Social norms of cooperation in small-scale societies

Indirect reciprocity, besides providing a convenient framework to address the evolution of moral systems, offers a simple and plausible explanation for the prevalence of cooperation among unrelated individuals. By helping someone, an individual may increase her/his reputation, which may change the pre-disposition of others to help her/him in the future. This, however, depends on what is reckoned as a good or a bad action, i.e., on the adopted social norm responsible for raising or damaging a reputation. In particular, it remains an open question which social norms are able to foster cooperation in small-scale societies, while enduring the wide plethora of stochastic affects inherent to finite populations. Here we address this problem by studying the stochastic dynamics of cooperation under distinct social norms, showing that the leading norms capable of promoting cooperation depend on the community size. However, only a single norm systematically leads to the highest cooperative standards in small communities. That simple norm dictates that only whoever cooperates with good individuals, and defects against bad ones, deserves a good reputation, a pattern that proves robust to errors, mutations and variations in the intensity of selection.This research was supported by Fundacao para a Ciencia e Tecnologia (FCT) through grants SFRH/BD/94736/2013, PTDC/EEI-SII/5081/2014, PTDC/MAT/STA/3358/2014 and by multi-annual funding of CBMA and INESC-ID (under the projects UID/BIA/04050/2013 and UID/CEC/50021/2013 provided by FCT). The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Indirect Reciprocity under Incomplete Observation

Indirect reciprocity, in which individuals help others with a good reputation but not those with a bad reputation, is a mechanism for cooperation in social dilemma situations when individuals do not repeatedly interact with the same partners. In a relatively large society where indirect reciprocity is relevant, individuals may not know each other's reputation even indirectly. Previous studies investigated the situations where individuals playing the game have to determine the action possibly without knowing others' reputations. Nevertheless, the possibility that observers of the game, who generate the reputation of the interacting players, assign reputations without complete information about them has been neglected. Because an individual acts as an interacting player and as an observer on different occasions if indirect reciprocity is endogenously sustained in a society, the incompleteness of information may affect either role. We examine the game of indirect reciprocity when the reputations of players are not necessarily known to observers and to interacting players. We find that the trustful discriminator, which cooperates with good and unknown players and defects against bad players, realizes cooperative societies under seven social norms. Among the seven social norms, three of the four suspicious norms under which cooperation (defection) to unknown players leads to a good (bad) reputation enable cooperation down to a relatively small observation probability. In contrast, the three trustful norms under which both cooperation and defection to unknown players lead to a good reputation are relatively efficient

Cooperation under Indirect Reciprocity and Imitative Trust

Indirect reciprocity, a key concept in behavioral experiments and evolutionary game theory, provides a mechanism that allows reciprocal altruism to emerge in a population of self-regarding individuals even when repeated interactions between pairs of actors are unlikely. Recent empirical evidence show that humans typically follow complex assessment strategies involving both reciprocity and social imitation when making cooperative decisions. However, currently, we have no systematic understanding of how imitation, a mechanism that may also generate negative effects via a process of cumulative advantage, affects cooperation when repeated interactions are unlikely or information about a recipient's reputation is unavailable. Here we extend existing evolutionary models, which use an image score for reputation to track how individuals cooperate by contributing resources, by introducing a new imitative-trust score, which tracks whether actors have been the recipients of cooperation in the past. We show that imitative trust can co-exist with indirect reciprocity mechanisms up to a threshold and then cooperation reverses -revealing the elusive nature of cooperation. Moreover, we find that when information about a recipient's reputation is limited, trusting the action of third parties towards her (i.e. imitating) does favor a higher collective cooperation compared to random-trusting and share-alike mechanisms. We believe these results shed new light on the factors favoring social imitation as an adaptive mechanism in populations of cooperating social actors

Social Closure and the Evolution of Cooperation via Indirect Reciprocity

Direct and indirect reciprocity are good candidates to explain the fundamental problem of evolution of cooperation. We explore the conditions under which different types of reciprocity gain dominance and their performances in sustaining cooperation in the PD played on simple networks. We confirm that direct reciprocity gains dominance over indirect reciprocity strategies also in larger populations, as long as it has no memory constraints. In the absence of direct reciprocity, or when its memory is flawed, different forms of indirect reciprocity strategies are able to dominate and to support cooperation. We show that indirect reciprocity relying on social capital inherent in closed triads is the best competitor among them, outperforming indirect reciprocity that uses information from any source. Results hold in a wide range of conditions with different evolutionary update rules, extent of evolutionary pressure, initial conditions, population size, and density

Comparison of dynamic monitoring strategies based on CD4 cell counts in virally suppressed, HIV-positive individuals on combination antiretroviral therapy in high-income countries: a prospective, observational study

