'Last-place Aversion': Evidence and Redistributive Implications

We present evidence from laboratory experiments showing that individuals are "last-place averse." Participants choose gambles with the potential to move them out of last place that they reject when randomly placed in other parts of the distribution. In modified-dictator games, participants randomly placed in second-to-last place are the most likely to give money to the person one rank above them instead of the person one rank below. Last-place aversion suggests that low-income individuals might oppose redistribution because it could differentially help the group just beneath them. Using survey data, we show that individuals making just above the minimum wage are the most likely to oppose its increase. Similarly, in the General Social Survey, those above poverty but below median income support redistribution significantly less than their background characteristics would predict

"Last-place Aversion": Evidence and Redistributive Implications

Why do low-income individuals often oppose redistribution? We hypothesize that an aversion to being in "last place" undercuts support for redistribution, with low-income individuals punishing those slightly below themselves to keep someone "beneath" them. In laboratory experiments, we find support for "last-place aversion" in the contexts of risk aversion and redistributive preferences. Participants choose gambles with the potential to move them out of last place that they reject when randomly placed in other parts of the distribution. Similarly, in money- transfer games, those randomly placed in second-to-last place are the least likely to costlessly give money to the player one rank below. Last-place aversion predicts that those earning just above the minimum wage will be most likely to oppose minimum-wage increases as they would no longer have a lower-wage group beneath them, a prediction we confirm using survey data.

When feeling good feels "wrong": Avoiding hedonic consumption when it reflects immoral character

Singapore Ministry of EducationOther conferences where this work was presented: Society for Consumer Psychology Boutique: Motivation and Emotions, New York: 2017 and Society for Personality and Social Psychology, San Diego, 2016</p

Evolving choice sets: The effect of dynamic (vs. static) choice sets on preferences

Most decision-making research examines static choice sets, with fixed options presented all at once. In contrast, people often make decisions from dynamic choice sets, in which new alternatives arise during the decision process. We show that compared to a static choice set, a dynamic choice set can systematically affect preferences, even when the final choice is from an identical set of options. Moreover, dynamic presentation can have opposite effects on preferences. To explain these patterns we propose a unified theory based on perceived variance of the attribute distribution. When dynamic presentation increases the perceived variance of a focal attribute, preferences shift towards the option that is best on that attribute. In contrast, when dynamic presentation reduces perceived variance of a focal attribute, preferences shift towards the option that is best on a non-focal attribute. Five studies examine this proposal using asymmetrically dominated and compromise choice sets. © 2021 Elsevier Inc.36 month embargo; first published online 7 April 2021This item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at [email protected]