Realization of GHZ States and the GHZ Test via Cavity QED

In this article we discuss the realization of atomic GHZ states involving three-level atoms and we show explicitly how to use this state to perform the GHZ test in which it is possible to decide between local realism theories and quantum mechanics. The experimental realizations proposed makes use of the interaction of Rydberg atoms with a cavity prepared in a coherent state.Comment: 16 pages and 3 figures. submitted to J. Mod. Op

Random-phase approximation and its applications in computational chemistry and materials science

The random-phase approximation (RPA) as an approach for computing the electronic correlation energy is reviewed. After a brief account of its basic concept and historical development, the paper is devoted to the theoretical formulations of RPA, and its applications to realistic systems. With several illustrating applications, we discuss the implications of RPA for computational chemistry and materials science. The computational cost of RPA is also addressed which is critical for its widespread use in future applications. In addition, current correction schemes going beyond RPA and directions of further development will be discussed.Comment: 25 pages, 11 figures, published online in J. Mater. Sci. (2012

The turn of the valve: representing with material models

Many scientific models are representations. Building on Goodman and Elgin’s notion of representation-as we analyse what this claim involves by providing a general definition of what makes something a scientific model, and formulating a novel account of how they represent. We call the result the DEKI account of representation, which offers a complex kind of representation involving an interplay of, denotation, exemplification, keying up of properties, and imputation. Throughout we focus on material models, and we illustrate our claims with the Phillips-Newlyn machine. In the conclusion we suggest that, mutatis mutandis, the DEKI account can be carried over to other kinds of models, notably fictional and mathematical models

Applying Bayesian model averaging for uncertainty estimation of input data in energy modelling

Background Energy scenarios that are used for policy advice have ecological and social impact on society. Policy measures that are based on modelling exercises may lead to far reaching financial and ecological consequences. The purpose of this study is to raise awareness that energy modelling results are accompanied with uncertainties that should be addressed explicitly. Methods With view to existing approaches of uncertainty assessment in energy economics and climate science, relevant requirements for an uncertainty assessment are defined. An uncertainty assessment should be explicit, independent of the assessor’s expertise, applicable to different models, including subjective quantitative and statistical quantitative aspects, intuitively understandable and be reproducible. Bayesian model averaging for input variables of energy models is discussed as method that satisfies these requirements. A definition of uncertainty based on posterior model probabilities of input variables to energy models is presented. Results The main findings are that (1) expert elicitation as predominant assessment method does not satisfy all requirements, (2) Bayesian model averaging for input variable modelling meets the requirements and allows evaluating a vast amount of potentially relevant influences on input variables and (3) posterior model probabilities of input variable models can be translated in uncertainty associated with the input variable. Conclusions An uncertainty assessment of energy scenarios is relevant if policy measures are (partially) based on modelling exercises. Potential implications of these findings include that energy scenarios could be associated with uncertainty that is presently neither assessed explicitly nor communicated adequately

Infinitesimal Idealization, Easy Road Nominalism, and Fractional Quantum Statistics

It has been recently debated whether there exists a so-called “easy road” to nominalism. In this essay, I attempt to fill a lacuna in the debate by making a connection with the literature on infinite and infinitesimal idealization in science through an example from mathematical physics that has been largely ignored by philosophers. Specifically, by appealing to John Norton’s distinction between idealization and approximation, I argue that the phenomena of fractional quantum statistics bears negatively on Mary Leng’s proposed path to easy road nominalism, thereby partially defending Mark Colyvan’s claim that there is no easy road to nominalism

On the Mathematical Constitution and Explanation of Physical Facts

The mathematical nature of modern physics suggests that mathematics is bound to play some role in explaining physical reality. Yet, there is an ongoing controversy about the prospects of mathematical explanations of physical facts and their nature. A common view has it that mathematics provides a rich and indispensable language for representing physical reality but that, ontologically, physical facts are not mathematical and, accordingly, mathematical facts cannot really explain physical facts. In what follows, I challenge this common view. I argue that, in addition to its representational role, in modern physics mathematics is constitutive of the physical. Granted the mathematical constitution of the physical, I propose an account of explanation in which mathematical frameworks, structures, and facts explain physical facts. In this account, mathematical explanations of physical facts are either species of physical explanations of physical facts in which the mathematical constitution of some physical facts in the explanans are highlighted, or simply explanations in which the mathematical constitution of physical facts are highlighted. In highlighting the mathematical constitution of physical facts, mathematical explanations of physical facts deepen and increase the scope of the understanding of the explained physical facts. I argue that, unlike other accounts of mathematical explanations of physical facts, the proposed account is not subject to the objection that mathematics only represents the physical facts that actually do the explanation. I conclude by briefly considering the implications that the mathematical constitution of the physical has for the question of the unreasonable effectiveness of the use of mathematics in physics

On the physical impossibility of ideal quantum measurements

Albert and Loewer have argued in this journal [4] that modal interpretations of quantum mechanics are ruled out if the abstract structure of Hilbert space is taken realistically. Their argument contains a dubious inference from a measure-zero set of non-ideal interactions. I look at possible ways to make this inference valid and I conclude that the evidence against the modal interpretation cannot be found in the Hilbert space alone. Instead an analysis of specific cases is required