BACKGROUND: Clinical guidelines vary with respect to the optimal monitoring frequency of HIV-positive individuals. We compared dynamic monitoring strategies based on time-varying CD4 cell counts in virologically suppressed HIV-positive individuals. METHODS: In this observational study, we used data from prospective studies of HIV-positive individuals in Europe (France, Greece, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, and the UK) and North and South America (Brazil, Canada, and the USA) in The HIV-CAUSAL Collaboration and The Centers for AIDS Research Network of Integrated Clinical Systems. We compared three monitoring strategies that differ in the threshold used to measure CD4 cell count and HIV RNA viral load every 3–6 months (when below the threshold) or every 9–12 months (when above the threshold). The strategies were defined by the threshold CD4 counts of 200 cells per μL, 350 cells per μL, and 500 cells per μL. Using inverse probability weighting to adjust for baseline and time-varying confounders, we estimated hazard ratios (HRs) of death and of AIDS-defining illness or death, risk ratios of virological failure, and mean differences in CD4 cell count. FINDINGS: 47 635 individuals initiated an antiretroviral therapy regimen between Jan 1, 2000, and Jan 9, 2015, and met the eligibility criteria for inclusion in our study. During follow-up, CD4 cell count was measured on average every 4·0 months and viral load every 3·8 months. 464 individuals died (107 in threshold 200 strategy, 157 in threshold 350, and 200 in threshold 500) and 1091 had AIDS-defining illnesses or died (267 in threshold 200 strategy, 365 in threshold 350, and 459 in threshold 500). Compared with threshold 500, the mortality HR was 1·05 (95% CI 0·86–1·29) for threshold 200 and 1·02 (0·91·1·14) for threshold 350. Corresponding estimates for death or AIDS-defining illness were 1·08 (0·95–1·22) for threshold 200 and 1·03 (0·96–1·12) for threshold 350. Compared with threshold 500, the 24 month risk ratios of virological failure (viral load more than 200 copies per mL) were 2·01 (1·17–3·43) for threshold 200 and 1·24 (0·89–1·73) for threshold 350, and 24 month mean CD4 cell count differences were 0·4 (−25·5 to 26·3) cells per μL for threshold 200 and −3·5 (−16·0 to 8·9) cells per μL for threshold 350. INTERPRETATION: Decreasing monitoring to annually when CD4 count is higher than 200 cells per μL compared with higher than 500 cells per μL does not worsen the short-term clinical and immunological outcomes of virally suppressed HIV-positive individuals. However, more frequent virological monitoring might be necessary to reduce the risk of virological failure. Further follow-up studies are needed to establish the long-term safety of these strategies. FUNDING National Institutes of Health

Plate-boundary deformation associated with the great Sumatra–Andaman earthquake

The Sumatra–Andaman earthquake of 26 December 2004 is the first giant earthquake (moment magnitude M_w > 9.0) to have occurred since the advent of modern space-based geodesy and broadband seismology. It therefore provides an unprecedented opportunity to investigate the characteristics of one of these enormous and rare events. Here we report estimates of the ground displacement associated with this event, using near-field Global Positioning System (GPS) surveys in northwestern Sumatra combined with in situ and remote observations of the vertical motion of coral reefs. These data show that the earthquake was generated by rupture of the Sunda subduction megathrust over a distance of >1,500 kilometres and a width of <150 kilometres. Megathrust slip exceeded 20 metres offshore northern Sumatra, mostly at depths shallower than 30 kilometres. Comparison of the geodetically and seismically inferred slip distribution indicates that ~30 per cent additional fault slip accrued in the 1.5 months following the 500-second-long seismic rupture. Both seismic and aseismic slip before our re-occupation of GPS sites occurred on the shallow portion of the megathrust, where the large Aceh tsunami originated. Slip tapers off abruptly along strike beneath Simeulue Island at the southeastern edge of the rupture, where the earthquake nucleated and where an M_w = 7.2 earthquake occurred in late 2002. This edge also abuts the northern limit of slip in the 28 March 2005 M_w = 8.7 Nias–Simeulue earthquake

The Evolution of Compact Binary Star Systems

We review the formation and evolution of compact binary stars consisting of white dwarfs (WDs), neutron stars (NSs), and black holes (BHs). Binary NSs and BHs are thought to be the primary astrophysical sources of gravitational waves (GWs) within the frequency band of ground-based detectors, while compact binaries of WDs are important sources of GWs at lower frequencies to be covered by space interferometers (LISA). Major uncertainties in the current understanding of properties of NSs and BHs most relevant to the GW studies are discussed, including the treatment of the natal kicks which compact stellar remnants acquire during the core collapse of massive stars and the common envelope phase of binary evolution. We discuss the coalescence rates of binary NSs and BHs and prospects for their detections, the formation and evolution of binary WDs and their observational manifestations. Special attention is given to AM CVn-stars -- compact binaries in which the Roche lobe is filled by another WD or a low-mass partially degenerate helium-star, as these stars are thought to be the best LISA verification binary GW sources.Comment: 105 pages, 18 figure