Electroencephalogram of Healthy Horses During Inhaled Anesthesia

BACKGROUND: Previous study of the diagnostic validity of electroencephalography (EEG) to detect abnormalities in equine cerebral cortical function relied on the administration of various drugs for sedation, induction, and maintenance of general anesthesia but used identical criteria to interpret recordings. OBJECTIVES: To determine the effects of 2 inhalation anesthetics on the EEG of healthy horses. ANIMALS: Six healthy horses. METHODS: Prospective study. After the sole administration of one of either isoflurane or halothane at 1.2, 1.4, and 1.6 times the minimum alveolar concentration, EEG was recorded during controlled ventilation, spontaneous ventilation, and nerve stimulation. RESULTS: Burst suppression was observed with isoflurane, along with EEG events that resembled epileptiform discharges. Halothane results were variable between horses, with epileptiform‐like discharges and bursts of theta, alpha, and beta recorded intermittently. One horse died and 2 were euthanized as the result of anesthesia‐related complications. CONCLUSIONS AND CLINICAL IMPORTANCE: The results of this study indicate that the effects of halothane and isoflurane on EEG activity in the normal horse can be quite variable, even when used in the absence of other drugs. It is recommended that equine EEG be performed without the use of these inhalation anesthetics and that general anesthesia be induced and maintained by other contemporary means

Wild justice and fair play: cooperation, forgiveness, and morality in animals

Abstract. In this paper I argue that we can learn much about ‘wild justice ’ and the evolutionary origins of social morality – behaving fairly – by studying social play behavior in group-living animals, and that interdisciplinary cooperation will help immensely. In our efforts to learn more about the evolution of morality we need to broaden our comparative research to include animals other than non-human primates. If one is a good Darwinian, it is premature to claim that only humans can be empathic and moral beings. By asking the question ‘What is it like to be another animal? ’ we can discover rules of engagement that guide animals in their social encounters. When I study dogs, for example, I try to be a ‘dogocentrist ’ and practice ‘dogomorphism. ’ My major arguments center on the following ‘big ’ questions: Can animals be moral beings or do they merely act as if they are? What are the evolutionary roots of cooperation, fairness, trust, forgiveness, and morality? What do animals do when they engage in social play? How do animals negotiate agreements to cooperate, to forgive, to behave fairly, to develop trust? Can animals forgive? Why cooperate and play fairly? Why did play evolve as it has? Does ‘being fair ’ mean being more fit – do individual variations in play influence an individual’s reproductive fitness, are more virtuous individuals more fit than less virtuous individuals? What is the taxonomic distribution of cognitiv