Social Dilemmas and Cooperation in Complex Networks

In this paper we extend the investigation of cooperation in some classical evolutionary games on populations were the network of interactions among individuals is of the scale-free type. We show that the update rule, the payoff computation and, to some extent the timing of the operations, have a marked influence on the transient dynamics and on the amount of cooperation that can be established at equilibrium. We also study the dynamical behavior of the populations and their evolutionary stability.Comment: 12 pages, 7 figures. to appea

Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on hierarchical lattices

An evolutionary prisoner's dilemma (PD) game is studied with players located on a hierarchical structure of layered square lattices. The players can follow two strategies [D (defector) and C (cooperator)] and their income comes from PD games with the ``neighbors.'' The adoption of one of the neighboring strategies is allowed with a probability dependent on the payoff difference. Monte Carlo simulations are performed to study how the measure of cooperation is affected by the number of hierarchical levels (Q) and by the temptation to defect. According to the simulations the highest frequency of cooperation can be observed at the top level if the number of hierarchical levels is low (Q<4). For larger Q, however, the highest frequency of cooperators occurs in the middle layers. The four-level hierarchical structure provides the highest average (total) income for the whole community.Comment: appendix adde

Experimental analysis of lateral impact on planar brittle material

The fragmentation of alumina and glass plates due to lateral impact is studied. A few hundred plates have been fragmented at different impact velocities and the produced fragments are analyzed. The method employed in this work allows one to investigate some geometrical properties of the fragments, besides the traditional size distribution usually studied in former experiments. We found that, although both materials exhibit qualitative similar fragment size distribution function, their geometrical properties appear to be quite different. A schematic model for two-dimensional fragmentation is also presented and its predictions are compared to our experimental results. The comparison suggests that the analysis of the fragments' geometrical properties constitutes a more stringent test of the theoretical models' assumptions than the size distribution

Extreme value statistics and return intervals in long-range correlated uniform deviates

We study extremal statistics and return intervals in stationary long-range correlated sequences for which the underlying probability density function is bounded and uniform. The extremal statistics we consider e.g., maximum relative to minimum are such that the reference point from which the maximum is measured is itself a random quantity. We analytically calculate the limiting distributions for independent and identically distributed random variables, and use these as a reference point for correlated cases. The distributions are different from that of the maximum itself i.e., a Weibull distribution, reflecting the fact that the distribution of the reference point either dominates over or convolves with the distribution of the maximum. The functional form of the limiting distributions is unaffected by correlations, although the convergence is slower. We show that our findings can be directly generalized to a wide class of stochastic processes. We also analyze return interval distributions, and compare them to recent conjectures of their functional form

Renormalization group theory for finite-size scaling in extreme statistics

We present a renormalization group (RG) approach to explain universal features of extreme statistics, applied here to independent, identically distributed variables. The outlines of the theory have been described in a previous Letter, the main result being that finite-size shape corrections to the limit distribution can be obtained from a linearization of the RG transformation near a fixed point, leading to the computation of stable perturbations as eigenfunctions. Here we show details of the RG theory which exhibit remarkable similarities to the RG known in statistical physics. Besides the fixed points explaining universality, and the least stable eigendirections accounting for convergence rates and shape corrections, the similarities include marginally stable perturbations which turn out to be generic for the Fisher-Tippett-Gumbel class. Distribution functions containing unstable perturbations are also considered. We find that, after a transitory divergence, they return to the universal fixed line at the same or at a different point depending on the type of perturbation.Comment: 15 pages, 8 figures, to appear in Phys. Rev.

Evolution of Coordination in Social Networks: A Numerical Study

Coordination games are important to explain efficient and desirable social behavior. Here we study these games by extensive numerical simulation on networked social structures using an evolutionary approach. We show that local network effects may promote selection of efficient equilibria in both pure and general coordination games and may explain social polarization. These results are put into perspective with respect to known theoretical results. The main insight we obtain is that clustering, and especially community structure in social networks has a positive role in promoting socially efficient outcomes.Comment: preprint submitted to IJMP

Conditional strategies and the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games

The fact that individuals will most likely behave differently in different situations begets the introduction of conditional strategies. Inspired by this, we study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game, where besides unconditional cooperators and defectors, also different types of conditional cooperators compete for space. Conditional cooperators will contribute to the public good only if other players within the group are likely to cooperate as well, but will withhold their contribution otherwise. Depending on the number of other cooperators that are required to elicit cooperation of a conditional cooperator, the latter can be classified in as many types as there are players within each group. We find that the most cautious cooperators, such that require all other players within a group to be conditional cooperators, are the undisputed victors of the evolutionary process, even at very low synergy factors. We show that the remarkable promotion of cooperation is due primarily to the spontaneous emergence of quarantining of defectors, which become surrounded by conditional cooperators and are forced into isolated convex "bubbles" from where they are unable to exploit the public good. This phenomenon can be observed only in structured populations, thus adding to the relevance of pattern formation for the successful evolution of cooperation.Comment: 7 two-column pages, 7 figures; accepted for publication in Physical Review

Evolutionary Dynamics of Populations with Conflicting Interactions: Classification and Analytical Treatment Considering Asymmetry and Power

Evolutionary game theory has been successfully used to investigate the dynamics of systems, in which many entities have competitive interactions. From a physics point of view, it is interesting to study conditions under which a coordination or cooperation of interacting entities will occur, be it spins, particles, bacteria, animals, or humans. Here, we analyze the case, where the entities are heterogeneous, particularly the case of two populations with conflicting interactions and two possible states. For such systems, explicit mathematical formulas will be determined for the stationary solutions and the associated eigenvalues, which determine their stability. In this way, four different types of system dynamics can be classified, and the various kinds of phase transitions between them will be discussed. While these results are interesting from a physics point of view, they are also relevant for social, economic, and biological systems, as they allow one to understand conditions for (1) the breakdown of cooperation, (2) the coexistence of different behaviors ("subcultures"), (2) the evolution of commonly shared behaviors ("norms"), and (4) the occurrence of polarization or conflict. We point out that norms have a similar function in social systems that forces have in physics

Extreme value distributions and Renormalization Group

In the classical theorems of extreme value theory the limits of suitably rescaled maxima of sequences of independent, identically distributed random variables are studied. So far, only affine rescalings have been considered. We show, however, that more general rescalings are natural and lead to new limit distributions, apart from the Gumbel, Weibull, and Fr\'echet families. The problem is approached using the language of Renormalization Group transformations in the space of probability densities. The limit distributions are fixed points of the transformation and the study of the differential around them allows a local analysis of the domains of attraction and the computation of finite-size corrections.Comment: 16 pages, 5 figures. Final versio

Social Network Reciprocity as a Phase Transition in Evolutionary Cooperation

In Evolutionary Dynamics the understanding of cooperative phenomena in natural and social systems has been the subject of intense research during decades. We focus attention here on the so-called "Lattice Reciprocity" mechanisms that enhance evolutionary survival of the cooperative phenotype in the Prisoner's Dilemma game when the population of darwinian replicators interact through a fixed network of social contacts. Exact results on a "Dipole Model" are presented, along with a mean-field analysis as well as results from extensive numerical Monte Carlo simulations. The theoretical framework used is that of standard Statistical Mechanics of macroscopic systems, but with no energy considerations. We illustrate the power of this perspective on social modeling, by consistently interpreting the onset of lattice reciprocity as a thermodynamical phase transition that, moreover, cannot be captured by a purely mean-field approach.Comment: 10 pages. APS styl