Unilateral effects of partial acquisitions: consistent calculation of GUPPI under horizontal merger guidelines within the EU
Pricing Internet access in the presence of user loyalty
User behavior, Customer loyalty, Pricing, Internet Service Provider (ISP), Bundling,
Quantity-setting games with a dominant firm
Forchheimer, Dominant firm, Price leadership, D43, L13,
Payoff dominance and risk dominance in the observable delay game: a note
Observable delay, Endogenous role, Payoff dominance, Risk dominance, L13, C72,